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**CENTRE FOR ADVANCED STRATEGIC STUDIES**

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**PROCEEDINGS OF SEMINAR**

**ON**

**REGIONAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT TO THE  
NORTH-WEST OF INDIA  
WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO AFGHANISTAN**

**21ST - 22ND MARCH, 1997**

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**SEMINAR****REGIONAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT  
TO THE NORTH-WEST OF INDIA  
WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE  
TO AFGHANISTAN****21st - 22nd March, 1997****( Venue : Auditorium, National Film Archives, India )****BACKGROUND PAPER****Introduction**

India has had interaction with Central Asia for many millennia. Almost all the invaders of India have burst into India from Central Asia, the Kushans, Scythians, Mahomed Ghor, Genghis Khan, Timur, Babar and Nadir Shah. This interaction over the centuries has left its mark on India, some good and some bad. Indian culture, particularly in northern India is heavily influenced by Central Asia. Indian traders have traded in such far off places as Urumchi in Sinkiang, Kubishev in Russia and Kazan in Tataristan.

Central Asia was at one time a very prosperous and cultured area. Mazar-e-Sharif is known as the oldest city in the world. Samarkand and Bukhara were on the silk route linking China with Western Europe and were famous for their beautiful buildings as well as for their being seats of learning.

The population of the Central Asian area is predominantly Muslim. The combination of a colonial past, poverty and remembrance of their past Islamic glory is the recipe for fundamentalism. This was dormant during the Soviet overlordship. It shows clear signs of emerging as a political force. At some stage or the other one must expect it to become virulent.

## India and the Region

Tagore's Kabuliwallah symbolised the happy relationship and mutual respect between India and Afghanistan. Cultural bonds remained deep and trade relations healthy and cordial. India took care at diplomatic level to reinforce this cordiality. India was one of the first countries to recognise the Rabbani-Masood Government of Kabul. It had the full support of the Afghan Government in the international fora on all issues, including the Kashmir issue. Afghanistan took keen interest in the activities of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM).

Considering the fast changing and extremely fluid political and military situation in Afghanistan, India adopted a benign policy of non-intrusive interference in its internal affairs. It resulted in keeping its goodwill intact with the various factions, which enables India to be in an advantageous position in dealing with the country when the situation clears and stabilises.

Through energetic high level diplomatic efforts, India established healthy and cordial relations with the CAS, at the earliest opportunity. These included the visits of the Indian Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister to these countries. The CAS reciprocated. The Presidents of some of the CAS visited India. Bilateral as well as Tripartite Agreements (involving Iran) on crucial economic and trade related issues were signed. The congruity of economic interests is being deepened and the area enlarged to include Iran into the fold.

British and Russian imperialism clashed in Central Asia and came to a mutual understanding of the northern zone as Russian sphere of influence, the southern as British influence with a buffer zone in between as no man's land. Independent India perhaps lacked the political will and the vision to continue this Curzonian policy.

### Central Asian States (CAS)

With the break up of the Soviet Union, Central Asian States have emerged once again as an important factor in global policy. One of the Central Asian Republics - Kazakistan is a nuclear power. Although de-jure free of Russian overlordship the Central Asian republics are still

heavily dependent on Russia and will remain so for at least a few more decades. They realise that their natural allies are their southern neighbours, with whom they can trade on more equal terms. But the agenda of the external actors creates problems and constraints.

Landlocked Central Asian States appear to hold the key to energy security in the 21st century. Experts believe that the untapped hydrocarbon resources could make the region the "Persian Gulf" for the next century. Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan oil fields are believed to have significant amount of oil reserves and largest gas reserves are believed to be in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Export routes out of Central Asia have now become one of the central issues in the post cold war politics among big powers. Geopolitics of oil as also geopolitics of the region is ripe for an incipient cold war.

Existing pipeline routes run north through Russia via Chechenya, one system serving Russia and the other - the export market via its Black Sea port of Novorossik. The CAS would prefer to loosen the Russian stranglehold by efforts to establish alternate routes. They are receiving substantial support of the Multi National Corporations, by the US, China, Iran and other countries. Russia views this as interventionism and insists on being a party to any deal to control flow of oil and gas from Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan.

### **The US Factor**

The US Exxon, the Chinese State Oil Company and the Japanese Mitsubishi Corporation are conducting feasibility studies for gas pipeline from Turkmenistan to the Pacific, a distance of 4900 miles. The US oil giant Chevron invested over a billion dollars into tapping the reserves in Kazakhstan for developing its Tengiz oil field in a 20 billion dollars deal. The US would like control over oil reserves and export routes. It appears determined to shut Iran out of the emerging oil game.

The US oil giants UNOCAL and Delta Oil have completed a feasibility study for a multi-billion dollar oil and gas pipeline project from Turkmenistan through Afghanistan to Sui in Pakistan. Pakistan ports being nearest to the CAS offer an attractive proposition. The

1600 km southern route from Kandahar into Karachi is half the distance of the route to Iran. Afghanistan remains the key to Pakistan's geopolitical access to Central Asia. The UNOCAL Executive Vice President, Chris Taggart stated that his company was providing "non-cash bonus payments" to Taliban in return for their cooperation. The UNOCAL signed a three billion dollar contract for a gas pipeline with the Turkmen government just after Taliban took over Herat in September, 1995, a strategically located town for the pipeline project. Incidentally the "Brown Amendment" waiving restrictions on exports to Pakistan came soon thereafter.

The US supported Rabbani-Masood bid for power after Soviet withdrawal till March 1994. When it found them more concerned with pursuing their national interests and not pliable to promote US interests, it veered to Taliban with indirect support, said to be of the order of 404 million dollars worth military supplies, between October, 1995 to August, 1996. It is also suspected of using Saudi Arabia to channel funds to Taliban. The US Assistant Secretary of State for South and South West Asia Ms Robin Raphel made three visits to Taliban controlled areas since 1995, the last one was two months before Taliban assault on Kabul. US Senator Hank Brown visited Taliban Headquarters in mid 1996. The US also kept regular contact with General Dostum since his ostensible private visit to the US in 1996. Taliban support to terrorists and large scale human rights violations have evoked US condemnation. The US interest is economic in nature. A friendly regime in Kabul could be a spring-board, a pressure point against Iran, India, Russia and also China. It could also help in curbing the drug barons of Afghanistan. The US has kept lines of communications open with various factions in Afghanistan. It has succeeded in establishing special relationship with Uzbekistan. However, the European business companies would also like to secure CAS markets irrespective of American interests.

### Iran Factor

Iran, since the end of 1994, after the Taliban attack on Shias extended support to the Rabbani regime in Afghanistan. It helped General Dostum-Masood get together. It wants to keep out American influence in Afghanistan and with Russian backing is constantly airlifting supplies to Mazar-e-Sharif. On 13 May 96, Iran inaugurated

a 300 km. rail link between Mashhad in Iran and the Turkmen town of Tedzen via Sarakhs which gives CAS access to Iran's port in the Persian Gulf. It concluded with Kazakhstan an oil swap deal on 11 May 96 making available in exchange for crude, oil to customers of Kazakhstan calling at Iran's Kharg island or other Gulf ports, initially 2 mn tons per year to go upto 6 mn tons over 10 years. Work on Iran-Turkmenistan 40 inch gasline is in progress. Iran is accepted as a more stable economic partner by the CAS.

### Afghanistan

Afghanistan has been a meeting ground for imperial rivalry as well as Super Power confrontation. The Pakhtoons comprise 60 p.c. of the nearly 2 crore population of Afghanistan, bulk of them agriculturists and are settled in the regions south of Jalalabad- Kabul-Herat road. The Tadziks, mostly in the Panjshir valley account for 31 percent, the Uzbegs in Central North Afghanistan around Mazar-e-Sharif, 5 percent, the Hazaras astride Hindukush in Central Afghanistan, 3 percent and Turkmens around and north of Herat, less than one percent. A sizeable portion of the population is Shiaite. Afghanistan does not accept the Durand time demarcating its international border with Pakistan on the ground that the Agreement of 1883 after the Second Afghan War and subsequent treaties concluded in 1905, 1921 and 1930 were signed under duress.

### US-Pakistan Axis And Repurcussions

Pakistan tried to hoist a pliant regime in Afghanistan to acquire strategic depth and an access to CAS creating regional de-pendency on Islambad to ensure traffic safety. It broke off with its protege, Gulbudin Hekmatyar a Pushtun, as he got close to terrorists and to Iran. It started upgrading Chaman-Kandahar highway but had to postpone the project due to strong protests from Afghan factions. It supported Naseerullah Babar's Taliban to secure the route, through training camps, military personnel and weapons with the tacit concurrence of the US, and Saudi funds enabling it to capture Kabul. ISI and Pak frontier troops are reported to have fought alongside Taliban. Taliban's push north of Kabul brought together General Dostum, Masood and karim Khalile of the Shiaite Hizb-e-Wahdat. Its harsh imposition of Shariat, large scale human rights violations and



laundering of drug money evoked universal condemnation. The ethnic overtones have set alarm bells ringing. The Presidents of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgystan and the Russian Prime Minister, Chernomyrdin got together in Almaty, capital of Kazakstan on 5 Oct 96 and threatened to use force against Taliban if it crossed into any of the CAS territory. Turkmenistan President, Niyazov did not attend the summit, not being a member of the Tashkent collective treaty of 1992. Eager to see construction work on the pipeline to begin and wanting "balanced and friendly relations" with all Afghan groups he did not want to antagonise Taliban. As per the recent reports, Russia and Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) plan to raise two armed divisions for deployment on borders to checkmate Taliban. Russia does not want another Chechenya on its hands. The provinces of Tatarstan, Daghestan, Ossetia, and some other Caucasian regions with overwhelming Muslim population might be afflicted by the "fundamental virus." It is reported that Ahmed Shah Masood has been forced to operate from Tajik territory as Taliban has destroyed practically all military airbases under his control.

### **China on Guard**

The real worry for China is its vulnerability in the Central Asian region, due to tribal loyalties and ethnic spread across international borders. Sudden unleashing of "democracy" and ethno-nationalism broke down the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. There are reports about unrest in Xingjiang and there is a secessionist movement. The Chinese have expressed concern at Taliban militia hobnobbing with Muslims in its Xingjiang province and their displeasure through Pakistan.

### **Afghan Civil War - Its Toll, Fallouts And Implications**

The Afghan civil war has killed 50000 to 60000 persons. Over 2,50,000 people mostly women and professionals are reported to have fled since the fall of Kabul to Taliban. This prompted a non-Pushtun realignment which along with the pro-Iranian Shias stalled the Taliban's advance. "Kalashnikov Culture" has become an indigenous phenomenon across the Pakistan Afghanistan frontiers.

There is much more to the Afghan civil war than meets the eye. The divided tribal loyalties of the Afghan society, with each ethnic

faction supported by outside mentors may result in disintegration of Afghanistan if the civil war continues for long. This will have grave implications for the adjoining multi-ethnic countries namely India, China, Russia, the CAS and Iran. Afghanistan is incapable of resolving internal contradictions as these are trapped in the agenda of external powers. The long term agenda of the United States in prolonging the Afghan civil war to keep on exerting pressure on India, China, Russia and Iran - the countries uncomfortable with the goal of a unipolar world led by the US, is extremely worrisome. Henry Kissinger addressing a distinguished audience during his very recent visit to India in the second week of March, 1997 spoke of China definitely emerging as a Super Power soon and the need for the US for a "restructured cold war strategy."

Trapped in the agenda of external powers, the CAS face the difficult challenge of how to deal with the dynamics of ethnic and regional realignments. At the same time they have to safeguard and promote their national interests specially on the economic front. They direly need Russian help at this juncture as the possibility of realignment of forces along traditional lines of ethnicity, tribalism and sectarianism looms large. Russia too needs to pursue its "near abroad policies" to stave off the danger to itself. The entire region to the North-West of India (including the Persian Gulf) is churning and going through a flux. The likelihood of the repercussions on the region and the adjoining countries being as explosive as the post Glasnost-Perestroika phase for the Soviet Union cannot be totally ruled out. The affected countries including Russia, China, Iran and India need accurate intelligence, assessment of the variable factors and prompt responses displaying statesmanship of a very high order to meet the challenge and safeguard their national interests.

### Conclusion

India has had to face a proxy war for many years from across its borders. Pakistan, specially the ISI has indulged in clandestine export of terrorism, mercenaries, drugs and arms for many years. Afghanistan and Pakistan straddling the southern route to the oil-gas rich CAS have acquired enough strategic importance to attract US attention and largesse, to use them to subserve its interests. The security bonds between Russia and the CAS are becoming active and stronger as a counter-measure against the likely fallout of the Afghan civil war. A

vivisection of Afghanistan on ethnic lines would have extremely serious implications for Pakistan as also India, Russia, China, Iran and the CAS. The situation is fluid. Notwithstanding the present Pakistani overtures, and a semblance of "stability" in J&K. India needs to keep a very close watch over the developments in the region and keep its options open till the situation becomes clearer.

### PROCEEDINGS OF THE SEMINAR

Air Marshal (Retd) S. Kulkarni, Director, Centre for Advanced Strategic Studies (CASS) opened the Seminar and welcomed the distinguished guests. He welcomed all the participants of the Seminar.

The Seminar was chaired by Shri R.D. Sathe, former Foreign Secretary. A journalist of repute Dr. V.P. Vaidik as the main speaker in the first session spoke on "Current Situation in Afghanistan : Policies of India, Neighbouring Countries And Super Powers Towards Afghanistan - A Global and Regional Perspective ; What India needs to do to safeguard and promote its interests." Mr. Sushant Sarin of the "Public Opinion Trends" (POT), New Delhi, spoke on "Pakistan and Its Influence an Afghanistan." as the main speaker in the second session.

Admiral (Retd) J.G. Nadkarni, chaired the sessions on the following day, i.e. on 22 Mar. 97. In the third session, Professor Ram Bapat ex-Pune University, spoke on "Central Asian Republics, Iran and Afghanistan : Islam Factor." The other main speaker, Shri Stobdan, Fellow of the Institute of Defence Studies And Analyses (IDSA), New Delhi spoke on "Central Asian Republics, Iran and Afghanistan : Overview". Lt Gen (Retd) Ashok Joshi, Chhatrapati Professor for Policy Analyses, Pune University was the main speaker in the fourth session. He spoke on "Regional Security Environment To The North-West of India With Special Reference To Afghanistan : Implications for India."

After presentation by the main speakers, the subject was thrown open for general discussion at the end of each session, and again at the end of the last, that is the fourth session. This proved animated, educative, thought provoking and lively.

## OPENING REMARKS BY THE CHAIRMAN

R D SATHE

May I first of all say how happy I am to be presiding over this particular seminar. I have a personal interest in this area, having served in Afghanistan for two and a half years, two years in Sinkiang, four and a half years in Iran and also in Moscow, as well as in China, practically in all the countries bordering on the areas on which we are speaking today.

It has been a great pleasure for me to renew my acquaintance with Dr.Vaidik, whom I have known for quite a number of years. Perhaps many of you may not know, he is probably one of our foremost experts on Afghanistan. He has been studying Afghanistan for the last 30 odd years, and has known almost every single important leader of Afghanistan from the time of President Daud onwards. He has also been associated with a number of other countries like Pakistan as well, which he visited not so long ago. So we are very fortunate in having him here as our speaker this morning.

I would like to also welcome and say a few words about Mr.Sushant Sarin, who is looking after the area which we are discussing today. His father founded the institution called Public Opinion Trends (POT) which analysed for the benefit of scholars studying in Central Asia and the Indian sub-continent, in particular the vernacular press in all these countries and it is of great importance for us not necessarily to go by what the English Press has to say but what the vernacular press has to say as well and in that respect Mr.Sushant Sarin has been associated with the POT ever since he was out of college.

We also have Mr.Stobdan, who was associated with Jawaharlal Nehru University in Delhi, joined IDSA. Thereafter he has been studying Central Asia and has been writing extensively on Central Asia.

We are particularly happy to have such a distinguished panel of speakers on the subject. Two other speakers who will be participating in the seminar are Dr.Ram Bapat, ex-Pune University and Lt Gen

(Retd) Ashok Joshi, Chhatrapati Shivaji Professor for Policy Analyses, Pune University. I would like to say how grateful and how happy we are that they are able to participate in this seminar.

I hope all of you have already received the summary, the background paper on this area. It is quite a comprehensive paper and I hope it will provide the background to the discussions that are to take place.

The object of the seminar is obviously to find out whether we are going in the right direction in our policy towards this area and if so how to strengthen our position. If we are not, then we would like to know that we are making mistake and how it can be corrected.

It is an area for which India has a great deal to thank. The ancestors of more than half the audience here today have come from Central Asia. I have probably heard special music, Indian music in Kabul. You will be surprised that every time I went to Kabul, the warmth with which I was received was unbelievable and I am talking about from the time from 1956 onwards.

Many of you will remember well. It really was some thing that was incredibly beautiful, the relationship that existed between the people of those countries and India. We had our differences with the governments all along. Nevertheless there was an understanding and desire on the part of both the governments, in some cases more ardent than others, but we had to support each other and we did it.

↓ SESSION I : सत्र १



**CURRENT SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN : A GLOBAL AND REGIONAL PERSPECTIVE**

**अफगानिस्तान की आद्य स्थिति : उसके प्रति भारत की,  
पड़ोसी राष्ट्रों की और महाशक्तियों की नीतियां :  
भारत के लिये क्या श्रेयस्कर ?**

**Chairman :** अध्यक्ष

**Shri. R. D. Sathe :** श्री. राम साठे

**Main Speaker :** प्रमुख वक्ता

**Dr. V. P. Vaidik :** डॉ. वैदिक

**PAPER PRESENTED BY Dr. V. P. VAIDIK**

**प्रस्तुतीकरण - डॉ. वैदिक**

आदरणीय श्री. राम साहेबजी, जनरल जोशीजी, श्री. सुशांत सरिनजी, श्री. राम बापटजी और श्री. स्तोब्दनजी, पुणे के सुसंस्कृत नागरिक गण, देवियो एवं सज्जनो । मुझे क्षमा करे कि मैं हिंदी में बोल रहा हूँ । और यह समझ के बोल रहा हूँ कि इस पुणे की पुण्यनगरी के लोग इतने उदार हैं कि एक दूसरी भारतीय भाषा में भी बात को सुन सकते हैं, समझ सकते हैं, और उसपर अपनी राय जाहिर कर सकते हैं ।

आज मुझे आदेश हुआ है एअर मार्शल कुलकर्णीजीका की मैं अफगानिस्तानके संबंधमें, भारतकी नीतियोंके बारेमें बोलू और इसके अलावा पड़ोसी देशोंकी उस अभागे देश के बारेमें क्या नीतियाँ हैं और जो महाशक्तियाँ हैं जैसे अमेरिका, ब्रिटन और पुराना सोव्हिएट संघ और अबका रूस इन सबकी नीतियाँ क्या रही हैं । और हमारा हित अफगानिस्तानमें कैसे संपादित हो सकता है ।

राम साठेजी यहां विराजमान हैं । अफगानिस्तानमें उन्होंने एक साधारण डिप्लोमेट की तरह और भारतके विदेश सचिव जो कि सर्वोच्च पद है कुटनीति के क्षेत्र में उसके नाते बड़ी गहरी दिलचस्पी ली है । राम साठेके विदेश मंत्रालय छोडने के बाद और श्रीमती इंदिरा गांधी के अवसान के बाद हमारे पास अफगानिस्तान के बारेमें कोई ठोस नीति

कभी रही नहीं। आखरी प्रयत्न स्वयं राम साठेजी ने किया था। ५ जनवरी १९८१ को वे स्वयं काबुल पहुंचे थे और उनकी भेंट तत्कालीन प्रधानमंत्री बब्रक कार्मलके साथ हुई थी। उसी जनवरी के पूरे एक महीने में अफगानिस्तानमें रहा और बब्रक कार्मल जो कि मेरे बहुत पुराने दोस्त थे प्रधानमंत्री बननेके बाद उनसे कई बार मेरी भेंट हुई। उस अवसरपर आखरी बार भारत अफगानिस्तानके बारेमें बहुत बड़े कदम उठानेके लिये तैयार हुआ था। श्री बब्रक कार्मलने मुझसे कहा था कि अगर श्रीमती इंदिरा गांधी और आपका विदेश मंत्रालय प्रयत्न करे और आठ दस गुटनिरपेक्ष राष्ट्र उनके फौजी अगर बुलादे तो मैं गद्दी खाली करने को तैयार हूँ। जो काम डॉ. नजीबुल्लाने १९८२ में किया और ठीक ढंगसे नहीं किया और विफल हुए, फंस गये और बादमें मारे गये वही काम बहुत अच्छे ढंगसे बब्रक कार्मल करना चाहते थे। और चाहते थे कि सोविएट संघ नहीं इसमें भारत अगवाई करे। क्योंकि भारतके प्रति उनकी आस्था थी। और उन्होंने मुझे एक बहुत बड़ी मजेदार बात कही थी कि उस वक्त जिसे मैं बहुत पहले से मानता था कि जो अफगान लोग बब्रक कार्मलके खिलाफ है, सोविएट संघ के खिलाफ थे भारतके भी खिलाफ बोलते थे, उनकी भी पाकिस्तानके बजाय अमेरिका की बजाय, इरानके बजाय, भारतमें कहीं अधिक आस्था थी। याने पूरा अफगानिस्तान चाहे वो प्रो. सोविएट हो या अँटी सोविएट हो, प्रो-पाकिस्तान हो या अँटी पाकिस्तान हो कुल मिलाके भारतके प्रति आस्थावान है। और बब्रक कार्मलका यह कहना कि इस आस्था का आप लोग फायदा उठा सकते हैं। भारतकी लीडरशिपमें भारतके नेतृत्व में अफगानिस्तानकी समस्या को हल किया जा सकता है।

१९८३-८४ के बाद उस सिलसिलेमें कई बार मुझे पाकिस्तान भी जाना पडा, पेशावर गया, सारे मुजाहिद्दीन लीडरोंसे, रब्बानीसे, सय्याबसे, मुजद्दिदीनसेभी मैंने बात की। मैं रोम भी गया। बादशाह जाहीरशाहसे भी मेरी बात हुई। उनकी बेटी मरिअम जो मेरे साथ पढती थी काबुलमें - प्रिन्सेस मरिअम - लंडनमें उनसे यह बात हुई। कई इनिशिएटिव्हज लेनेकी हमने कोशिश की। लेकिन उसके बादसे भारतकी जो नीति रही बहुतही मुझे कहनेमें लज्जा अनुभव होती है कि पीछे पीछे चलनेकी रही, अनुगामीकी नीति रही, नेता की नीति नहीं रही। अनुसरण करनेवाली नीति रही। आज भारतकी नीति क्या है इसपर जरा हम विचार करें।

तालीबान सत्तारूढ होने के बाद तालीबानोंके नेताने बयान दिया कि हम भारतके खिलाफ नहीं हैं। भारतसे हमारा क्या झगडा है? यह ठीक है कि कुछ लोग काश्मीरमें चले गये। काश्मीर तो रब्बानीके लोग भी गये थे, हिकमतयार के लोग भी गये थे। और याद करे १९४८ की काश्मिरमें जो घुसपैठिये लोग घुसे थे वो किसके लोग थे। जाहीरशाके लोग थे। जिसको पैसा दीजिये जिसको बंदूक दीजिये, जिसको सोना दीजिये, गन

दीजिये वो अफगान तैय्यार है काश्मीर आनेके लिये, दिल्ली आनेके लिये - कलकत्ता आने के लिये। पिछले ५०० सालका इतिहास बताता है। इसलिये तालीबानके हम जबरदस्त खिलाफ है। हम क्यों खिलाफ हैं तालीबानके ? इसलिये की इरान खिलाफ है। इरान डरता है। इरान जो जो चाहता है अब हम इरानके पीछे लगे हैं। यह ठीक है कि इरानसे संबंध बढ़ाने के कारण हमको मध्ये एशियामें, सेंट्रल एशियामें जानेका मार्ग मिल रहा है। तुर्कमेनिस्तानसे नया समझौता हुआ है। कझाकिस्तानतक हम पहुंच सकते हैं। यहांतक कि किरगीजिस्तानतक पहुंचनेमें भी हमको इरानके जरिये आसानी हो सकती है। और इरानसे संबंध बढ़नेसे पाकिस्तानपर भी कुछ नियंत्रण बढ़ सकता है। ये सब फायदे हैं। इन फायदोंसे मैं इन्कार नहीं करता। लेकिन अफगानिस्तान हम इरानके जरिये ऑपरेट करे ये बात मरे गले नहीं उतरती। क्योंकि इस इलाकेकी भारत महाशक्ति है। हमारी जिम्मेदारियां इरानसे, पाकिस्तानसे, सेंट्रल एशियाके राष्ट्रोंसे कई अधिक बड़ी हैं।

जो आदमी दिल्ली में बैठता है या जो आदमी पहले कलकत्तेमें बैठता था उसकी जिम्मेदारी लॉर्ड कर्झनके जिम्मेदारीसे कम नहीं है। १९०२ में लॉर्ड कर्झनने अपने रोमनीज लेक्चर्समें कहा था कि भारतकी स्ट्रैटेजिक जिम्मेदारियां क्या है, हमारी रणनीतियों का फैलाव कहांतक होना चाहिये, हमारी सीमा सिर्फ वाघा बॉर्डरपर खत्म नहीं होती। वाघा बॉर्डर तक तो हमारी राजनीतिक सीमाएँ खत्म होती हैं। वहांतक तो हमारी राजनीतिक संप्रभुता है, हमारी पोलिटिकल सॉल्वरेंटी है। हमारी स्ट्रैटेजिक सीमाएं तो बक्षोदारियासे प्रारंभ होती हैं। और ये आजसे नहीं, हजारों वर्षोंसे हैं। अगर आमू दरियापर ऑक्सस रिव्हरपर कोई खतरा आता है तो उस खतरेकी आवाजें, उसकी घंटियां दिल्लीमें बजेगी और वो हमें सुनना पड़ेगी। बक्षीसरितासे हमारी सीमा प्रारंभ होती है, फारसके खाड़ीसे हमारी सीमा प्रारंभ होती है। ये अंदमान निकोबारपे हमारी सुरक्षा की सीमा समाप्त नहीं होती। हमारी सुरक्षाका मामला और आगेतक जाता है। मलक्का जल उमरू मध्य तक जाता है।

भारतको एक बड़े राष्ट्रकी तरह सोचना होगा। अफगानिस्तानके मामलेमें जो सोविएत संघ कर रहा है वो हम करते जा रहे हैं। आप याद कीजिए। राम साठेजी फॉरेन सेक्रेटरी थे उस वक्त जब इंदिरा गांधी दुबारा आई और जो बयान दिया गया था १२ जनवरी को या १४ जनवरीको। किसी औरने ड्राफ्ट किया हुवा था। इंदिरा गांधीने वो बयान दे दिया। ब्रेज्नेवने जो कदम उठाया था अफगानिस्तानमें उसका अंध समर्थन किया था। बादमें जून १९८० में, शायद १६ जून १९८० को नरसिंहरावने प्रधानमंत्रीकी हैसियतसे पार्लमेंटमें लंबीचौड़ी सफाई पेश की। उस सफाईको मैं साथ रखके घूमता था। पेशावरमें सारे नेताओको बतलाता था मुजाहिदीनोंको कि हम सोविएत संघकी



गोदमे नहीं बैठे हैं। हम लोग आझाद मुल्क है। अपनी राय हम स्वतंत्र है। और वास्तव में बाद मे हम स्वतंत्र राय जाहिर करते रहे। लेकिन हमारी बात किसीने सुनी नहीं। दुनिया के सारे इस्लामिक देशोंमे, एक एक अफगान के दिलमे बात बैठ गयी की हम सोविएत संघके दुमछन्ने है। हम सोविएत संघके पिछलगू है। अब हम इरानके पिछलगू हैं। भारतका क्या है। हमारी अपनी नीति होनी चाहिए।

मैं बराबर कहता रहा कि ब्रक कार्मल हमारे दोस्त है। नजीबुल्ला हमारे दोस्त है। काबुलमे जो नामपंथी सरकार बनी हुई है उससे हमे दोस्तीका रिश्ता रखना है। वो हमारे बेहतरीन दोस्त है। लेकिन हम मुजाहिदीनको नाराज क्यों करें। क्या सिर्फ इसलिये नाराज करे कि पाकिस्तान उनको आश्रय दे रहा है। बिलकुल नहीं करना चाहिए, मुजाहिदिनसे हमको पॅरलल लाईन खोलके रखनी चाहिए। भारत सरकारने खोली हो या ना खोली हो मैंने मुजाहिदीनके साथ लाईन खोलके रखी है। पिछले १५-१६ बरसमे छह, सात मुजाहिदीन लीडर मैं बराबर काबूलमे, काबूलके जलालबादमे या पेशावर मे या लंदनमे या न्यूयॉर्कमे, या रोमसे, जहां भी किसी कॉन्फरन्समे जाता था उन लोगों को ढूँढ लेता था उनसे बराबर मैं मिलता रहता था। एक पॅरलल लाईन हमको खोलके रखना चाहिए। इसी तरह तालीबान के साथ आज तीस मेसे इक्कीस बाईस प्रांतोंपर उनका अधिकार है। दो तिहाईसे अधिक अफगानपर उनका अधिकार है। यह ठीक है कि तालीबान को पाकिस्तानियोंन खडा किया है और वे इरानियोंको तंग करेंगे। तालीबान बहुत ही कट्टरपंथी है, बहुतही फंडामेंटलिस्ट है। डेमॉक्रेटिक नहीं है। तालीबान अफगानिस्तानका अरबीकरण करना चाहते है। अरबायझेशन करना चाहते है, जो कि हमको पसंद नहीं है। लेकिन बहुतसी चीजे हमको पसंद नहीं है। अपनेही देशमे बहुत सारी चीजे हमको पसंद नहीं है। कल तक क्या यह संभव था कि हिंदुस्तान के केंद्रिय सरकारमे कम्युनिस्ट बैठे ? यह संभव था, सोच भी नहीं सकते थे। आजसे २० साल ३० साल पहले सोच भी नहीं सकते थे कि हिंदुस्थानकी केंद्रिय सरकारमे कोई कम्युनिस्ट मंत्री भी होगा। आज आपका गृहमंत्री कम्युनिस्ट है। और सबसे बडा कम्युनिस्ट है, सबसे जोरदार कम्युनिस्ट है, इंद्रजीत गुप्ता। हिंदुस्थानके लोग सोच नहीं सकते थे। लेकिन तथ्य बदलते है। परिस्थितियां बदलती हैं उनको स्वीकार करना पडता है। भारतने इन सारे मामलेमे एक जबरदस्त भूमिका अदा करनी चाहिए। भारत हमेशा कहता रहा है कि काबूलमे जिसका कब्जा हो हम तो उसको रेकग्निशन देंगे। जिसका डिफेक्टो कब्जा हो उसको डि ज्युरे रेकग्निशन दे देंगे। अब किसका कब्जा है काबूलमे ? अब रब्बानीका है क्या ? अब तो तालीबान का है। तो दो तालीबानको, तालीबानको रेकग्नाईज क्यों नहीं करते ? मैं तालीबानके रेकग्निशनके पक्षमे बिलकुल नहीं हूँ। सिर्फ तर्क कर रहा हूँ। सिर्फ बहसके लिये कह रहा हूँ।

तालीबान को तो पाकिस्तानने भी रेकग्राईज नहीं किया। ओ. आय. सी. ने भी रेकग्राईज नहीं किया। किसीने भी नहीं किया अमेरिकाने जिसने उसे खडा किया है उसने भी रेकग्राईज नहीं किया है। हम क्यो करे ?

भारतके इंटररेस्ट अफगानिस्तानमें बहुत गहरें हैं। पेरिफेरल नहीं है। मामुली नहीं है। सतेज है। हमारे इंटररेस्ट वहां क्या है ये हम तब ठीकसे परिभाषा कर सकेंगे, डिफाईन कर सकेंगे जब हमे ये मालूम हो कि हम क्या हैं। भारत क्या है। भारत की जिम्मेदारियां क्या हैं। इक्कीसवीं सदीका भारत कैसा बननेवाला है। क्या हम परमुखापेशी देश हैं ? क्या दूसरोके इशारोंपर चलनेवाला देश है। क्या भारतकी कोई अस्मिता है या नहीं ? भारत की कोई पहचान है या नहीं ? भारतके कोई लॉग-टर्म इंटररेस्ट हैं या नहीं ? आप सोचिये अफगानिस्तान बाल्कनाईज हो जाता है, टूट जाता है, चार पांच टुकडोमें बिखर जाता है तो होगा क्या ? एक नया पख्तूनिस्तान उठ खडा हो जायेगा। पेशावरसे लेके इलाका गैर और उसके पार जितने पुशतुन प्रांत है वो टूट के अलग हो जायेंगे और व्होलेटाईल हो जायेंगे। बलूच इलाका सारा व्होलेटाईल हो जायेगा। जरासी अफगानिस्तानमे गडबड हुई, भारत मे लाख दो लाख पशतून आ गये। ओर वो तो पाकिस्तानकी सरकार मजबूत थी, विसा और पासपोर्ट लगा रखा था तो लाख दो लाख आये। अगर विसा पासपोर्ट नहीं होते, और यही गडबड अफगानिस्तानके बजाय पाकिस्तानमे हुई होती तो तीस लाख लोग सिर्फ नसीरके कॅम्पमे नहीं रुकते। पेशावर तक नहीं रुकते। वो तीस लाख लोग पोशिंदा लोग चलके दिल्लीमे आते, कलकत्तेमे पहुच जाते। पूनामे बसती बनाते। पूनामे भी अफगान लोग रहे है। अहमदशा अबदालीके जमानेमे लोग पूनातक आ गये थे वो लोग तीस चालीस लाख लोग वहां नहीं पडे रहते। करोड दो करोड तीन करोड लोग; हिंदुस्तानमें घुस आते। बंगला देशके लोग जब यहां घुस आये। कलकत्ते में कॉलनी खडी करली उन्होंने।

यदि पाकिस्तान जब डिस्टॅबिलाईज होता, अफगानिस्तान जब डिस्टॅबलाईज होगा तो क्या हिंदुस्तान यह कह सकता है कि वह तो बडा दूर देश है, हमारा नेबरिंग कंट्री नहीं है, वो इरानवाले जाने ? इरान अफगान लोग नहीं जाना चाहते। इरान बहुत परेशानीमे जाते है। इरान के लोग पिछले दो सौ सालसे १७४७ के बादसे और उसके पहले भी नफरत की नजरोसे देखते है अफगान लोगोंको। अफगान इरान जाके खुश नहीं है। अफगान हिंदुस्तान आनेसे खुश है। हिंदुस्तान उसका एक ट्रॅडिशनल रास्ता है। बराबर रूट यहा रहा है। उसका बिझनेस यहां रहा है। उसके इंटररेस्ट यहां रहे है। यहां अफगानोने हुकूमत की। वे हिंदुस्तानियोंको जानते है। हिंदुस्तानके लिये ये बहुत बडा खतरा कभी नहीं हो सकता है। अफगानिस्तान कोई मामुली जगह नहीं है। पूरे सेंद्रल एशियामे जो कि भारतके प्रभाव क्षेत्रका इलाका है जानेके लिये मार्ग प्रदान करता है।

आज इरानका सारा मामला इस तरह से जमा हुवा है। चौसर बैठी हुई है। चौपड जमी हुई है कि भारतके साथ मामला ठीक चल रहा है। लेकिन क्या आपको याद नहीं कि १९७१ मे जो बंबवर्षा भारतपर हुई, जो बंबार्डमेंट भारतपर हुआ था वे जहाज कहां से उडे थे। वे जहाज सारे इरानसे उडे थे। इरानमे कब पासा पलटता है, इरानके रिश्ते बेहतर होते है। अमेरिकासे रिश्ते होते है। और मुलकोसे बेहतर होते है। इरान आखें पलट सकता है।

आज भारतको एक ग्रँड स्ट्रैटेजीकी जरूरत है। इक्कीसवी सदी की महान स्ट्रैटेजीकी जरूरत है। मेरी राय है की हमे पाकिस्तानसे भी रिश्ता सुधारना चाहिये। आजकी खबर पढके मैं बहुत खुश हुआ हूँ। विसा वगैरे के बारे में पिछले तीन सालसे इस बारेमे मैं प्रयत्न कर रहा हूँ। हर साल पाकिस्तान जाता हूँ और प्रयत्न करता हूँ की विसा खुले और लोगोमे संपर्क बढे। अभी पाकिस्तानसे २०० - ३०० लोग आये थे डिसेंबरसे। कलकत्ता मे हमने सम्मेलन किया था। फिर मैं इधर से गया। आठ दस दिन कमसे कम तीन्सौ लोगोसे अलग अलग पाकिस्तानमे मेरी मुलाकात हुई। नवाज शरिफसेभी चार मुलाकातें हुई और ये सब मामला शुरू हुआ।

हम लोग जबतक दरियादिली नहीं दिखायेंगे और एक बडा व्हिजन नहीं रखेंगे, फॉरेन पॉलिसीको नया रूख नहीं दे सकते है। हमे देखना ये है की सेंट्रल एशियासे जो रास्ता खुलेगा - उसका फायदा अकेले पाकिस्तान तक आकर सीमित न हो जाय। अकेले पाकिस्तानको फायदा मिले और फायदा आगेतक न आये ऐसा नहीं होना चाहिये। बात कुछ ऐसी होनी चाहिये की तुर्कमिनिस्तानसे चलनेवाली गॅसकी पाईपलाईन या कझाकिस्तानसे चलनेवाली ऑईल की पाईपलाईन सारी हिंदुस्तानतक आये। हिंदुस्तानका मॅन्युफॅक्चरड माल सारा समुद्रके जरिये इरानके जरिये जाये तो अच्छा है। वो अफगानिस्तानके जरिये भी जाना चाहिये। वह काम कैसे होगा। वह अकेले दोस्तमको खुश करनेसे या रब्बानीको खुश करनेसे या खलीलीको खुश करनेसे नहीं होगा। वो होगा पूरे अफगानिस्तानको ठीकठाक रखनेसे। और वो जिम्मेदारी हमारी है।

पाकिस्तानका एतबार अफगान लोग बहुत कम करते है। मैं कहता था की मुजहिदिन जिस दिन आयेगे काबुलमे वो ड्यूरंड लाईनके बारेमे सवाल उठाना शुरू करेंगे। उसपर कोई भरंसा नहीं करता था १९८३ मे। जैसे ही मुजदददी गये सिबकतुल्ला मुजददनिने पहिलेही बयान मे कहा। ड्यूरंड लाईनके बारेमे सवाल खडा किया। उसने अपनी अँटॉनॉमी घोषित की। आप याद करे की जनरल झिया के जमानेमे जैसे ही जनरल झियाने हिकमतियारको आखें दिखाई, हिकमतियारने कहा, मैं पेशावरसे उठाके अपना कॅंप मशरदमें लूँगा। मैं तुम्हारा गुलाम नहीं हूँ। ये लोग गुलामी नहीं करते है। भिंद्रानवालेसे

गुलामी करायी क्या ? भिंद्रानवालेको आपने आगे बढ़ाया । उससे गुलामी करासके ? मार दिया । उसकी हत्या कर दी । तमील लोगोंको प्रभाकरनको और जितने लोग हैं मैं सबको जानता हूँ उनको हमने मदद की । लाखो करोडो रूपया हर महिने उनको दिया । उनको ट्रेनिंग दी उनसे हम गुलामी करा सके क्या ? वो हमारे दूसरे प्रधानमंत्रीको खा गये । राजीव गांधीको खा गये । तो नसिरुल्ला बाबर जो उनके होम मिनिस्टर हैं । जिन्होंने तालिबानको खडा किया । नसिरुल्ला बाबरको मैंने पिछले साल भी कहा । तीन साल पहिले भी कहा था । ये भूल जाओ कि तालीबान तुम्हारी गुलामी करेंगे । ये मारेंगे तुमको । तुम ये समझ रहे हो कि तालीबानके जरिये अफगानिस्तानमे हुकुमत कर सकते हो ॥ ये तालीबानको पावरमे आने दो अभी आठ दस दिन पहले तालीबानोंके नेताने पाकिस्तानके खिलाफ आरोप लगाया है कि पाकिस्तान बहुत इंटरफीअरन्स कर रहा है । पाकिस्तानमे ट्रेन्ड लोग जलालाबादमे हमसे तालीबानसे लढ रहे है । अभी आरोप लगाया है । थोडा और पावरफुल उन्हें होने दो । पाकिस्तान जो खेल खेल रहा है वो समझ रहा है कि उसने तालीबान की हारमाला पहन रखी है । वरमाला पहन रखी है । ये वरमाला नहीं है । ये हारमाला नहीं है । ये तो सापोंकी माला है । जैसे मुजाहिदीने पाकिस्तानको तंग कर दिया है ये तालिबान पाकिस्तानको तंग करेंगे ।

यहां पर भारतकी भूमिका आती है । भारत अगर चाहे तो उसका दूर रहना अफगानिस्तानसे दूर स्थित होना बहुत फायदेमंद सिध्द हो सकता है । भारत चाहे तो एक बहुत अच्छे मिडिएटरका रोल अदा कर सकता है । मुझमे कोई खास बात नहीं थी । मैं भारत का नागरिक हूँ । भारत का एक नौजवान विद्यार्थी था । जो पेशावर जाता था । जिन दिनों हिकमतियार और रब्बानी एक दुसरे के कमांडरोंकी हत्या करते थे । १९८३ में हिकमतियारने ३६ कमांडर रब्बानी के मार गिराये । वही पेशावरमे रब्बानीने जब मुझे बुलाया इश्तारके लिये रमझानके बाद मैं रमझानमे रोजा रखता हूँ उपवास रखता हूँ । पक्का मुकम्मल ॥ मैंने रब्बानीको कहा कि जबतक यहां हिकमतियार और सय्याफ नहीं आयेंगे मैं अपना रोजा नहीं तोडूंगा । मैं तो सेहरी भी नहीं करता हूँ । सुबह नहीं खाता हूँ । शामको साडे छे बजे इफ्तारके वक्त एक बार चौबीस घंटेमे खाता हूँ । कहने लगे आप तो मर जायेंगे । हमने तो सुबह सेहरी की है । हम रोजा तोड रहे हैं । आप तो रोजा नहीं तोडेंगे । मैंने कहा मैं तो यहां सबको मिलने आया हूँ । जबतक आप उन्हे नहीं बुलाओंगे मैं रोजा तोडनेवाला नहीं हूँ । मैं भूखा रहूंगा । कलतक भूखा रहूंगा । परसोतक भूखा रहूंगा । मर जाऊंगा लेकिन जबतक सबको नहीं बुलायेंगे मैं रोजा नहीं तोडूंगा । मैंने तो कह दिया था । झक मारके हिकमतियार वहां मिलनेको आये । एक दुसरेको बंदूकसे मारने के लिये तैय्यार बैठे ये लोग उसके बावजूद एक मामुली हिंदुस्तानी के कहनेसे वे लोग एक होने को तैय्यार हुए । जनरल झियाको मैंने कहा साहबजादा

याकूबखानको उस जमानेमें मैंने कहा इन सब लोगोंको जबतक आप एक नहीं करेंगे - सातो लोगोंको - ये नजिबुल्लासे बात कैसे करेंगे। नजिबुल्लाने मुझसे कहा की अगर ये सातो लोग एक होकर, एक पॉलिसी बनाकर मुझसे बात करने आये तो मैं ट्रान्सफर ऑफ पॉवर कर सकता हूँ। मैं उसके लिये तैय्यार हूँ।

भारत को जो रोल अदा करना चाहिये वह यह कि सबको एक करे, नजिबुल्लासे बात कराये और फिर पाकिस्तान से कहे की हम तुम्हारे गलेसे ये अफगानिस्तानका साप उतार रहे है। तुम काश्मीरके बारेमें हमसे ढंगसे बात करो। वो बात कर सकते है। लेकिन पता नहीं क्या होता है? ब्यूरोक्रसी आडे आती है या राजनेताओंका अहंकार आडे आता है या हम भारतीय बहुत बडे है? भारत एक महान देश है ये बात आडे आती है कि हमारे फॉरेन पॉलिसीमें जो लचीलापन आना चाहिये इन सारे इलाकोंके बारेमें वो नहीं आ पाता है?

बडी खुशीकी बात है की नेपालमें, बांगला देशमें और श्रीलंकामे अभी अभी हमारी सरकारने जिसको हम खिचडी सरकार कहते हैं, तेरह दलोंकी साझा सरकार कहते हैं, गिरने पडनेवाली सरकार कहते है, घुटने चलनेवाली सरकार कहते हैं, इसी सरकारने इन तीनों देशोंमें लंका, बांगलादेश और नेपालमें कितने अच्छे समझौते किये है। यह ठीक है कि, हमने कुछ रियायतें दी हैं; उनकी बहुतसी बातें जो हम बहुत वर्षोंसे नहीं मानते थे वो हम मान गये है। लेकिन जरा वहां जाकर देखिये। भारतके पक्षमें कितनी जबरदस्त हवाएं बह रही है। कितना आनंद हमें भारतीय होके देखनेको मिलता है। पाकिस्तान में लगभग हरसाल जाता हूँ और खुले आम घूमता हूँ। सैकड़ो लोगोंसे बात होती हैं। कई बार सभाओंमें बोलनेका मुझे मौका मिलता है शायद मैं अकेला भारतीय हूँ जिसके लिये पाकिस्तानी लोग सभार्य भी करते है। पिछले साल लाहोरके प्रेस क्लब में एक बडी सभा हुई। दोसौ पत्रकार इकट्ठे हुए थे। खुलके बात हुई काश्मीर सवालपर एकएक इनके तर्कको मैंने तारतार कर दिया। लेकिन किसीने बुरा नहीं माना। किसीने झगडा करनेकी कोशिश नहीं की।

जैसे इन तीन देशोंके साथ भारत ने काम किया और जैसे आज सुबह, हमारी सरकारने वहाँके विसा वगैरे को ढीला कर दिया है। ऐसे बहुत सारे जेस्चर्स है, फ्रेंडली वेंचर्स हैं जिसके देनेसे कोई देश टूटनेवाला नहीं है। कोई हानि होनेवाली नहीं है।

पाकिस्तान एक जरासा देश है। उत्तर प्रदेशसे भी छोटा है। वो हमारा क्या कर लेगा। हम फिजूल उनसे डरे हुए है। औसत पाकिस्तानीभी इस कदर भारतके प्रेममें मुफतिला है कि उसका बस चले तो वाघा बॉर्डर तोड दे। दरवाजोंको गिरा दे और हिंदुस्तान जाय। इस कदर उत्साह उनका है। इन फॅक्टर्स को हम ठीक तरहसे समझें तो अफगानिस्तानको हम बहुत ठीकसे टँकल कर सकते है। अफगानिस्तानमें हमारे

सिर्फ ये जिओ - स्टैंटेजिक इंटररेस्टही नहीं है। इकॉनॉमिक इंटररेस्ट भी है। अफगानिस्तानके हाजी भाग मे कइ बिलियन टन लोहा, कच्चा लोह आयस्कर वहां पर धरा हुआ है। कोयला वहां धरा हुआ है। ये तुर्कमिनिस्तानमे गॅस फील्ड हैं। मजारे शरीफके आसपास गड्डेमेसे कुछ हवासी निकल रही है। और आगसी जल रही है। बरसोंसे आग जल रही है। इतनी गॅस वहां पर है। तेल वहांपर इतना है। कई बार जर्मन कंपनीया, फ्रेंच कंपनीया अबसे चालीस साल पहले, पचास साल पहले अफगानिस्तानमे काफी पैसा लगा चुकी हैं। हम सब उन चीजोंको एक्स्प्लोर कर सकते है। वो सब चीजें हमको लाभदायक हो सकती हैं।

ये जो इस्लामके नामपर एक आँधीसी फैल रही है वह बहुत चलनेवाली है नहीं। यहां हम पढते हैं अखबारोंमें। अफगानिस्तानमे कहां उस तरहका इस्लाम है जिस तरह का इस्लाम ये तालीबान चलाना चाहते हैं। है ही नहीं। वहां शरियत कौन मानता है। पख्तून व्हेलीको पहले मानते हैं। पख्तूनोका जो पुराना आर्यन कोड है उसको मानते है। शरियत कौन मानता है। वहा जो मुल्ला होता है, सय्यद होता है उसको गाली दिये बिना पठान बात नहीं करता है। और कहता है कि अपनी शरीयत इसलिये चलाता है कि इसकी रोटी मांडा, इसकी अंडा पूरी बनाये। इसलिये चलाता है। तो उससे घबराईये मत कि अफगान लोग इस्लामका कोई बहुत बडा पेहरावा पूरे सब कॉर्टिनेंटमे चला देंगे। ऐसा कुछ नहीं है। अफगान लोग स्वभावसे बहुत सेक्यूलर है और उसका इस्तेमाल हमको करना चाहिये।

बहुत सारे ओर फॅक्टर्स है जिन्हे कन्सिडर करना होंगे इस इलाकेके लिये। यहां की फॉरेन पॉलिसी बहुत अॅक्टिवेट करने के लिये। इरानका इंटररेस्ट हम सोचें कि अफगानिस्तानमे क्या है। इरानकी सबसे बडी समस्या है कि अभी कुछ दिनों पहले इरानका अमेरिका घेराव कर रहा था चारो तरफसे। उस घेराव को तोडना इरानकी सबसे बडी शर्त थी। और एक मायनेमे इरानको सबसे बडी सफलता भी मिल रही है। अफगानिस्तान अगर फसा रहे। अफगानिस्तानमे जंग अगर चलती रहे तो इरान तो मालामाल हो जायेगा। सेंट्रल एशियाका जितना तेल है, जितना गैस है, जितना कोयला है अगर उसको हिंदी महासागरतक आना है तो रास्ता कौनसा है। बंदर आब्बासके अलावा कौनसा रास्ता है। अगर अफगानिस्तान पूरा फसा हुवा है दलदलमे, तो बंदरे आब्बास ही रास्ता है। अभी तुर्कमेनिस्तानसे उनका अॅग्रिमेंट हुआ, कझाकीस्तानसे उनका अॅग्रिमेंट हुवा। रूसके साथ उनका पहलेसेही अरेंजमेंट है। ऑईल रिफायनरी उनकेपास बहुत अच्छी है। इरानको यह बहुत सूट करता है कि अफगानिस्तानमे गडबड झाला चलता रहे। या तो गडबड चलती रहे या इरानका वहां वर्चस्व रहे। इरानके पॅरलल रूटका अफगानिस्तानमे सारा मामला ठीक हो जाता है तो इरानको

कौन पूछेगा। इरान बहुत आँख दिखाता है। शिया और सुन्नीका मामला कितनी गडबड पैदा करता है सेंट्रल एशियामे कि लोग इरानको पसंद नहीं करते। इरान ने कई बार बडी कोशिश की सेंट्रल एशियामे इस्लामके जरिये घुसनेकी। पहिली चीज तो इस्लामकी जडे इतनी गहरी है नही। शिया इस्लामको लोग पसंद नही करते। अजर बैजानकी बडी कोशिश की ईरानने लेकिन अजर बैजानी लोग भी पसंद नही करते। इरामने किरगिजीस्तानसे बहुत कोशिश की। वो लोग भी पसंद नही करते। वो इरान के बजाय तुर्कीको जादा पसंद करते है। एक तो भाषा के कारण। इरानी भाषा फारसी भाषा तुर्कमिनीस्तानके अलावा कहां बोली जाती है। उझबेकीस्तानके कुछ हिस्सोमे खिवा बुखारामे बोली जाती है। खिवामेभी नही बोली जाती है। समरकंदमे बोली जाती है। और कहां बोली जाती है। उसके बजाय टर्किश लॅंग्वेज पूरे इलाकेमे बोली जाती है। पाँच हजार किलोमीटरमें। इसलिये इरानको तो यही स्थिती सूट करती है। या इससे बेहेतर कौनसी वाहियदवाले जो शिया लोग है वहां खलीली और उझबेक और ताजिक इन लोगोंकी असेन्डन्सी रहे।

लेकिन भारके लिये ये स्थिति हो ये आवश्यक नही है। भारतको ये स्थिति सूट नही करती। ये हमारे अनुकूल नही है। हमारे अनुकूल तो ये है की अफगानिस्तानवाला मार्ग भी खुला रहे और पाकिस्तानवाला मार्ग भी खुला रहे। दोनो खुले रहे ये हमारे अनुकूल है। और इसके लिये हमे एक बडी स्ट्रैटेजी बनाना पडेगी।

अफगानिस्तानको अमेरिकी लोग जब दूरसे देखते है तो समझते है कि कब्जा करके हम अपना रूट कायम कर लेंगे। अमेरिकीयोंने शेवरान कंपनीने बीस अरब डॉलर कझाकिस्तानमें इन्हेस्ट कर दिया है। उनकी एक दूसरी कंपनी है। यूनोकोलने आठ दस अरब डॉलर तुर्कमेनिस्तानमे इन्हेस्ट कर दिया है। और ये सोच के इन्हेस्ट किया की चेचेन्यासे जो पाईपलाईन जाती है यूरोपकी तरफ बो तो इस्तेमाल हो नही सकती है। चेचेन्याके अंदर बडा भारी जंग चल रहा है। कब बंद हो जाय। कब रास्ता गडबडा जाय। उस रास्तेका इस्तमाल तो कर नही सकते। तो यही रास्ता - अफगानिस्तानवाला - इस्तमाल करो। अरबो खरबो डॉलर लगा दिया लेकिन अमरिकी गांठ के पक्रे और अकलके अंधे। अमरिकीयोंके गाठमे रुपया तो बहुत है। लेकिन अकल उपर खाली है। पैसा तो लगा दिया उन्होनें। अब फस गये। तालीबानको पैसा तो दे रहे है। हथियार मुजाहिदीन दे रहे है। पहले मुजाहिनको दे रहे थे कि अफगानिस्तानवाले रूटपे कब्जा हो जाय। लेकिन वहां तीन रुकावटे हैं। अफगानिस्तानवाले रूट मे तीन फसावटे है। रातभर शिया लोगोंका कब्जा रहता है तो वो जो रूट है रमेजवाला वो चल ही नही सकता। वो सडक बडी मजबूत है। उन्नीससौ पचपनसे बनाना शुरु की थी कुश्चोव्हके जमानेमे। ये आइसेनहॉवरके जमानेसे बडी

मजबूत सडक है। हैरातसे कंदाहार तक बहुत बढिया सडक है। वो रास्ता बंद है और उपर उधर कंदुश वगैरामे अगर तालीबानका कब्जा नहीं है तो उपरवाला रूट वो भी बंद। सलांग टनल पर ताजिकोंका कब्जा है व मसूद आदिका कब्जा है वो रूट भी बंद है। और बीचमें सेंट्रल अफगानिस्तानमे बामियानका शिया लोगोंका कब्जा है। बामियानवाला इलाका जो घोरबंदवाला इलाका है हजार जात वाला जो इलाका है। तो किन किन को पटायेंगे। रिशवत देकर पैसे देकर हथियार देकर आप पूरे देशमे किनकिन को पटायेंगे। कौनकौनसे रास्तें खोलेंगे। एक रास्ता खोलेंगे दूसरा रास्ता बंद हो जायेगा। दूसरा खोलेंगे तीसरा बंद हो जायेगा। और जिसको पैसा इन्व्हेस्ट करना है वो क्या इन्व्हेस्ट करेगा खतरेकी जगह। जबतक पूरे अफगानिस्तानमे शांति कायम नहीं हो जाती कोई ट्रेड रूट वहां खुल नहीं सकता है। भारतका इंटरैस्ट इसमे है कि ये ट्रेड रूटस्का फायदा अमरिका ले जाय, यूरोपके देश ले जाय, जापान ले जाय, उसके बजाय हम लें।

अभी डेड साल पहले पाकिस्तानके राष्ट्रपति से मेरी दो घंटा बडी लंबी बात हुई। फारूक लेघारी साहब के साथ। उन्होने एक बारभी काश्मिरका जिफ्र नहीं किया। मैंने कई बार काश्मिरके बारेमे बात छेडनेकी कोशिश की और यहां तक मैंने कहा कि देखिये आपके पास काश्मिरका छोटासा हिस्सा है। आप उसको मॅनेज नहीं कर पा रहे है। तो अब हमारेवाला काश्मिर आप ले लेंगे तो उसको कैसे मॅनेज कर सकेंगे। मैंने उनसे कहा अगर हमारे वाला काश्मिर अगर हम आपको देदे तो आप कैसे मॅनेज कीजियेगा। और आपके कश्मिरका जो प्राइम मिनिस्टर है - सरदार कय्यूम खान - वो मुझसे बोलते है मैं म्युनिसीपालिटीके चेअरमनके बराबर भी नहीं हूँ। वो गालियाँ देते है आपको। हमारा काश्मिर हम आपको दें हजूर आप इसको कैसे चलाईंगा। वो रीअॅक्टहीनही किये। उनको काश्मिरकी चिंता नहीं है। वो दो घंटा मुझे यही कनविन्स कराते रहे कि वो जो पाईपलाईन उपरसे आयेगी देखिये उसकी चाबी हमारे पास रहेंगी। वो हम आपके खिलाफ कभी नहीं घुमायेंगे। मैंने कहा समझाईये हमको, कैसे नहीं घुमायेंगे। जरासी भी आप काश्मिरमे गडबड करेंगे और हम वहां फौज मूव्ह करेंगे आप कहेंगे हम ऑईल बंद कर देते है। हम गॅस बंद कर देते है। बोले नहीं नहीं आपको जो माल मिलेगा उसके आप पैसेदेंगे। हमको तो बिना मालके पाईपलाईन गुजरने देनेके लिये पैसे मिलते है। अगर हम तेल बंद करेंगे तो हमारा तो बहुत नुकसान है। हमको जो किराया मिलता है। आप किराये पर या व्याजपे नहीं जिंदा है। हम तो किराये और व्याजपर जिंदा है। और कुछ करही नहीं सकते। जो वहांसे तेल और गॅस आपके यहा जायेगी उसका जो कमिशन यादलाली मिलेगी पाकिस्तान तो उसपर जिंदा रहेगा। उसको हम कैसे बंद करेंगे। वो बंद करेंगे तो हम तो मरेंगे। हमारा तो नुकसानही नुकसान है। हम कभी



नहीं बंद कर सकते हैं। हम तुर्कमेनिस्तानसे ऑग्रिमेंट करेंगे, हम कझाकीस्तानसे ऑग्रिमेंट करेंगे कि ये पाईपलाईनपर ट्रिपल की होगी। एक की से तो बंदही नहीं हो सकता है। जैसे कि डबल की होती है न्यूक्लियर आरसेनलके मामले में। ट्रिपल की लगा देंगे। एक आपकी चाबी हो एक हमारी चाबी हो एक जिस देशकी पाईपलाईन रही है उसकी चाबी हो। यही कन्व्हेन्स कराते रहे।

हम लोग ऐसा काम न करें की सेंट्रल एशियाका सारा बाजार, सेंट्रल एशियाका सारा माल उसपर पाकिस्तान कब्जा कर ले, या पाकिस्तानके जरिये अमरिका कब्जा कर ले। वो तो हमारा प्राकृतिक अधिकार है। हमारा नॅचरल राईट है उसपर। सेंट्रल एशिया तो हमारी जगह है। हजारों वर्षोंसे हमारी जगह है। सेंट्रल एशियाके लोग यहां आते रहे। हजारो वर्षोंसे वो हिंदुस्तानका सारा सोना लूटके चले जाते रहे। हिंदुस्तान उनके लिये सोनेकी चिडिया रही। हमारे यहांसे व्यापारी लोग हजारों बरससे यहां जाते रहे। आप पूरे सेंट्रल एशियामें घूमे। मैं लगभग पूरे सेंट्रल एशियामें कईबार गया हूँ। महिनो रहा हूँ। उन लोगोंको पहचानिये। हमारे बुजुर्ग लोग जो खाना खाया करते थे वो खाना वो लोग खाते हैं। हमारे बुजुर्ग लोग जो भाषा बोलते थे, मूल ऋग्वेदकी भाषा, अवेस्थाकी भाषा, वो पुरानी बौध्द भाषा वो सेंट्रल एशियामें सर्वत्र देखनेको मिलती है। बौध्द स्तूप और अवशेष सर्वत्र सेंट्रल एशियामें बिखरे पडे हैं। ये खिचडी हम लोग खाते हैं। सेंट्रल एशियाके बिलकुल सुदूर गावमें चले जाईये आप तो - खिचरी - कुरुद। उसको किचरी बोल लेते हैं। किचरी - कुरुद। कुरुद दही होता है। जैसा हमारे पूर्वज लोग खाते थे और जो उपनिषदोमें जिस शब्दोंका वर्णन है : मान्स ओदनः जिसको उडदकी दाल बोलते हैं उसको पंजाबी लोग - माकी दाल - माकी दाल वो वेदका शब्द है। मान्स ओदनः। ओदन बोलते हैं चावलको। उदन भी बोलते हैं। आदन भी बोलते हैं। ये संस्कृतका शब्द है। ये सारे शब्द वहां मिलते हैं। ये सारे भोजन वहां मिलते हैं। हम लोगोंकी जो जीवनपध्दति है वो वहां मिलती हैं। वो अमेरिकाका एरिया बनजाय, इसलिये कि हम अपनेइंटरैस्ट गार्ड नहीं कर रहे हैं इससे बढकर लज्जाकी बात क्या हो सकती है ? ये हमारा एरिया है। सेंट्रल एशिया हमारी जगह है। ये भारतका प्रभाव क्षेत्र होना चाहिए। और उसके लिये हमको ग्रैंड स्ट्रॅटेजी बनाने की जरूरत है। उसके लिये थोडे बहुत कन्सेशन अगर पाकिस्तानको देना पडे, बातचीत करना पडे तो करना चाहिए। चीनियोंसे हम कर रहे हैं कि नहीं बातचीत। जिस जमीन के बारेमें अभी पिछले साल दो साल पहले पार्लियामेंटमें शपथ ली। दो तीन साल पहले कि एक इंच जमीन खाली नहीं करेंगे। और १९६२ में शपथ ली की हम चीनियोंको जमीन नहीं देंगे। उनके लिये एक इंच जमीन खाली नहीं करेंगे। उनसे बात कर रहे हैं। अब रिश्ते ठीक हो गये। अभी सात, आठ या नौ चौकियाँ खोली है। अब जो रिश्ते ठीक हो गये हैं उनसे तनाव घटा है

कि नही ? जब चीनियोंसे बात कर सकते है तो पाकिस्तानी और अफगान लोग तो हमारे अपने लोग है अभी पचास साल पहले हमसे अलग हुवे है ।

पाकिस्तान को हमे एक हमारे प्रांत की तरह ट्रीट करना चाहिये । हमारे अपने लोग है । जो हमारे यहां प्रांतोमे, समस्या होती है । जो उत्तर प्रदेश मे सरकार नही बन रही है । वहा सिंधमे भी नही बन रही है । बडी मुसीबत है । मै जब वहां जाता हूँ मुझे वे लोग विदेशी की तरह ट्रीट नही करते । मै जब इतनी बार वहां जाता हूँ तो मुझे लगता है कि एक हमारी अपनी जगह है । पूरा सेंट्रल एशिया मुझे ऐसा लगता है । लेकिन इस सबका मतलब ये नही कि हम इमोशनमें बहके अपने इंटरेस्ट को दरकिनार कर दें । अपने इंटरेस्ट को गार्ड करने के लिये ही इमोशनस को यूज करे ऐसा मेरा तर्क है ।

मैं अधिक समय नहीं लूँगा । बोलने मे मुझे बहुत आनंद हो रहा है । आप कृपा करके सुन रहे है । शांतिपूर्वक । इसके लिये मै आपका बहुत आभारी हूँ । धन्यवाद !!!

### प्रतिभागियों से संवाद के उपरान्त

चीन अफगानिस्तानके बारेमें कुछ इसलिये भी अलर्ट रहता था - क्योंकि वहां शरीयत इन्फ्लूअन्स बहुत जादा था । याने कम्यूनिस्ट गव्हर्नमेंट १९७८ के पहिले भी झाहीर-शा के जमानेमे भी रशियन इन्फुलअन्स जादा था । सोव्हिएट इन्फ्लुअन्स जादा था । इसलिये उसको चेकमेट करनेकी कोशिश चीनकी हमेशी होती थी । लेकिन चीनने विस्तार अफगानिस्तानमे किया नही । ट्रेड नाममात्र था । जादा नही था । लेकिन चीनको इस बातकी हमेशा खुशी रहती थी कि पिछले इस बारा सालमें पाकिस्तानी इन्फ्लूअन्स वहां की जनतामे बढ़ रहा है । और चीनको ये शिकायत बहुत कम रही कि अफगानिस्तानके लोग सिंकीयांग वगैरे मे अक्टीव हुए नही है । बहुत कम कॉन्टैक्ट तो रहा है । मर्सिनरीज कहते है अक्सरे मजदूर । ये तालीबान मे भी अस्करे मजदूर बहुत हैं । जैसे सिर्फमजदूरी के लिये लडाई लढते है । उनको ये जानके आश्चर्य होता है कि हिंदुस्तानमे फौजको बिना लडाई की तनखा मिलती है । पैसे दो और लडाई लढो । पैसे दो और नावमें बैठो । उस तरह का मामला है । वे लोग सिंकीयांग वगैरे मे पैसे लेके, गन अॅण्ड गोल्ड लेके थोडा बहुत अॅक्टीव्ह हुए है । चीनको अफगानिस्तानसे जादा खतरा है नही । चीन अफगानिस्तानके मामलेसे करीब करीब न्यूट्रल है । तालीबान वगैरेके मामलेमे भी कोई ऑफिशिअल पोझिशन उन्होने ली नही । लेकिन अपना डिस्प्लेजर जरूर जहाँ तहाँ खबरोंके जरिये या शिनवा न्यूजपेपरके जरिये वे प्रकट करते रहते हैं ।

रशियाका तो बहुत बडा इंटरेस्ट है । रशियाका तो अभीभी इंटरेस्ट है । अब वास्तवमें रशिया इंडिया और ईरान हम तीनोंका अॅक्सेस बन गया है । ये तीनो मिलकर किले

बंदी कर रहे हैं कि वहां अमरिकीयोंको न घुसने दें, पाकिस्तानियोंको न घुसने दें । और अगर चायनीज थोडा बहुत इंटरफीयरन्स करे तो उसको भी रोके ।

सोवियेत एम्पायर खतम हो गया है । लेकिन रशियन इंटररेस्ट खतम नहीं हुआ है । अभी भी तुर्कमेनिस्तानकी बॉर्डरपर करीब पच्चीस हजार रशियन सैनिक पेट्रोलिंग करते हैं । रूसकी हमेशी ये कोशिशे रहती है । जैसे ही तालीबानका कब्जा हुवा २७ सितंबरको पिछले साल वहां पर रूस और बाकी के चार रिपब्लिक, तुर्कमेनीस्ताननें जॉईन नहीं किया । उसका कारण स्पष्ट है कि तुर्कमेनीस्तानमे अमेरिकन इनव्हेल्हमेंट बहुत हो गया था । और उसके अलावा - तुर्कमेनिस्तान उनकी जो सेक्युरिटी ट्रीटी है सेंट्रल एशियन राष्ट्रोंकी रूसके साथ उसका भी सदस्य नहीं है । और निआझीको कुछ अपने बारेमे उसको तो कहते हैं नाबेगाये तवाना फारसीमे कहते हैं । नाबेगाये तवाना वो नियाझो सुपर मुराद निमाझे अपने आपको बहुत बडा लीडर मानता है । लेनिन के तरह समझते हैं । माओत्से तुंग की तरह समझते हैं । स्टालिन की तरह समझते हैं । तो येल्त्सीन जैसे छोटे मोटे लोगोंके साथ बैठनेमे उनको थोडा संकोच होता है । वो नहीं आया उसमे । बाकी इन सारे राष्ट्रोंने मिलके तालीबान के खिलाफ किलेबंदी करनेकी बात भी सोची ।

एक मायने मे भारत का इंटररेस्ट सर्व्ह हो रहा है इसमे । तालीबानकी वजह से पाकिस्तान आयसोलेट हो गया है । और सारे सेंट्रल एशियन राष्ट्र रूस, इरान, चीन, भारत एक लीग मे हैं । अलग लगते हैं । वो ठीक है । उसको मैं बुरा नहीं कहता हूँ । लेकिन ये आयडियल नहीं है । आयडियल क्या है कि हमारे इंटररेस्ट को प्रायमसी हो । इरानियन इंटररेस्ट, रशियन इंटररेस्ट ठीक है । वो बी सर्व्ह होते हों तो कोई बुरी बात नहीं । लेकिन इंडियन इंटररेस्ट को प्रायमसी होनी चाहिये । हम पीछे पीछे ट्रेल करनेवाले राष्ट्र नहीं हैं । मजबूरी मे कहीं ट्रेल करना पडे तो करें लेकिन इनिशिएटिव्ह हमारा होना चाहिये कि हम अग्रगण्य राष्ट्र हों । सबसे आगे चलनेवाले राष्ट्र हैं ।

रूसका इंटररेस्ट इस सारे इलाके मे अभी नया नहीं है । आप अगर काऊंट नेसलरोटके जमानेका, पुराने झारोके जमानेका इतिहास देखें । काऊंट नेसलरोट उनका सबसे जबरदस्त फॉरेन मिनिस्टर हुआ है । १५० बरस पहले भी पूरे रूसी एम्पायर का जोर इस बातपे था कि हिंदी महासागरके तटतक आ जाय । ग्वादरतक आ जाय, बंदरे आब्बास तक आ जाय और आपको याद होगा अभी दो तीन साल पहले झरीनोव्हस्की यहां आया था । रूसी ऑपोज़िशन लीडर झरीनोव्हस्की । बार बार झरनिव्हस्की कहता था कि मैं रूसको इतना मजबूत बनाना चाहता हूँ कि मेरे रशियन सोल्जर्स हिंद महासागरमे आके अपने बूट धोयें । जो बूट मॉस्कोसे पहनकर चले वो हिंद महासागरमे आकर धोयें । और आप याद करे १८१५ मे जब व्हर्सायकी ट्रीटी हुई उस समय कॅथरीन

कितना आँसू बहाती थी। कि मुझे पूरे सेंट्रल एशियाको पार करके पूरे लेंडलाक्ड इलाकेको पार करके वॉर्म वॉटर पोर्ट तक जानेका मौका मिले। तो कॅथरीन काऊंट ने सलेरोट इनकी सबकी स्ट्रटेजी पिछले १५० - २०० साल हिंद महासागर तक पहुचनेकी थी। और ब्रेझनेवने बुढापेमें अपने आखरी वक्तमें जो भयंकर गलती की अफगनिस्तानमे घुसनेकी उसके पीछे भी मुख्य मक्सद यही था कि अफगानिस्तानपे हम कब्जा करेगें तो फिर अफगानिस्तानके जरिये ग्रेटर पखतुनिस्तानका आंदोलन चलाके नीचे कराचीतक घुसनेका ग्वादर तक घुसनेकी हमको सुविधा रहेगी। ये बात दूसरी है की ब्रेझनेवने बाद मे दुनियाभरके तर्क दिये अपनी बातको जस्टिफाय करनेके लेकिन मास्कोमे तो मिलिटरी एस्टॅब्लिशमेंटके जो लोग थे उस जमानेमे, मै दो-तीन बार मास्कोभी गया और अॅकॅडमीजमे जो बहस हुई उसमे साफ साफ वो नही बोलते थे लेकिन उनकी इच्छा तो यही थी की वो लोग - वॉर्म वॉटर पोर्ट तक आ जायें। आज भी वॉर्म वॉटर पोर्टतक आनेकी इच्छा रुसकी कम नही हुई। हालाकि ताकद कम हुई है। सोव्हिएत एम्पायर खतम हो गया है लेकिन रुस की जो वासना है हिंद महासागरतक आनेकी वो कम नही हुई है।

उनकी वासनाका लाभ भारतको मिले और पाकिस्तानको अमेरिकाके खिलफ थोडी बहुत किल्लेबंदी हो जायतो कोई बुराई नही है। लेकिन अभी जरुरी ये है की हम अपना इंटरेस्ट गार्ड करने के लिये अगर हमे अमेरिकासे भी बात करनी पड़े और अमेरिकासे थोडा हाथ मिलाना पड़े तो मुझे कोई बुरा लगता नही। क्योंकि अमेरिकी लोग गाठके पक्रे और अक्लके कच्चे है, बुध्दु है। वो वास्तवमे बच्चे है। अभी दो सो साल मे तो राज्य बना है उनका। और मुश्किल से चालीस पैंतालीस सालसे कुटनीति करना उन्होने शुरू किया है। और वो भी कुटनीति किस दमपे करते है। आप देखें कि सीटो सेंटो जो बने है किसने बनवाये। सर ऑलेफ गॅरो की किताब पढके उन्होने मिलीटरी पॅक्टस बनाया 'वेल्थ ऑफ पॉवर'। ऑलोफ गॅरो कौन थे। हमारे फॉरेन सेक्रेटरी थे। राम साठेजी उसी खुर्सीपर बैठते थे। ऑलेफ गॅरो अभी पाच छः साल पहले तक जिंदा थे। ससेक्स मे रहते थे। ऑलेफ गॅरोने मास्टर माइंड किया अमेरिकन फॉरेन पॉलिसीको। एशियाके इस इलाके में तो बच्चे है अमेरिकन्स। हमारे विदेश मंत्रालय के जो अफसर है योग्यता की दृष्टि से दुनिया के सर्वश्रेष्ठ अफसरोंमे एक है। बौध्दिक दृष्टिसे चारित्रिक दृष्टीसे। लचीलापन और थोरज। तुरन्त काम करनेकी दृष्टिसे बहुत योग्य है। अगर वे लोग मिलके कुछ इस तरह की रणनीति बनाए अमेरिका जो इस इलाके मे इन्व्हेस्टमेंट करना चाहता है। वो पाकिस्तान को जरिया बनाने के बजाय हमारे साथ ईक्वल लेव्हलपर कोलॅबोरेट करे तो भारतकी समृध्दि भी बहुत बढेगी। डेमॉक्रॅटिक देश है। उसके साथ भी हमारा मेलजोल पोलिटीकल लेव्हलपर बढेगा। सोशल, अॅकॅडॅमिक एज्युकेशन

टेक्निकल लेव्हलपर तो है ही। सबसे जादा है। व्यापारिक लेव्हलपर भी सबसे जादा होता जा रहा है। लेकिन पॉलिटीकल लेव्हलपर भी बढ़ेगा। रूसके साथ जो पारंपारिक संबंध है वो हमारे बने रहे लेकिन कुछ फॉरेन पॉलिसी के नये ड्राईमेन्थान्स खुले तो टवेन्टीफर्स्ट सेंचुरीका भारत जो एक पॉवर की तरह इमर्ज होना है उसमे हमको आसानी रहेगी।

अभी तो अफगानिस्तानके साथ ऑफिशिअल लेव्हल ट्रेड करीब करीब निल है। पिछले पाच सात सालमे इन लोगोंकी खानेकी बहुत कमी हुई है। यहासे प्लेन लोडस् ऑफ गोस्त मांस भेजते थे। दवाइयाँ भेजते थे। कपडे वगैरा भेजते थे। सारी ग्रेट जाती थी। जब तक पाकिस्तानसे बॉर्डर बंद है अफगानिस्तानसे ट्रेड का क्या सवाल उठता है। थोडा बहुत इरानके जरिये जा सकता है। सेंट्रल एशियाके जरिये कुछ चीजे स्मगल होके जा सकती हैं। पाकिस्तानके जरिये स्मगल होती हैं। वो जो नॉन ऑफिशिअल ट्रेड है वो चलता रहता है।

ट्रेड तो अफगानिस्तानके साथ तभी डेव्हलप हो सकता है तभी बढ सकता है जब पाकिस्तानसे उसके रिश्ते नॉर्मल हों और पाकिस्तानसे हमारे रिश्ते नॉर्मल हो। ये बडा मजेदार मामला है। सिर्फ अफगानिस्तानसे हमारी नॉर्मलसी हो उससे नही चलेगा। अफगानिस्तानसे सिर्फ पाकिस्तानकी नॉर्मलसी हो उससेभी नही चलेगा। सिर्फ पाकिस्तानसे हमारी नॉर्मलसी हो उससे भी नही चलेगा। तीन तीन नॉर्मलसीज चाहिये। अफगानिस्तानसे हमारा रिश्ता ठीक हो, अफगानिस्तानसे पाकिस्तानका रिश्ता ठीक हो, पाकिस्तानसे हमारा रिश्ता ठीक हो। पाकिस्तानसे मान लो हमारा रिश्ता एक्सलेंट है और अफगानिस्तानसे पाकिस्तानका वॉर चल रहा है। क्या करेंगे। मैं आपको उदाहरण देता हूँ। सन पचासमे पाकिस्तानसे हमारा रिश्ता ठीक था। बुरा नही था। ट्रेड चलता था। लोग काफी आते जाते थे। पाकिस्तान इंडिया। लेकिन उन्नीस सौ पचास मे मुगलाई नामका एक गाँव है। उसपर पाकिस्तानियोंने बंब गिराये। सरदार दाऊदके चचा हाशिम वो प्राइम मिनिस्टर थे। बडा हंगामा हुवा।। बॉर्डर बंद हुई। उन्नीससौ पचपनमे ये बन युनिट प्लेन डिवलेअर हुआ। पाकिस्तानी एम्बसीको आग लगाई। हिंदुस्तानकी एम्बसीको आजतक कभी आग नही लगाई गयी। पाकिस्तानकी एम्बसीको कमसे कम दस बार आग लगाई गयी। पाकिस्तानी डिप्लोमेट्सके लोगोकी पकड पकड कर हत्याए की हैं। आजतक हिंदुस्तानके डिप्लोमेटस् को मारा नही गया। पीटा नही गया। अपमानभी नही किया गया। पाकिस्तानियोंको तो पीटते है अफगान लोग। मारते है। सन पचपनमे एम्बसी जला दी। फिर ट्रेड बंद हो गया इंडिया का। सन पचपनमे चल रहा था थोडा बहुत ट्रेड। लेकिन अफगानिस्तानसे बिलकुल ठप हो गया। १९६१ मे सरदार दावूद का तेवर इतना तेज हुआ, पख्तून सवाल पर कि करीब

करीब दो सालतक उन्नीस या बीस महिने तक ट्रेड बंद रहा पाकिस्तान और अफगानिस्तान एकदम ठप हो गया। भारतके साथ अफगानका ट्रेड ठप हो गया। इसलिये तीन तरफा जब रास्ता खुला हो तब ट्रेड और कॉमर्स अफगानिस्तानके साथ बढ सकते हैं।

अफगानिस्तानमे हमने अस्पताल बनाया है। बच्चोंका जो अस्पताल है राधाकृष्णनने शिलान्यास किया और जाकीर हुसैन साहबने उसका उद्घाटन किया। वहां इतनी खिदमत होती है अफगान बच्चोंकी शफाखाना याथपाल कि आपको मैं कह नहीं सकता हूँ। भारत के लिये कितनी दुवा देते हैं गरीब लोग बुजुर्ग लोग। अपनी आर्खासे मैंने देखा है कि भारत ने वहां मेहरबानी की तो भारत के वहां बहुत से काम हुए। जैसे शिक्षकोंका जो काम है। हमारे शिक्षक सैकड़ों की संख्या मे वहां प्रायमरी स्कूलो मे, युनिव्हर्सिटीजमे सबदूर पढाते थे। एक बार मैंने प्राईम मिनिस्टर हाशिम मेमवार को पूछा। वो बड़े प्रो - पाकिस्तान है। लेकिन मेरी उनसे दोस्ती थी। हाशिमसाबसे मैंने पूछा की साहब इतने प्रो - पाकिस्तानी है लेकिन टीचर सारे आपने इंडियन बुला रखे हैं। क्या मामला है। बोले देखो भाई बात ये है कि पाकिस्तानी जब यहां आता है तो हमारे अफगानिस्तानियोंको डर लगता है। एक तो वो सुन्नी मुसलमान है। हम लोग भी सुन्नी है वो भी सुन्नी है। वो आयेगा और हमारी लडकियोंको उडा ले जायेगा। विवाह करलेगा उनसे या और कुछ रिश्ता कर लेगा। बोले आपका जो हिंदुस्तानी आता है, हमसे डरता है। एक तो कहता है भाई ये पठान है। हमसे अलग है। तो इनकी लडकियोसे कोई भी संबंध हो नहीं सकता। शादी विवाह का संबंध हो नहीं सकता। और हमारी बडी इज्जत करता है। इसलिये मैं पाकिस्तानी मुसलमानोंको यहां टीचर के तौरपर बसने नहीं दूंगा। सिर्फ इंडियन्सको आने दूंगा।

आप देखिये इस तरहके कई फॅक्टर्स काम करते है। वहां इस्लाम जो है वो जोडता नहीं है, तोडता है। पडोसीपन वहां जोडता नहीं है, तोडता है। हमारा दूर रहना उनसे जोडता है। इंडियन्स है गडबड नहीं करेंगे। वहां का जितना ट्रेड था एक यहूदी परिवार था। बाबाजान, उसके अलावा पूरा ट्रेड अफगानिस्तानका पिछले सौ बरससे हमारे कब्जेमे था। हमारे लोग ट्रेड करते थे। पूरे सरायराह जादा तक भारतियोंका, हिंदुओंका अधिकार था।

अमीर अब्दुल रहमान जैसा सख्त उतना जबरदस्त शासक इस पूरे सब कॉटीनंटमे पिछले दो चार सौ सालोमे नही हुआ। उसने अपने किलेपर महल मे अपने अंगरक्षक कभी पठान, अफगान या ताजीक या मुसलमान रखेही नहीं। वो इंडिया से बुलाता था। हिंदुओंको बोलता था मुझे इनपर एतबार है। इनपर विश्वास करूं। और किसीको अपना बॉडीगार्ड नहीं बनाऊंगा। किससे शामिल हो जाय। बगावत कर दे साटगट

कर दे, मुश्किल खड़ी कर दे। आप देखें बाबरकी हत्या कैसे हुई। बाबर तो अडतालीस साल की उम्र में मरा और यहां आगरा में हुआ क्या? बाबर के मरने के चार साल पहले जिन लोगों ने जहर खिलाया वो कौन थे। वे कोई भारतीय थोड़ी थे। मतलब ये कि वे लोग इब्राहिम लोदी ने ब्राइब करके बाबरियों को उसके यहा प्लॉट कर दिया था। उन खानसामानाओं ने उसको पुलाव में जहर खिलाया। बाबर ने बाईस आदमियों का कतल कराया रात की रात। ये जितने बादशाहा लोग थे ये बड़े सतर्क रहते थे।

इस मायने में फिनान्सका, टॉप सेक्युरिटीका मॉडर्नायजेशनका सवाल है। अफगानिस्तानको पिछले पचास साल में भारतकी बहुत देन है। और ये जो मॉडर्नायजेशनकी आयडियाज है इरान से आयी है ऐसा नहीं है। ये महमूद तर्जी लाया, जो अमानुल्ला का ससुर था और महमूद तर्जी ना अफगानी था, ना सौदी था, ना इरानी था। वो तो टर्कीश था। इस्तानबूलमें रहता था। अमानुल्ला के छोटे भाई अभी भी जिंदा है वो इस्तंबूलमें रहते हैं। और महमूद तर्जी वगैरा इन सब लोगोंसे संबंधित थे। वो वहां अखबार लाये। अखबार पहली बार आया। यूनिव्हर्सिटीका कन्सेप्ट लाये। सडकोंका कन्सेप्ट लाये। तो इंडियन्सने ये जो कन्सेप्टस् जितने आये उनको वहा लागू किया।

भारत के लिये बडा शुक्रगुजार महसूस करते हैं अफगान लोग। जब एक बार पोलिटीकल नॉर्मलायझेशन हो जायेगा - इस पूरे इलाकेमें, तो मैं समझता हूँ कि अफगानिस्तानका चप्पा भारतके मालसे पट जायेगा। भारतका माल, भारतीय शिक्षा, भारतीय तकनीक, भारतका विज्ञान, भारतीय संस्कृती, फिल्में। आपकी फिल्में अफगानिस्तानमें घर घर में देखी जाती है। महात्मा गांधी फिल्म जब आई थी उन दिनों मैं काबुल गया हुआ था। कोई घर काबुल में ऐसा नहीं था कि जो गांधीजीपर दिवाना नहीं था। इसी फिल्ममें तिलकजीकी कोई भूमिका थी। मुझे वहां अफगान लोग पूछते थे कि बाल गंगाधर तिलक कौन थे। क्या गांधीजीसे बड़े आदमी थे। मैंने उनको बताया कि चौपाटी पर जब पहली बार गांधीने दर्शन किया तिलकका तो तिलकके पांव छूये। तिलकके चरणोंमें गिर पड़े गांधीजी। और बाल गंगाधरजीने उनको उठाया। कहा कि आप उठिये मेरे पाव पर मत पड़े रहो। बोले, नहीं महाराज मैं आपका चरणस्पर्श करता हूँ। मैंने कहा तिलक इतने बड़े आदमी थे।

अफगान लोगोंकी इतनी जिज्ञासा है भारतके बारे में। हमारी फिल्में देखते है। अपने बच्चोंके नाम हमारी फिल्म ऑक्टर्स के नामोपर रखते है। इतने भारतप्रेमी लोग हैं। इसका फायदा हमलोगोंने उठाना चाहिये। उनकी भाषा सीखकर आपसी संबंध और निकट लाने से भारत और अफगानिस्तान दोनों के लिये हितकर होगा।

एक मायनेमें समझिये सेंट्रल एशियन रिपब्लिक्स सोविएट कॉलनी रहे। सत्तर साल

और डेडसो साले से रूसी कॉलनी मान लेना चाहिये । वहां कुछ है ही नहीं । अभी किरगीजीस्तानके विदेश मंत्री और प्राइम मिनिस्टर ने मुझे इतनी बड़ी लंबी लिस्ट देदी और बोले देखो यहां प्रिंटिंग प्रेस नहीं है । इन्विटेशन छपाना हो तो मास्को भेजना पडता है । किताब नहीं छप सकती । स्टेशनरी नहीं । कुछ नहीं । । रूसियोंने समझिये उसको बिलकुल एक कॉर्डन एरिया बना रखा था । अपने लिये माल निकालनेके लिये चीजें निकालनेके लिये कच्चे माल के लिये बना रखी थी । कोई खास डेव्हलपमेंट हुआ नहीं । इलेक्ट्रिसिटी है वहां । पानी है । कुछ न्युक्लिअर मटेरियल वगैरह हैं । ये सब है । इतना व्हास्ट एरिया है । भारत से कई गुना बडा है कजाकीस्तान । और आबादी कितनी शायद डेड करोड । हमारे एक दो जिलेके बराबर आबादी यू. पी. के. जिलेके बराबर आबादी और इलाका भारत के तीन गुना बडा । अमेरिका से भी तीन गुना बडा एरिया सारा सेंट्रल एशिया का है ।

एक बार हम कोशिश करे । आप घूमने के लिये चले जाइये । पूना के कुछ इंडस्ट्रियालिस्ट्स । यहां बहुत अच्छे उद्योगपति हैं । उनसे मैं कहता हूँ की घूमने के लिये चले जाइये किरगीजीस्तान, उजबेकिस्तान । समरकंद देखिये । क्या अद्भुत जगह है समरकंद । वहां एक से एक महल बने हुए हैं । उनको देखना जीवन का एक विलक्षण अनुभव है । बुखारा चले जांय । रवीवा के महल देखें । कारपेट देखें । रवीवा जो सबसे पुराना शहर है । दो हजार साल पुराना शहर है, जसके तस पूरे किले के अंदर शहर है । उसको देखो तो लगता है कहां आ गये । स्वप्न लोक में आ गये । क्या अद्भुत जगह है । उसको देखना एक अनुभव है । यूनेस्कोने उसको अँडॉप्ट कर रखा है ।

हम लोगोंको वहां जाना चाहिये । वहां खूब बिझिनेस ऑपोर्च्युनिटीज हैं । बहुत एज्युकेशन अँव्हेन्यूज हैं । वहां के लोगोंको यहां ट्रेन करनेका एक बहुत बडा काम है । हमको कोशिश करनी चाहिये किये जो पडोसी देश हैं इनकी भाषाएं सुविधापूर्वक पढाएं । अगर हम लोग फारसी पढाएं अगर ये उझबेकी पढाएं । ये सारी भाषाए पढाएं । इनका इतना फायदा होगा मैं आपको बता नहीं सकता हूँ ।

अफगानिस्तानमे प्राइम मिनिस्टर के अँडव्हाईसर्स जो होते थे । झाफरशा के जमाने मे भी और कम्युनिस्टोंके जमाने वो सब हमारे लोग होते थे । सारे मिनिस्ट्रोंके जो खास अँडव्हाईसर्स होते थे, हेल्थ अँडव्हाईसर्स, फायनान्स अँडव्हाईसर्स, प्राइम मिनिस्टर के अँडव्हाईसर्स । इंडियन्सपे इतना एतबार करते हैं । इतना भरोसा करते हैं कि एक बार हम लोग वहां चाबी खोल दे । आज देखिये पूरे सेंट्रल एशिया मे छा जाने के लिये हमको कोइ रोक नहीं सकता । स्काय इज द लिमीट । पाखतूनिस्तान का एक नये राष्ट्र के रूप में उभर आना नामुमकिन है ।



कुछ लोगों की समझ में जिसका कब्जा काबुल पर हो उसका अधिकार पूरे अफगानिस्तान पर होता है। यह गलत है। भारत सरकार भी यही करती है। जिसका काबुल पे कब्जा है उसको अफगानिस्तानका बादशाह मानती है। मेरा कहना ये नहीं है की तालीबानने बीस प्रॉव्इन्सेस मे कब्जा कर लिया है इसलिये इनको रेकग्नाइज करो। इसलिये नहीं। इसलिये कि वो एक फॅक्ट ऑफ लाइफ है। और तालिबान ने कब्जा कैसे किया। अब यह बात वैसी है जैसा यह कहना की काशिरका मामला इसलिये उठ खडा हुआ है कि वहां पाकिस्तानी घुस आये। ये आंख मीचना शुतरमुर्गकी नीति है। यह कहना कि काशिरमें कुछ ही नहीं वो तो पाकिस्तानने खडा कर रखा है। तालीबानके बारे मे कहना कि सिर्फ ये पाकिस्तानका क्रिएशन है। यह बात ठीक है कि पाकिस्तानकी सबसे जादा मदद है। पाकिस्तान हाथियार दे रहा है। स्ट्रैटजी बना रहा है। उनके पीछे पाकिस्तानी आर्मीके लोग जाके लढ रहे है। ये सब ठीक है। लेकिन सिर्फ ये पाकिस्तान का क्रियेशन है यह कहना तालीबान को नहीं समझना है। तालीबान के साथ ये पता नहीं है हमारे फारेन ऑफिस के लोगों को और जो अखबार पढने वाले हमारे नये एक्सपर्ट्स, अफगानिस्तान के, सेंट्रल एशिया के, उनको ये नहीं मालूम है कि तालीबान में कमसे कम दस परसेंट लोग हमारे है। ये उनको पता नहीं। बब्रक कमल के लोग, पर्सन फॅक्शनके सारे लोग एक साथ तालीबानमे घुस गये। ये उनको पता ही नहीं है। तालीबान का कॅरेक्टर क्या है इसको हमारे लोग ठीक तरहसे समझते नहीं है और भरोसा कर लेते है जो अमरीकी कहते है जो पाकिस्तानी अखबार कहते हैं। मे देखता हूँ। अभी दो-तीन किताबे मैने पढी है। तालीबानपे आयी है उसने पाकिस्तानी अखबारोंको कोट कर रखा है। अरे भाई जाओ, खुद जाओ, देखो, बात करो, समझो, उन लोगोंका ट्राइबल कनेक्शन देखो। उनके बायो डेटाज देखो। उनकी पुरानी हिस्टरी देखो। हमारे दोस्त लॉडविक अँडेमिक्की किताब पढो। उसमें कई लोगों का बायो डेटा आपको मिल जाएगा। उसमें हजारो बायो डेटाज इकट्ठे कर रखे है। फिर उसको अँनालाईज करो। तब मालूम पडेगा की तालीबान का असली कॅरेक्टर क्या है।

बिलकुल यही बात, अज्ञानकी बात, जो तालीबान के बारेमें बोल देते है यही अज्ञानकी बात मुजाहिदीन के बारेमे बोल देते थे। राजीव गांधीने मुजाहिदीनके खिलाफ ८७ मे ८८ मे उतनी जबरदस्त मोहिम चलाई। जहां जाते मुजाहिदीनके खिलाफ बोलते। ८८ में मे पेशावर गया तो मुझे हिकमतीयारने पहला सवाल ये किया की भाई राजीव गांधी को हुआ क्या है। हमने किया क्या है उनके साथ। रोज हमारे खिलाफ बोलता है। इसलिये हम भी गालियाँ देते है उसको। मैने कहा आप उसको एक महिने तक गालियाँ मत दीजिये राजीव गांधीको। वो नासमझ आदमी है। नया नया प्रधानमंत्री बना है हमारा। उसको जो अपसर कह देते है वो बिचारा बोल देता है। आप जरा

महिनाभर चुप रहिये मैं जाता हूँ बात करता हूँ। राजीव गांधी उसी दिन जिस दिन हिकमतीयास्से हमारी बात हुई थी वो तुर्की गये हुए थे। तुर्की में फिर गालियाँ दी उन्होने। दुसरे दिन हिकमतीयास्से मिला। बोले देखिये पाकिस्तानी अखबारोमे छपा है। मैंने कहा महिना तो अब हुआ नही ना। आप महिनाभर चुप रहिये। मैं जाता हूँ। लौटके बात करता हूँ। मामला ठीक हो गया। एक प्रकारका कनेक्शन बन गया। मैं तालीबानको सिरपर बैठानेकी बात नही कर रहा हूँ। एक बात कह देता हूँ की तालीबान - पाकिस्तान के और अमरिका के गुलाम होकर चलेंगे नही। उनका माल खा रहे है। उनके हथियार ले रहे हैं। लेकिन वो लोग अँटर्नॉमस है। अफगान लोग गुलामी करना नामुमकिन है। समझना चाहिए। अफगानिस्तानका दो हजार सालका इतिहास पढिये। अफगानिस्तानमे किसीकी गुलामी करना - इम्पॉसिबल है। बिलकुल नामुमकिन है। बाबरनामा पढिये। बाबरने क्या लिखा है कि अफगान लोग पिटाई करते है बुरी तरह हमारी। बाबर इतना तंग हो गया था कि वो भागके यहां आया। इसलिये तालीबानके बारे मे किताबे लिखना, अखबार में आर्टिकल वगैरा लिखना अलग बात है।

जरा उसको समझना चाहिये। और फॉरेन ऑफिसमे, क्षमा करे, बहुत योग्य लोग है। लेकिन तीन साल तक उनका इंटरैस्ट रहता है। जबतक पोस्टिंग रहता है तबतक इंटरैस्ट रहता है। बहुत कम लोग जानकारी करनेकी कोशिश करते है। बहुत कम इनको पता होता है। इसलिये बड़े बड़े ब्लैंडर्स होते है। जब ब्रेझनेव्ह वहां गया खा गये तो हिंदुस्तानकी तो बातही क्या है। अफगानिस्तान के बारेमे थोडा सरकारको शांतिसे गहराईसे सोचना चाहिये। और एक बड़े राष्ट्र के नाते हमको जबरदस्त इनिशिएटिव्ह लेना चाहिये।

मेरी सारी बातका निचोड सिर्फ एक था कि अफगानिस्तानमे या सेंट्रल एशियामे या तिब्बतमे या म्यानमारमें या हिंद महासागरमे, सेशेल्समे या छागोस आर की तलेगोमे या मलक्का स्ट्रेट्समे या बंदरे आब्बासके आसपास कहीं भी कोई गडबड होती है तो जिम्मेदारी हमारी है।

१९६६ मे जब दिओ गो गाशियाका अँग्रिमंट हुवा, ३० डिसेंबर १९६६ अमेरिका ने गुपचुप ब्रिटनके साथ अँग्रिमंट किया तब शायद भारत मे मैं अकेला ऐसा विद्यार्थी था जिसने उसपर जमकर लिखा। धर्मयुग ने वो लेख छपा। और संसदमे जबरदस्त बहस उसपे हुई। इकतीस साल हो गये इस बात को। तब भी मैंने कहा था कि भारत की जिम्मेदारी है कि हम देखें क्या हो रहा है। ये जो आमूदारियाका इलाका है। वो जो मलक्का जलसंधीका इलाका है। ये सब हमारे भारतमाताकी त्वचाकी तरह है। चमडी है। अगर इसपर आंच आती है, मध्य एशियासे इरान से या अरेबिक देशोंसे या चीन की तरफसे तो दिव्नीमे बैठे आदमीको तुरन्त सचेत होना चाहिए।

जनरल जोशी ने बहुत अच्छी बात कही कि अफगानिस्तानमे गडबड होती है तो उसका मुकाबला हिंदुस्तान अकेला नहीं कर सकता है और न पाकिस्तान कर पायेगा ये तो आपने देख लिया। पाकिस्तानियोंको बड़ी गलतफहमी थी। वो अपने आपको इंपिरिअल हेरिटेजका बडा भारी उत्तराधिकारी मानकर चलते है। ख्वाब देखते है मुगालिया। ख्वाब देखते है अलीकी समशेरका जो स्पेन तक चली थी। उनको मै कहता हूँ पाकिस्तानके उलेमानको। काझी हुसेन अहमदसे अभी दो महिना पहले बड़ी लंबी बहस हुई। मैने उनसे कहा कि स्पेनकी पूरी कहानी पढिये कि हुआ क्या था। इस्लामका नामतक साफ कर दिया था उन्होने। और ७०० साल बाद इन्तकाम लिया था। सातसौ साल तक इंतजार किया था। उनको बहुत ख्वाब दिखाई पडते है। लेकिन पाकिस्तानको पिछले तीन चार वर्षो मे अपनी हद्द, अपनी सीमाओंका अपनी मर्यादाओंका, अपनी कमजोरियोंका पता चल गया है। अफगानिस्तानको वो अपने सूबे की तरह ट्रीटकर रहे थे। प्रांत की तरह ट्रीट कर रहे थे। वहां विदेश मंत्री नहीं जाता था। गृहमंत्री जाता था। वो समझते थे कि अफगानिस्तान हमारा एक एक्स्टेंशन है।

पाकिस्तान हमारा एक प्रांत है। पाकिस्तान अफगानिस्तानको अपना एक प्रांत समझ रहा था। समझना और करना दोनो मे बडा अंतर होता है। समझ तो अमेरिकाको भी अपना एक प्रांत समझ सकते है। लेकिन उसे डील करने की कुवत चाहिये, हिम्मत चाहिये, ताकत चाहिये, दृष्टि चाहिये, तसव्वुर चाहिये, व्हिजन चाहिये। दुर्भाग्य ये है कि भारत की विदेश नीतिका व्हिजन लोगोंके पास है नहीं। जो लोग नीति बनाते है विदेश मंत्रालय में। उनका व्हिजन सिर्फ तीन सालका होता है। जैसे पत्रकारका व्हिजन सिर्फ तीन पेजका होता है। तीन पेजका एक आर्टिकल लिखा पंधरा सौ शब्दांक। मामला खतम। उसके बाद वह बिचारा सोच पढ नहीं पाता। डिप्लोमॅटकी समस्या ये है कि तीन सालकी पोस्टिंग जहां होती है उसके बाद वह नामतक भूल जाता है।

जो नेता लोग है हमारे उनको खुर्सी और रिश्वत उससे फुरसत नहीं। जो विद्वान है। जिनको चाहिये कि सोचें देशके बारे मे उनकी बड़ी दुर्दशा है। उनको कोई पूछता नहीं। नतीजा क्या होता है ? पूरा समय फुटनोटस् लगानेमे नष्ट हो जाता है। अखबार पढकर पंडिताई शुरु हो जाती है। नतीजा शून्य होता है। वही नतीजा होता है जो ब्रेझनेव्ह के जमानेमे अफगानिस्तानमे घुस जानेका हुआ था। हम घुस गये श्रीलंका मे। बिना तय्यारी के घुस गये। उन्नीस सौ सत्यासीके तीस जुलै को इतना भोंडा समझौता हुआ। राजा दिनेश सिंग फ्रान्समे गये हुवे थे। पूछा तक नहीं उनसे, कन्सल्ट तक नहीं किया कि ये समझौता करें यान करें। और हिंदुस्तान मे जो लंकाके एक्सपर्टस थे, हिम्मत नहीं थी। उनकी जबान लडखडा रही थी यह बोलने से यह समझौता विनाशकारी है।

मेरा निवेदन ये है की पूना की इस प्रबुध्द नगरी मे इतने लोग, इतने सिनीअर लोग, समझदार लोग बैठकर दो दिनसे विचार कर रहे है हमारे वेद शिक्षितांके बारे मे उनको गंभीरता से सोचना चाहिये । और शायद हम लोग जो दिल्ली मे बैठते हैं, हमारे मुकाबले आपका सोच अधिक वस्तुनिष्ठ हो सकता है । अधिक तटस्थ हो सकता है । अधिक वास्तविक हो सकता है । और पूना के लोगोंने बडी दूर दूर तक मार की । पूना की समशेर अफगानिस्तान के आगे तक चली गयी । लोगों को मालूम है की पेशवा लोगोने क्या किया ।

अगर अफगानिस्तान विश्रंखलित होता जाता है तो पाकिस्तानको विश्रंखलित होने से दुनिया की कोई ताकत रोक नही पायेगी । और पाकिस्तान अगर विश्रंखलित होता है तो इसकी जिम्मदारी भारतकी होगी । भारतको चाहिये कि वो अफगानिस्तानमे एक विशेष भूमिका अदा करे । ये तो सिर्फ अफगानिस्तानकी बात मैने कही ।

मै एक और बुनियादी बात पर आपका ध्यान आकर्षित करना चाहता हूँ । सवाल सिर्फ यह नही है उन्नीस सो सैतालीसेमे भारत टूटा । भारत सैतीसमे भी टूटा था । उसकी किसीको याद नही । बर्मा किसके पास था ? भूतान के वैदेशिक संबंध किसके पास थे ? कर्नल यंग हसबंड के जाने के पहले तक उन्नीससौ चार और उन्नीससौ तेरा के पहले तक तिब्बत किसके पास था ? पूछता हूँ आपसे । हम लोग अब पूछतेही नही है । प्रश्नोंको उठातेही नही । ये सारा भारत है । ये सारी भारतमाता है । लेकिन घबराईये मत । एक के हम सात हो गये । आठ हो गये । आठ देश बन गये । या सात मान लीजिये । तिब्बत को देश नही मानते है । हम एकके सात हो गये । लेकिन जब तक ये भावना हमारे हृदयमे रहेगी की हम एकही है । पूरे दक्षिण एशियाके, साऊथ एशियाके सातों राष्ट्र हम एक परिवार है । हम एक लोग है । विभिन्न धर्म होते हुए हमारी एक संस्कृति है । दर्जनों भाषाएं होते हुए हम लोगोंकी मूल जीवनपध्दति, बृहद जीवनपध्दति हजारो वर्षोंसे एक तरहकी है । हम लोगोंकी जीवनदृष्टि एक तरह की है । हमारे सुख दुःख एक तरह के है । अगर ये भाव भारत मे उत्पन्न होता है और चलता है और मजबूत बनता है तो सुरक्षाकी समस्याए रहेंगी नही । गरीबीकी समस्याए रहेंगी नही । युध्द के बादल फिरसे मंडरायेंगे नही ।

लेनिनके थीसिस को मै उलटता हूँ । जरा उसपर ध्यान दे । लेनिन कहते थे कि सोव्हिएत संघ मल्टी नॅशनल स्टेट है । ठीकही कहते थे । टूट गया एक दिन । सारे नेशन्स बिखर गये । एक के सोलह हो गये । हिंदुस्तानके बारे मे मैं उलटीबात कहता रहा हूँ । लेनिन कहते थे कि वो मल्टी नॅशनल स्टेट है । दक्षिण एशिया के बारे मे मैं कहता हूँ हम मल्टी स्टेट नेशन है । हम बहु राज्यीय राष्ट्र हैं । हम ऐसा राष्ट्र हैं जिसमे बहुत सारे राज्य है ।

अभी जो भारत के प्रांत है उनके आपसी अंतर कम हैं ? उनकी आपसी दंगल कम हैं ? गुजरात और महाराष्ट्र लड़ रहे हैं। तामिलनाडु और कर्नाटक लड़ रहे हैं। कभी पानीपर लड़ रहे हैं कभी सीमा पर लड़ रहे हैं। कभी बिजली पर लड़ रहे हैं। आसाम और बाकी के सात राज्योंमें कम बातोंपे झंझट है।

प्रांत हैं और प्रांतोंके बाहरकी जो सीमा है उनके कुछ राष्ट्र बन गये। ये सब हमारे हैं। ये लोग हमारे हैं। इनकी परेशानिया, इनके सुखदुख हमारे हैं। ये भारतको सोचना पड़ेगा। ये एक नया इंपिरीअल व्यू है। यह एक आक्रमणकारी, पोषणकारी, साम्राज्यवादी दृष्टिकोन नहीं है। यह एक प्रेमका - जिसे इमंशर्नलीझम कहके मत टालिये - मानवीय मामलोंकी आंतरराष्ट्रीय मामलोंकी जो गहरी अंतरधारा है उसका एक दृष्टीकोन है। ये जो एक अरब लोग है या सवा अरब लोग है पूरे हिंद महासागरसे हिमालयतकके विशाल क्षेत्रतक ये सब हमारे लोग हैं।

जब ये दृष्टि रखेंगे तो समस्याओंको आप दूसरे ढंगसे देखने लगेंगे। और दूसरे ढंगसे अगर देखेंगे तो हम ये नहीं कहेंगे कि पाकिस्तान अगर आत्महत्या करना चाहता है तो कर ले। कल मेरा बेटा मुझसे कहे कि मैं आत्महत्या करना चाहता हूँ तो मेरा कर्तव्य क्या होगा। हिंदू फिलॉसॉफी तो कहती है कि अपना अपना धर्म है, अपना अपना कर्म है। सब भुगतेंगे। ठीक है। अल्टिमेटली तो वही होना है। अंततक समझायें कि है। लेकिन कर्तव्य क्या है पिताका, कि पिता बेटेको समझायें। अंततक समझायें कि आत्महत्या तरे हितमें नहीं है। वरना अर्जुनसे माथाफोडी करनेकी कृष्ण को जरूरत क्या थी। अर्जुन मरना चाहता था। कृष्ण कहता था मरो मेरा क्या जाता है। कृष्ण का कौन क्या बिगाड सकता था। लेकिन कृष्णने पूरी गीता अठरा अध्याय कह दी और उसे समझाया।

चाहे तिब्बतका प्रश्न हो। चाहे पाकिस्तानका प्रश्न हो। चाहे अफगानिस्तानका प्रश्न हो। भारतकी जिम्मेदारी है। और भारतकी जिम्मेदारी सिर्फ हम थोडा व्यापार बढ़ा दे थोडे पैसे कमाले यही नहीं है। ये भी है। आज की दुनिया जिस तरह से चल रही है। अगले बीस पच्चीस वर्षोंमें जो सिनारिओ उसको दिखाई पडता है। ये जो संप्रभुता के प्रश्न है। सॉव्हेरैन्टीके प्रश्न है ये काफी गौण हो जाएंगे। इनका महत्त्व लगभग नहीं के बराबर रह जाएगा।

अभी आप देखें। आपको फॅक्स करना है यहांसे। सीधे बेनझिर भुट्टो के दतर में फॅक्स कर दीजिये यहाँ से। नवाझ शरीफके दफतरमें फॅक्स कर दीजिये और कह दीजिये जहांगीर करामातसे यूरोपमें उनके आर्मीके चीफमें जो दम हो तो, इतनीसी जो मशिन है दस हजार की फॅक्सकी उसपे कागज जाता है। कोई बुलेट नहीं। बम्ब नहीं। रोकलो उसे। वे रोक नहीं सकेंगे। वह जाएगा। सीधे नवाझ शरीफके दफतरमें जाएगा।

डायरेक्ट । फोन को रोकले । कैसे रोकेंगे । टेलिविजनपे आनेवाले चित्रको रोकले । कैसे रोकेंगे । खतम कर दिया इन्होंने । इन्फर्मेशनने सूचनाने सॉफ्टवेर-टीको ध्वस्त कर दिया । जो आपने किला बना रखा था उसको तोड़कर ध्वस्त कर दिया, खंडित कर दिया ।

यही अर्थव्यवस्थाका होनेवाला है । आज एक बिलीयन डॉलर से जादा माल हमारा पाकिस्तानके गली गली मे बिकता है । कहाँ से जाता है । व्हाया दुबई व्हाया सिंगापूर । रोक ले दम हो तो । कैसे रोकेंगे । रोक नहीं सकते । माल जाएगा । विचार जाएंगे । जीवनपद्धति जायेगी । पाकिस्तानमे घूमिये । लोग धोती देखते है तो नमस्कार करते है अपने आप । मैं उनको सलाम देने को नहीं बोलता हूँ । अपने आप कहते है । नमस्कार । टेलिविजन तो देखते हैं । कहां तक रोक लेंगे । विचार फैल रहे हैं । विचारोंको कोई रोक नहीं सकता । दोस्तीका विचार फैल रहा है । समृद्धिका विचार फैल रहा है ।

युध्द की तैयारी सुरक्षा की तैयारी, युध्द नहीं कहूंगा, सुरक्षा की तैयारी हम पूरी करें लेकिन थोडा आपसी संबंधोंको बढ़ानेके लिये मन बदलनेकी तैयारी भी करें । पाकिस्तानके कंपल्शन क्या है ? अपने आपको इम्पीरियल सक्सेसर मानते हैं । इसिलिये ज्यूरंड लाईनका प्रश्न बार बार उठते है । अगर पाकिस्तान नहीं बना होता तो अफगानिस्तानसे हमारा इतना झगडा होता कि जिसकी कोई कल्पना नहीं कर सकता । हम ज्यूरंड लाईनको टूथ अँडनेल डिफेंड करते रहते, जैसे मॅकमोहन लाईनको डिफेंड करनेके लिये इतने लोग हमने मरवाये । युध्द किया । क्यों ? चीन तो कह रहा था मॅकमोहन लाईन हम नहीं मानते ।

भारत को बांधा इन दो लाईनोने । उधर से मॅकमोहन लाईन और इधरसे ज्यूरंड लाईन । मॅकमोहन लाईनको लेके अगर युध्द हुआ तो ज्यूरंड लाईनको लेकर भी होगा । पाकिस्तान ज्यूरंड लाईन डिफेंड कर रहा है वो हमारा काम कर रहा है । अफगान कहते हैं कि ज्यूरंड लाईन निकृष्ट है । उसको हटाव । ठीक कहते है । क्योंकि इंपीरिअल लाईन थी । १८९३ मे जबरदस्ती इंपोज कर दी गयी थी । गंडमतकी ट्रीट्री कैसे साईन की । अमीत अब्दुल रहेमान ने चुझुभर आंसू बहाए कि एक निक्कमी लाईन खींच दी । लेकिन ऐसी लाईने पूरे सॅट्रल एशियामे खिंची है । समरकंदमे, बुखारामे जाके आप तुर्की बोलके देखिए ।

पाकिस्तानके दिमागमे एक माइंड सेट बन गया है, जो जिन्नाने शुरू किया टूनेशन थिअरी के जरिये । वो अभीतक कई पुराने जनरलोंके और पुराने नेताओंके दिमागमे जमा हुआ है । लेकिन आपसे नई हवाओंके बारेमें कह देना चाहता हूँ । पाकिस्तानमे अब टू नेशन थिअरीपर कोई बहस करता नहीं । नई पीढीके लोग उसके बारेमे कोई बात करते नहीं । जबसे बांगला देश बना है और टू नेशनके श्री नेशन हो गये है पाकिस्तान

मे अबकोई आरग्यू करता नहीं । ये दूसरी चीज भी खतम हुई ।

तीसरी चीज पाकिस्तानने देखली की ओ. आई. सी. ऑर्गनायझेशन ऑफ इस्लामिक यूनिटी अब कुछ करके देती नहीं । उससे कुछ होता नहीं । अपनी आयडेंटीटी उसने बहुत तलाश करके देखी । ब्रेस्ट एशियामे जाकर अब पाकिस्तानी अपने पुराने खानदानोंको तलाश करते है । बडे बडे पाकिस्तानी नेता लोग - कहते हैं हम राजपूत है । हम कोशल ब्राम्हण है । अभी नवाझ शेरीफके जो सबसे निकट मित्र है शेख ताहीर । जब उनके घरमे गया तो उन्होने कहा मै अरोरा हूँ । और आपको बढिया व्हेजिटरीयन खाना खिलाउंगा । सारे लोग अब अपने अपने रूटस की तरफ पाकिस्तानमे जा रहे है । यह एक अच्छी बात है । जातिवाद खतम हो यह एक अच्छी बात है । लेकिन अपनी अस्मिताको पहचान रहे है । कोशिश कर रहे हैं । यह बडी बात है ।

पाकिस्तानके कंपल्शन्स अब बदल रहे है । उन बदलते हुए कंपल्शन्सको हमे देखना चाहिए । अमेरिकाका भी अभी खेल सिर्फ आर्थिक रह गया है । पाईप लायनोंका खेल रह गया है । सोविएत एम्पायर अब उध्वस्त हो चुका है । चीनने भी अपनी राह बदल दी है । इसलिये ये खतरा भारतको अब वैसा नहीं है जैसा कि पांच साल पहले, सात साल पहले था । पाकिस्तान के घुटने अब हिलने लगे है कमजोर हो गये हैं । यह पहली बार पचास सालमे मौका तयार हुआ है कि आज पाकिस्तानको अपने बडे इम्पिरीअल फ्रेमवर्क मे जड सकते हैं । पाकिस्तानको यूज कर सकते हैं । अपना सिपहसालार बना सकते हैं । इस मौके को खोना नहीं चाहिये । कलतक मुझे ये लग रहा था कि भारत सरकार काफी ढिलाईसे काम करती है । नवाझ शेरीफ इतने सिग्रल्स भेज रहा है इतने जेस्चर्स भेज रहा है पता नहीं हम क्यू डरे हुवे है । लेकिन कल सुबहके अखबारको देखकर थोडीसी छूट नवाझ शेरीफने दे दी । हमारे अडतीस बच्चोंको मछवारोंको जो पकड रखा था उनको छोड दिया है । वो विसाकी जो दुक्कल है । जो मिटींग हो रही है ओ. आय. सी. की इसके डरके मारे कि कहीं कोई वहा बम्ब न लगा दे । हम लोग सिंधियोंको वहा घुसाकर कोई और काम न करलें उन्होने छब्बीस विसा बुलकुल बंद कर रखे है । लेकिन छब्बीसके बाद पाकिस्तानके एम्बसीने हमारें यहाँ बहुत सारे लोगोंको अॅशुअर कर रखा है विसाके लिये । कुछ जर्नालिस्ट अभी जाना चाहते थे उनका विसा बंद कर दिया है । ऐसा नहीं है की नवाझ शेरीफ पूरे मालिक है । ये ऊँचा नीचा चलेगा । लेकिन हमको बरदाशत करना होगा । इतने बडे सबकॉन्टिनेन्टको हमे चलाना है । सव्वा अरब लोगोंको । एक चौथाई मनुष्यता के हम नेता हैं । हमको बहुतसी बाते बरदाशत करना पडेगी ।

## SESSION II

## PAKISTAN AND ITS INFLUENCE AN AFGHANISTAN

Chairman : R D Sathe

Main Speaker : Sushant Sarin

## PAPER PRESENTED BY MR. SUSHANT SARIN

Mr. Ram Sathe, Air Marshal Kulkarni, Ladies & Gentlemen.

You have done me great honour by asking me to come and address this very distinguished gathering. I will be talking on Pakistan and its influence on Afghanistan. I will also speak on the emergence of Taliban, their future and the likely impact of the developments in Afghanistan on India.

Let me at the very outset beg your pardon because I belong to a generation which does not share the emotionalism which many of the senior people here have shared. I feel that we Indians suffer a certain degree of inferiority as far as the Afghanis, Pakistanis, Iranis and all others are concerned. Fortunately or unfortunately I do not share that view of most of the people.

Ever since the fall of Dr.Najibullah's Government, the scene in Afghanistan has changed so rapidly that it is quite difficult for anyone to predict with certain amount of certainty as to what will happen next. The situation has been made worst by the Afghan genius for making such fluid alliance that one cannot say as to today's friends may turn enemies tomorrow and friends again the next day.

Therefore at the very outset I will say that if at the end of my presentation you are as confused and unclear about the evolving situation and feel that places the presentation as illogical, inconsistent or even contradictory, the blame does not lie upon me it lies upon the Afghanis themselves because only they can make things as complicated as they are.



But great deal of responsibility has to be shared by Pakistanis also who are not only the external factor but are the principal external factor in the developments in Afghanistan and to make some sense of the madness that was there in Afghanistan, the role of Pakistan is crucial.

It is said about the Middle East that there can be no war without Egypt and there can be no peace without Syria. Something of this nature is true for Afghanistan. While there can be war given the Afghan genius and the delight which they take in killing each other, there can be a war in Afghanistan even without Pakistan, but there can never be peace in Afghanistan unless Pakistan wants it. This sums up the influence which Pakistan exercises on Afghanistan.

Pakistan is in a sense the inheritor of the legacy. They have not been able to decide whether they are the inheritor of the legacy of the British in Afghanistan or the inheritors of the Ranjit Singh's empire in Afghanistan. They certainly do not have the capability and the resources of the British. They of course imagine that they do. Pakistan's influence actually stems from a wide variety of factors which really are ethnic, linguistic, cultural, social, religious and sectarian, the geographical realities as well as the political realities of the cold war period and now the post cold war period. All these talks of Central Asian trade have been also a great source of influence of Pakistan on Afghanistan's economy. Pakistanis and Afghanistans have been going to each other's countries for years now for marriages, education, business and trade and what is most important to carry out dissident political activity.

All these factors have played an important part in making Pakistan an extremely important factor in Afghanistan and while one does not want to discount the importance of the US military and economic aid and the intelligence support during the years of Afghan Jihad, these are the factors that have enabled Pakistan to play a role that did enable them during Afghan resistance against Soviet occupation. In fact the sort of intrusive and aggressive influence which Pakistan today exercises over Afghanistan, the classic example being the Taliban today, is the result of its active involvement in Afghan's war against the Soviets.

There is another country which is supposed to exercise a lot of influence over the events in Afghanistan and that is Iran. But Iran has been limited by a couple of factors. During the years of the Afghan war, Iranis were more busy fighting the Iraqis as that was a question of their survival, and they really did not want to open another front gainst Soviets at that point of time. This to an extent saved them from the kind of mess Pakistan is in today. But also did not allow them to have the leverages which Pakistan has today. There were other factors of course, one being a sectarian factor, Iran being a Shia majority country and also the fact that Iran was isolated internationally and did not have the resources which Pakistan got to sponsor the war in Afghnistr at that point of time. They do have some cultural and linqustic affinity and historically a degree of influence on trade, commerce and other things in the northern and western parts of Afghanistan, but certainly not to the kind of degree to which Pakistan exercises an influence.

The politicl influence which Pakistan exercises has continued really since early 1970s when the same General Nasirulla Babar who was then the Governor of the North West Frontier province who is now credited with creating the Taliban had patronised the dissident elements in Afghanistan as a means of putting pressure on the Afghani Gvernment to desist from raising the issue of Pakhtunistan. This stood Pakistan in good stead once it decided to resist the Soviet occupation, and it was these elements, notably Gulbadin Hikmatiyar was one of them. So was Rabbani and other one which you know allowed them to conduct the kind of warfare which they did during those years and just like that thing stood them in good stead. It was the support which they gave to the Mujahidins during the Jihad years led them into establishing very important linkages which made it possible for them to throw the new card, every time things did not go their way. But they probably played their very last card, the Taliban and I think this was the last card which they really had in their hand.

The experience which Pakistan gained from conducting the Soviet war is another important element. They know the region, the people, their strength and weakness and how to utilise and exploit these. There is the refugee factor. More than two million Afghan refugees are in Pakistan. While this did earn the Pakistanis some

amount of good will, in fact a lot of good will, amongst the Afghans, it is also a source of tremendous leverage to sponsor trouble and put pressure on Afghans. These refugees include communists, former politicians, soldiers, members of the erstwhile royal families, high officials from the days of monarchy, relatives of the Afghan warlords who are at the moment fighting against Pakistan and accusing it of sponsoring Taliban and a very vast underclass which can be exploited like Dr. Vaidik has used the term as the Pashtuns, of the hired soldiers to carry out trouble in Afghanistan.

The warlords of Afghanistan have vital economic interests. They are running universities, schools, businesses, trading establishments from within Pakistan, the supply lines for food and fuel and other essential goods depends on Pakistan and those who are still close to Pakistan are also getting arms, ammunition and money. For an instance, Gulbudin Hikamatiyar who was during the years of Jihad very very close associate of Pakistanis and front man during that period has been reduced to selling his wares and his land trusers to simply survive.

So once the Pakistanis pull back support, most of these chaps you know they fall on very very bad days. One can go on and talk about the kind of influence which Pakistan exercises but that would only be to state the obvious. The exercise of influence however is not a one way street. For the very reason that Pakistan exercises an influence on Afghanistan, Afghanistan too has an influence on Pakistan - its society, its economy, and its politics. Very succinctly this was summarised by the Pakistani newspapers which had said that the sort of leverages that Pakistan has on Afghanistan also lands it with a liability, germs of hostility are inherent in the situation. As such unless we play our cards right away we can get into a quagmire as they seem to have got caught in it.

Now every step that Pakistan takes to exercise and increase its influence in Afghanistan also has an impact on Pakistan and really for us this is the most troubling part of Pak-Afghan relations. From a long term point of view, what should be really bothering us then is not what happens within Afghanistan because it has been ruined beyond recognition. I do not think we should bother much about the misery of the Afghans, but the fact that how this will have a fallout on the

entire region and since the impact of development in Afghanistan, on the region is to a large degree determined by the influence and the interference in its affairs by external forces, the spill over too will be proportionate to the influence and interference.

As such maximum impact will naturally be on the country that exercises the maximum influence and also at the same time has the maximum interest in its hold on Afghanistan, and that is Pakistan of course. Now the influence which Pakistan wields, although enormous, is limited by the impact on Pakistan's own domestic polity, Pakistani political parties, specially the religious parties like Jamate Islami, the JUI which is supposed to, you know from where, whose Madrasas, Taliban have suddenly emerged out of the woodwork.

These are parties which have very vital stakes within Afghanistan because they feel that if they have their kind of government in Afghanistan, it will give them a lot of leverage in Pakistani politics as well. And then of course the Pakhtun factor. This also limits Pakistani influence to some extent. The influence is also limited to the extent to which you know the Afghanis are willing to accept that influence.

Dr.Vaidik has spoken about the Afghans not really believing in Shariat and believing more in the Pakhtun Valley. But I would like to differ and I would say that Afghans really do not believe in anything. Pakhtun valley is something which they observe more in its violation than following it. It depends upon the situation whether they want to observe it or they do not want to observe it, and like you know, in Hinduism they say "Aap ne pap kiya to gangajime jakar usako dho sakate hain." Similarly there are ways and means of getting around violations of the Pakhtun Valley also. I also do not agree with Dr.Vaidik that the Afghanis are very honourable people and of very high character.

But then there are other limiting factors. One is the kind of objectives that Pakistan has set for itself, I think what they are trying is too ambitious, second is the capacity of Pakistan to enforce these objectives and finally the extent to which the other interested countries which have vital interests, strategic and economic in Afghanistan, the

amount of interference they do. This also limits Pakistan's influence in Afghanistan.

When the Soviets had entered Afghanistan, there was basically a twofold objective for the Pakistanis - one was of course the threat which Soviets posed to Pakistan itself and the second one was Pakistan at that point of time had a military dictatorship which was really beleaguered and it was believed that it will not last very long. It is around 1979, and really the Soviet invasion came as a God-send for the Pakistanis dictatorship. Because this suddenly propped them up. The Western Press suddenly switches their stand as much as the Afghans do and suddenly you know the General Zia Ul Haq became a fighter for freedom, and democracy and what not. So this was another factor.

After the Soviets withdrew and the Soviet Union broke-up, suddenly the objectives changed. Principally now the objectives are - number one the return of refugees who have put tremendous pressure on Pakistan's economy and its society and its polity, number two Pakistan's confrontation with India and its concept which they have suddenly - the great General Mirza Aslam Baig has propounded of having a strategic depth. I will return to this point later but let me right now say that the strategic depth is more of a strategic nightmare and a strategic black hole for Pakistan. Number three, formalising the Durand Line so that they settle this entire concept of Pashtunistan once and for all. Then of course this Central Asian Trade and not only the Cenral Asian Trade but to deny India the benefits of the Central Asian Trade. That is very important for Pakistan. And finally, they want a stable and friendly government which can control the narcotics, arms and the consumer goods smuggling, which is wrecking havoc on Pakistan's own economy.

While really there is nothing objectionable in these objectives as far as Pakistan goes, they are a bit unrealistic and impractical. Not only this, not enough attention has been paid to certain essential prerequisites for achieving these objectives. Nor was there any thought given as to how to convince Afghans to go along with the Pakistani plan, without making them feel that they have been reduced to a

client state. And finally, after all the experience of dealing with the Afghans, the Pakistanis ignored certain very fundamental characteristics of Afghans and proceeded on the mistaken belief that after assistance rendered to them during the Jihad they would be so eternally grateful to them and with religion being the binding factor the Afghans would do whatever was asked of them. This does not happen.

Number one, no refugee has ever gone back, I remember a very senior Pathan leader telling, Pakistani Pathan leader telling my father that if the refugees had gone back five thousand years back the Hindus would not be here, if they had gone back 1400 years back, Islam would not be here, if they had gone back 50 years back, I would not be out here. So they have never gone back and we are expecting too much to expect the people who have now come and stayed in Pakistan for the last 20 years to go back to Afghanistan and start their lives anew.

There is another problem of the refugees. If they are forced to go back they will be held to stay within Pakistan Pushtun area of frontier province and north Baluchistan. A man Walikhan who is now again a very very important political leader after the recent election. He has said that on both sides of the border it is Afghan country and those on the other side of the Turkham border crossing cannot be stopped from entering their own land.

So this is the kind of feelings which exist, but on the other hand if these refugees stay then apart from the pressure which they are putting on Pakistan's resources there is simmering conflict in north Baluchistan between the Pathans and the Baluch and this might just erupt into a full-fledged conflagration given the kind of heavy militarisation which has gone on of the civil society in Pakistan and especially these border areas.

Then there is a question of Afghans accepting the Durand Line. To an extent this question becomes irrelevant because today the Durand Line exists only in Atlases. There is no Durand Line any more. Moreover there are senior Pakistani political people like Leghari, people like General Babar and the others also who have been talking

in terms of having an easy like arrangement with the Pakistanis and eventually leading up to a confederation between Pakistani and Afghanis.

I don't think they really know what it involves but it is a term and it has to be bandied about and they bandied about. But this whole question of the Durand Line, Pakistanis have a very very typical knack of ruffling feathers which they don't need to do anything like this. And by raising this contentious issue it might backfire on them, especially in case there is a sudden upsurge of Pashtun nationalism, given the kind of conditions which exist in Pakistan and in case Pakistan breaks into ethnic lines, there is the possibility of that suddenly this whole factor of Pashtunistan might just arise and the Durand Line will again become a major point of contention.

As far as controlling of the narcotics, and consumer goods and other smuggling is concerned, I do not see it happening in the near future because narcotics today is an imperative for Afghanis. They cannot survive unless they are not exporting narcotics. Their entire rebuilding plans of Afghanistan and even the fact that they have to survive depends upon this. They export the narcotics and from the money they are buying food and that is the kind of pattern of trade going on. But this pattern of trade is having a very very serious impact on Pakistan for example they have about three million heroin addicts today and according to one of the Pakistani institutes the annual turnover of smuggling has been estimated at Rs.10000 crores and another 5000 to 6000 crores of narcotic smuggling and the whole lot of their impact on the domestic trade, the domestic industry because of this smuggling but there is a slightly deeper impact also.

Pakistan today is fulfilling all the needs of the Afghanis, specially their food needs. What this is resulting in is that there are major shortages within Pakistan and this is causing inflationary pressures and as it is the mismanagement of the economy has resulted in high inflation but shortages are only exaggerating the existing problems. They can try and fulfil these shortages through imports but really the kind of crisis they are facing on foreign reserves position does not allow them much scope for all this. This is why the Central Asian Trade suddenly becomes important for Pakistan. They expect that the

spin-off of this trade will be the panacea for all the ills which are pervading the Pakistani economy at the moment.

But as far as the Central Asian Trade is concerned, Pakistan is caught in a Catch-22 situation. It anticipates substantial benefits if it captures the trade in transit and of course the pipelines from Central Asia, the shortest route from Central Asia also passes through Afghanistan and Pakistan and is shorter by almost 1600 kms if you see it to Karachi and if you see it to the Iranian Port of Bandar Abbas. Moreover with the Iranians being untouchables for the Western world really the Iranian route is not very attractive for the MNCs which have to invest the money and develop the infra-structure. But for Pakistan then to be in a position to exploit its geographical and political strength it is necessary that there be a stable and friendly government in Afghanistan.

Since April 92, when Najibullah failed, the Mujahidins have been constantly fighting and as a result of the unending warfare between the various factions and their inability to come to any sort of understanding on power sharing, all Pakistan's dreams and ambitions of capturing Central Asian trade have come to a stop. After all that Pakistan has done and it has suffered during the Jihad, Pakistan expects its pound of flesh from Afghanistan. But the civil war does not allow this to happen. The dilemma for Pakistan is that it cannot allow the fighting to continue but if it intervenes it is not sure as to whether it has the capability of sustaining the economic, the political and the military fall-out of such intervention. So it is damned if it does not, and it is damned if it does.

Lot of people talk about the British being defeated in Afghanistan, the Russians being defeated in Afghanistan, Afghanistan always being independent. I really do not agree with it. They might be very very fiercely independent and that might be. It is because of certain geographical and economic and political factors but you know it is no big deal subjugating your people. OK it requires a lot of blood shed and massacres and all that but we have seen it happen in history and we might well see it happen today also.

I do not agree with this thesis which people propound that the British lost in Afghanistan. I don't think that the British lost in



Afghanistan. I just feel that they did not find it worthwhile to continue in Afghanistan any more. Because their basic economic philosophy of imperialism is a cost+ kind of a philosophy and Afghanistan really had nothing to offer to the British. It only had a certain strategic value and once they had settled their problems with Russians they really did not need to intervene and spend so much money in Afghanistan any longer. So I don't think the British lost. Also I do not think that the Russians lost in Afghanistan. They lost men alright. There were constant skirmishes. They lost about 10000 men. But Russia was an imperial power and in imperialism 10000 men really did not have too much of a value.

For the Russians the problem was economic and it was domestic economic problems and they could not sustain it any longer. The whole country was falling apart and they could really not sustain it any longer. This is the difference between Russia, Britain and the Pakistanis. The Pakistanis do find it very worthwhile to intervene in Afghanistan. They anticipate substantial economic benefits from this intervention. I think for them it makes a lot of sense to intervene and they do it. I don't know if they can sustain it very long but they can capture it. I will not put it past that. They have a very professional army even if it is a very politicised one, but professional nevertheless. But how long they can sustain it even with the returns of Central Asian trade, if at all comes about is another matter altogether.

Now then there is another point that will Pakistan really be able to reap the benefits of Central Asian Trade. And if you really see the substantial foreign investment coming up even if it manages to hold sway over Afghanistan. Not because it is not possible or because the trade does not have potential or for other reasons. But the fact is what does Pakistan have to offer to the Central Asians. They do not have an industry which can supply the kind of needs which central asia has. OK they can probably supply soap, detergents and stuffs like that but what more do they have to supply to the Central Asia.

Number two, how does the investment decision of the Central Asians be made. Pakistan is not just hankering for pipeline only. They are not interested only in pipeline. They are not looking at the benefits of only how much money they will get as "kiraya". They are only

interested in that. They also anticipate a lot of foreign investment will come in. Now the point is how do the MNCs make their investment decisions. Will they find it worthwhile not to invest upstream but to invest downstream or to invest upstream and only use the transit routes to Pakistan.

I do not think that anybody can really say with some degree of certainty what will be the kind of investment which will be made in trade and industry and then the point is what do the Afghans get out of this entire thing. You see the basic Afghan character is "Aaye to kya laye ho aur ja rahe ho to kya chhodke ja rahe ho." That is how they have always survived. Now let us assume for a minute that the Taliban manage to establish their sway all over Afghanistan. What happens to the economics of Afghanistan under the Taliban. There is the prospect of Central Asian Trade and pipeline. And they will have the spin-offs of this. Pakistan has already entered into a deal with Taliban which promises Taliban government if at all they can have one free for transit rights, gas to all the cities which fall on the routes of the pipeline and to utilise Afghan labour during the construction of this entire infrastructure.

But given the state of affairs, will this be enough for rebuilding that war ravaged country and will the Afghans be satisfied with this. This is an imponderable which nobody really has thought about because is it not possible that once the Afghans see that investments are being made downstream in Pakistan and Pakistan is reaping the maximum benefit, will this not cause a conflict between the two.

But this is as far as the other part is concerned. The real failure of Pakistan actually has been a very political and a diplomatic failure. For achieving its objectives, Pakistan needed a stable and friendly government in Afghanistan. In pursuit of this all Pakistani calculations were based on having a Pashtun dominated government in Afghanistan. Partly for historical reasons as for the last 250 years Afghanistan has been ruled by the Pashtun and partly for domestic political reasons, the Pashtun factor within Pakistan and the fact that Pakistan has maximum linkages with the Pashtuns.

When Dr.Najibullah government failed, the Pashtuns lost the race for Kabul. Kabul is not important because Kabul is Afghanistan.

Kabul is important because traditionally Afghanistan has been at least for the last 200 years ruled from Kabul. So it just has basically very symbolic value as far as Afghanistan is concerned.

The victory of the non-Pushtuns did cause a lot of anxieties among the Pashtuns and once again the establishment started fearing that there was this resurgence of Pushtu nationalism within Pakistan. But there is a flipside to the focus on Pushtuns. After putting all the stress on the Pushtuns, the Pakistan has alienated all the other ethnic groups. The failure really lies in the fact that during the Jihad all that the Pakistanis concentrated on was the military side. There was never really any political party, when once the war was won, who would move into vacuum and take over the affairs of Afghanistan. This actually was the real failure of Pakistanis. This led to a situation that once the government of Najibullah failed, there was really nobody to take control after that.

The infighting which started and Pakistan tried to mediate but it had already lost all the leverages which it had as an honest broker. Nobody was willing to trust them. Their own favourites were not willing to trust them. They did not believe that what the Pakistanis were doing was for their benefit, for the benefit of Afghanistan. For example Gulbudin Hikmatiyar accused Pakistan of not supporting him against the Rabbani, Masood government and allowing food and fuel convoys to Kabul which was then helping the government to fight against Hikmatiyar's men. On the other hand Rabbani and Masood accused Pakistan, of not doing enough to stop Gulbudin Hikmatiyar attack. So this kind of a thing they were simply not in a position to mediate any more.

And in any case Pakistan kept talking that we are neutral in the entire conflict, just as they are neutral between the Taliban and the others. Now it is a very very fundamental feature that neutrality is a very very alien concept for the Afghan. For the Afghan the reality is that if you are not with me, then you are against me. There is no concept of neutrality. If Pakistanis wanted to be neutral, they can try and be neutral.

In addition to all this, Afghans, including the so-called Jihadi forces do not trust Pakistan. They are willing to use Pakistan's assistance

to take power but once having come to power they will always be suspicious of the Pakistanis because they know by taking Pakistani support to come to power the kind of destabilisation potential Pakistan have on any Afghan government and the kind of problems that can be caused. That is why once they come to power, they will always have some kind of tiff with the Pakistanis.

They know the influence alright, but there is also the kind of lack of restraint which the Pakistanis are famous for and for imposing their own agenda upon Afghanistan. As far as Afghan is concerned it is OK if you back me up but do not dictate terms to me. They want to follow an independent path. They are aware of the importance which Pakistan holds for them and the fact that they cannot do without Pakistan, but they do not want a dictation from Pakistan and this will happen because Pakistan wants to dominate them.

Given this kind of a thing, suddenly there was some sort of urgency started developing because the warring factions were unable to come to an agreement. The Iranians started moving to pre-empt the Pakistanis by forming that pipeline and setting up that railway and road net work. And most of all what irritated the Pakistanis that suddenly they saw the government of Rabbani and Masood had started hobknobbing with the Indians and all this concept of strategic depth was getting lost.

This made them very desperate and then probably they pulled out, what in my opinion the last card in their hands which is the Taliban. It is a force which fulfils all the criteria. It is untinted by the greed and struggle for power, which have characterised the Mujahidins. It is a predominantly Pushtun force fighting for the glory of Islam and establishing an Islamic order, it is well trained by American, British and other mercenaries and again a very very important point, it is not fatigued by the years of warfare.

They first emerged in November 94 when they freed this convoy of Pakistani trucks to Central Asia and they defeated the local commanders of Kandahar and took over that entire place and then they suddenly started moving towards north, towards Kabul and on the other side, from the south towards Herat. The spectacular gains

that they made of course are very well known, but their origins; organisational structure, support base all these are shrouded in a lot of mystery. The Pakistanis insist that the Taliban is an indigenous Afghan phenomena. The former Pakistani Foreign Minister, Asif Ali has called them as the French revolution of Afghanistan. But despite Pakistani protestations that they have nothing to do with the creation of Taliban, nobody really believes this.

And I will make a couple of points here. Number one no country has ever admitted interfering in the affairs of another country or sponsoring an invading force, regardless of the fact whether that invading force is indigenous or alien. Pakistan is no exception to this. And no one knows this better than Indians, that we are having to hear the Pakistani denials of having sponsored terrorism in Kashmir and calling it moral, political, diplomatic support. We know what Pakistani protestations are really all about.

Number two, if the Pakistanis really did not know of the Taliban, then it was a singular failure of Pakistani intelligence and indeed the Pakistani State, that a force of almost 25000 men armed with about 200 tanks, about 25 fighter aircraft emerged, a lot of that force coming from Pakistan and the Pakistani state becomes aware of it only after they suddenly emerged on the scene.

It is also difficult to believe that certain Mullas and religious students could possess such tactical skill, and proved to be such good soldiers that they swept aside the experienced and battle hardened Mujahidins.

And finally all this talk about Taliban, the origin of the Taliban and their reaction to the ways of the local commanders that they emerged not in November 94 but actually in July 94, when some local commanders had raped some women and these guys took up cudgels on their behalf. They rescued the Pakistani convoy because General Nasirulla Babar had requested them to do this. I think all this, and it is purely my opinion, is a part of elaborate exercise to not only give the Talibans a certain degree of acceptability as a bunch of people who resolved to put things right in Afghanistan but also to confuse and confound the Afghans and the world. Because only when there is a confusion, nobody can point a finger at the Pakistanis.

Till date, nobody really knows about their organisation structure. The little that is known is that most of the leading members of the Taliban come from Kandahar. Now this is where yet another factor comes in - of the rivalry within Pushtun. The Pushtun of eastern Afghanistan are Gilzais and these chaps are Durrani and there is the traditional rivalry between the two parts also. Their leader is a man known by the name of Moulana Mohammad Umar who is the Amir of Taliban; his deputy is a certain Moulana Mohammad Rabbani. Only names are known and nobody really has a regular Kachcha Chiththa of these chaps and what their past and what their future is.

Even the Taliban leaders are not clear as to the exact composition of their organisation. There is a Shura. The figures of this Shura range between 25 & 40. Then at top there is a Four members apex Shura, followed by an inner sanctum of 8 members and then a larger consultative Shura between 30 and 40 members. Who the members are is still not known. As far as their origins are concerned, there have been reports of U.S. and British involvement and all this started sometime in 1993 when two British NGOs in Queta on the pretext of sending some humanitarian aid to Kandahar made a recommendation for collecting intelligence and recruiting people. After this an American NGO called Office of Peace and Disarmament started recruiting trained and experienced ex-soldiers. Fabulous salaries were paid. More rare raw recruits came from the seminaries in JUI and Baluchistan and the frontier. The Madarsas doubled-up also as military academies. Incidentally JUI had lot of influence in Pushtun area of frontier and Baluchistan traditionally and the father of this guy who is presently leading is Maulana Fazlul Rehman, was also the Chief Minister of NWFP in 1970s and Fazlul Rehman incidentally is very closely associated with Benazir Bhutto Government.

JUI was used in the same way as the Jamate Islami was during the Jihad years. As far as the JUI is concerned again the prospect of its men wielding power in Afghanistan was very welcome. In fact, after the fall of Kabul, the JUI has been already invited by the Taliban to draw up interim constitution for Afghanistan.

U.S. involvement also became very clear after the sudden revival of U.S. companies' interest in 1995. there is very little doubt that there

is active involvement behind Taliban of the Americans, the British saw these as banks rolling it, the Pakistani are also supporting it, there are reports that Pakistan commanders are ex-servicemen, some serving officers and soldiers are leading the Taliban into attacks.

Let me just touch upon the reasons for the success of Taliban, because people find their success spectacular. It is partly because of the kind of soldiers who are leading them. It is also because of a very skilful use of traditional Afghan methods as of buying the opposition or threatening them into submission, then finishing off the old leadership. This has contributed a great deal to their success.

But one factor which is very important in my view was the initial pattern in which power was exercised after the Najibullah government failed. The pattern of control over the provinces around the time the Taliban emerged was something like this : all the provinces had autonomous or semi-autonomous governments run by some of the more influential commanders of the area. These commanders had allegiance to one or the other of the main party, but really paid a nominal kind of allegiance to these chaps. They did not depend upon these party leaders for their own position which they held in their stronghold, but they were at the same time not so powerful that they could resist an invading force of about 15000 to 20000 men and this was the reason why one province after the other failed.

There was yet another very important factor which is likely to play a very very important role in the ongoing conflict and that is the mutual suspicion and distrust between the various warlords. After Herat fell in September 95, the Governor of Herat, accused Masood who is supposed to be his ally, of hobknobbing with the Taliban and not supporting him in fighting off the Taliban invasion. The suspicion between Masud and Dostam is also legendary that they made an alliance of convenience is alright. But how far they will be able to continue with it if the Taliban is defeated is again unknown. And to a great extent even this factor will decide future of Taliban and their victories.

As far as the Taliban now are concerned, they hold sway over about 75% of the country. But nobody has recognised them so far. This

is probably because of the outcry of the kind of policies which the Taliban have followed and Americans in the initial flush when Kabul was taken Americans had welcomed Taliban and expressed cautious optimism of Taliban taking control of Kabul. But then suddenly the Americans just withdrew because of the kind of things Taliban did. Pakistan itself has not recognised them. But behind the scene lot of negotiations are taking place and lot of agreements are being signed.

Now the point is what happens if the Taliban wins. In my view, I think that there will be a prospect of a wider Afghan war because of the involvement of other states. The Taliban have already threatened Iran that they will declare war on Iran if they sponsor some trouble. They are notorious for the obstinateness, the stubbornness. So they might well do something like this. Supposing they move further north and further west, then the Iranis, the Uzbeks, the Tajiks because of their own problems start sponsoring some kind of an insurgency. It is entirely possible that the Taliban might try and move in out there. So there is the prospect of larger Afghan war which might suck in all the countries. If they lose then one prospect is of the break-up of Afghanistan along its midline; the other prospect is which is to my mind is a more realistic one is that the Afghanistan will break up and the Taliban will turn their attention on Pakistan.

Basically Pakistan is a secular society within the context of Islami society, it is a very secular and liberal society and it will be an anathema for the Taliban to tolerate such a society and they will have a catastrophic impact on the Pakistanis.

As far as we are concerned, I think a lot of focus is on how the Taliban will impact on Kashmir. I am not really bothered about what they do in Kashmir. They might send a thousand, two-thousand men. We can take care of that. My botheration is that what happens when the Taliban and this kind of a phenomenon have a catastrophic impact on Pakistan. Pakistan is already being seen possible failed state and it might well be a failed state in the near future, possibly in 10 years, 15 years.

If Pakistan breaks-up, then what do we do. And I think it is a very very realistic possibility that Pakistan may just collapse under the



weight of its own contradiction. It might not be in our interest. It is certainly not in our interest. We would like to have a stable and if not a friendly at least not a hostile Pakistan. I do not think we can do really much to save the Pakistanis from themselves and if they have decided to self-destruct, then they will. And my assessment is that they might well do it. And how to handle the consequences is now what we should really be bothered about rather than the sponsorship of may be 100, 200, 2000 men in Kashmir. I think Kashmir, the tide has turned. We might have been able to control it. The worst is over. But what will be the worst is what happens if Pakistan breaks-up.

## SESSION III

CENTRAL ASIAN REPUBLICS, IRAN AND  
AFGHANISTAN

Chairman : J G Nadkarni

Main Speakers : Ram Bapat, P. Stobdan

## PAPER PRESENTED BY PROFESSOR RAM BAPAT

Admiral Nadkarni, Air Marshal Kulkarni, Ladies &amp; Gentlemen.

I am neither an area specialist nor someone who was ever involved in the decision making, administrative or media management processes related to foreign and security policies. Moreover, very well informed specialists have addressed us yesterday and they are going to follow me soon.

In the given situation, my focus would be mainly on the, not so much on Afghanistan, but of course including Afghanistan, in general, on Central Asian States, who were earlier a part of the Soviet Union. Even there, I shall concentrate my attention on only one dimension of the problem, of their cultural life, namely religion. It has of course implications for Afghanistan and for our own interest and concerns in the area. The issue has been recently put on the agenda by a German specialist in the following terms :-

"The Afghanisation of the region is often cited as a main threat to regional stability. Attention focusses here on the developments in Tajikistan. However, what does Afghanistan stand for in this context for the Islamic State which the country has officially called itself since 1992 or for the non-state, for anomy and for the disintegration of the State.

Is it Islam which threatens them from Afghanistan or the fact that neither Islam nor the secular nations have been able to hold these sorely afflicted countries together. The fact that Taliban participate in the Afghanistan chaos with Islamic slogans and are munitioned by the

Pakistani Secret Service and that ordinary power struggle between tribal and ethnic factions of the Afghan Civil War are presented as a holy war, does not allow the reduction of the Afghan tragedy to Islamic fundamentalism. It is certain however that the developments in Tajikistan and the tragedy in Afghanistan extends far beyond the frame of regional conflicts and that they deserve international attention."

I share this perception of the problem and before I proceed to the issue, let me just put in nutshell the larger framing which really conditions the approach to this particular problem.

In the first instance, let us be very clear about one thing. There is an illusion that either Afghanistan or any one of the alternate local power, as if it were, including the so-called regional powers like Iran or Saudi Arabia or Pakistan has a special draw for this particular states. This is not the case.

A very ambitious study was carried out really by a Franco German Institute, an opinion survey. All of us are aware of the limitations and also of the prejudices which govern these kind of exercises. But still the results would be interesting. Opinion polls conducted in Central Asian States inter-alia, tells also about the attitude of the population towards the country's foreign policy orientations.

Respondents who were drawn from the security services, from the various administrative establishments, from the opinion makers and also from the Ulema, by the way. Respondents who expressed approval of foreign influence and the model effect of foreign model hardly look to the countries of the middle east for their orientation. Among the younger age group, the options favoured were USA 44%, Japan 40%, Europe 37%, Muslim countries 31%, Turkey 26%, Russia in the younger age group 35%, in the age group over 50, 60%

More interesting from our point of view of the countries from which responders felt that their own countries should disassociate itself. Afghanistan was mentioned most frequently, followed by Iran and Pakistan. They viewed their own geopolitical environment as

discomforting. Turkey, a partner on account of its ethnic kinship did not figure as strongly as expected. And most important, and I think this is a very important point, almost 80% of the respondents rated Islam as almost 8th or the 9th factor in the various processes which were to condition really the future of this area, both at the peoples' and at the state levels. So this is the first point.

We also are aware that these countries as yet are not fully integrated in any meaningful sense of the term in the so called Islamic framework of contemporary international polity. But let me go to the second point.

When I am talking about the larger frame, I am really talking about the interest of the three big powers - U.S.A., Russia and China. For us when we try to understand these perceptions of the big powers, our own position should be clear. Linkages of geography, culture, security and economy have bound India and Central Asia through all vicissitudes of history. This is a fact of life and this has nothing to do with any kind of an imagined kind of a community or any kind of an emotionalism. The partition no doubt broke our direct physical contact with the area, but as a paradox, for well-known reasons, it has added further immediacy depth than quality to our concerns and interest in the area. The present inability of Central Asia flows out of three sources :

First, the sudden disintegration of USSR has impinged a successor nation state for peoples of the area to achieve further advance to further and sharper national identities and to secure more meaningful operational sovereignty. They therefore are drawn to work out an efficient and enduring resolution of the various ethnic issues within and outside their national boundaries and territories. In any case, as all of us know, it is a difficult proposition.

The second source of instability, moreover, all of them suffer from economic under-development and their societies moreover stand at different stages of economic growth. So far as the political economies were concerned, they were dovetailed to the Moscow oriented Russian command economy. Sudden exposure to the processes of marketisation have shaken their economies in a very serious kind of manner -

things that you are all aware of, the kind of problems which really Kirgizistan had to face in this respect in the very recent past.

The leadership of the various Central Asian States is therefore in a desperate search for external capital and diversification of economy, particularly in areas related to trade, commerce, transport and above all, extraction and transport of hydro-carbon resources to the outside world. Realisation of these goals requires peace and absence of intrusive presence of alien forces both in direct and indirect forms. Lack of these conditions is also clear now.

The third factor, the failure of the international community to achieve a workable consensus about the contours, the contents and the structure of the post cold war world order is also responsible for generating uncertainty all over the world and particularly in Central Asia. In fact, Central Asia is emerging as one of the sensitive and principal trouble spots of the present world order.

Given these three sources of instability and the fact of life that conditions necessary for stability would not be available for a long time to come, I have to study Central Asia with a greater sense of reality. Now the situation may be perceived in three ways.

One, in the very large strategic frame, where, as was mentioned by the Chairman just now, we may really talk about the confrontation between the land and the sea forces, as really one of the crucial factors of the global factor. We are all aware of the rather abortive attempts of the earlier maritime power to really secure direct control over Central Asia. I am referring to Britania. Now once again, another sisterly maritime power is making an attempt to have a permanent say in the affairs of this part of heartline, this part of Eurasia. Eventually, some kind of an equilibrium may emerge as a result of the inevitable stalemate. But at least for the time being, given the relative superiority of the United States of America, in financial and in industrial matters, as compared in the other rivals and particularly collapse of a counterveiling super power there in the form of Soviet Union, this seems to be rather a tall order.

The situation may be also approached in terms of the restructuration of the world political economy. Just as attempts are

being made out to fashion the operational mechanism of the United Nations by undervaluing the impact of the General Assembly and by valourising the role of the Bretton Wood institutions.

Similarly, I think more importantly in our context, a kind of restructuring of the world energy economy is being sought by various multinationals. It is this ongoing search and competition for development in terms of the hydro-carbon reserves to balance the so called national appetities of the Persian Gulf players is also an important factor. I think this is not only to be seen in terms of the opening of the southern corridors to the Indian ocean but also to be seen in terms of at least kind of the balancing which is being achieved by using political resources to overcome the economic needs as well as legitimate interests of the third world.

So in this context now I come to the issue of fundamentalism. But let me make two points clear over here. What are the American, the Russian and the Chinese interests in concrete ? I think the American interests are too well known here because of our constant exposure to Anglo-Saxon sources.

After the break-up of the Soviet Union, Russia's policy in Central Asia in the last five years or so lacks a clear concept for the Central Asian policy. Now they have started to use the term neighbouring territory in order to draw a distinction between Russia's policy vis-a-vis the former Soviet Republics and genuine foreign policy and relations with proper foreign countries. In other words, they are really now staking a new claim to this area. But the problem is in the given international framework, they lack the economic clout as compared with the military one and that is why Russians are likely to militarise all issues and in order to rationalise this particular kind of a tactics they have also started talking about Islamic fundamentalism in Central Asia as a de-stabilising factor. If now you come to, I think what has happened in Tajikistan really can be taken as an illustration.

If you turn to China, recent China specialist has spelt out the Chinese interest in the following terms. China feels that its own position has been improved by the reduced American and Russian presence in Asia and lost no time in presenting itself as a stabilising

power in the region. It is mainly motivated by the concerns arising out of fundamentalism. China helps to counter the risk of any spill over of Pan-Turkism, Pan-Islamism into China's ethnically heterogeneous north-western territory and thus to ensure the strategically important border province of Sinkiang.

But once again I think we should not under-rate two factors. Chinese, have always been very cautious in such matters. One, they are not going out of the way in order to cultivate any one of the particular factions which are interested in the so-called Islamic politics. Two, more importantly as at present they are not providing any kind of either direct financial or military aid to any one of the players there.

So this is the situation so far as the larger frame work is concerned. Now let me come to the local factor and I end.

On the eve of the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Muslim population in the USSR numbered 56 million, almost 70 percent of all Soviet Muslims lived in Central Asia. Ethnically, the absolute majority of the Central Asian Muslims are of Turkish origin and of major Central Asian peoples only the Tajiks are Iranian speaking and they also speak Irani dialect of a kind. I will come to this factor last, and that is why we have to remember five things.

When it comes to the whole issue of Islamic fundamentalism, the term Muslim here, at least in the context of Central Asia does not denote a denominational but ethnocultural category. It really refers more to the historical memory and affiliation of various ethnic groups which were Islamacised at different times in history. The overwhelming majority belongs to the Sunnait branch of Islam and follows the Anapi school.

But here two things are very very important. Not only Shias have a very very minority presence, Islam is and never was a monolith so far as international world order is concerned. Two, particularly when it comes to Central Asia, Islam has its own history and has its own kind of a quality of its own. Here we have to talk about four dimensions of Islam in Central Asia.

First we have to make a distinction between Islam in the land of the formerly nomadic economic management and way of life and Islam in the sacred regions of Central Asia. I think that is the distinction, let us say, between Uzbek Islam, Tajikistan Islam as differentiated from Islam not exactly in Turkamenia as distinguished between Islam in Kirgijistan or Islam in Tajikistan. At least in certain parts of Turkamenistan and some parts of Kazakistan.

Even in terms of area, you will find that really the presence of Islam is uneven, uneven in the sense afterall we have to talk about the Central Asia's Islam. We have to make a distinction between three types of Islam ethnic Muslims, cultural Muslims, and doctrinal Muslims. And I think most of the times these distinctions really are not noted.

There is a third dimension to this problem. When we really talk about Islam anywhere, and particularly in Central Asia, we do talk about higher and the so called popular Islam. By higher Islam, I do not want to take your time, all of you know that. But by and large higher Islam is an Islam really projected by the Ulemas and let us say by the Institutional Islam and moreover Islam where the influence of the Arab Islam is much larger than the popular Islam. When it comes to popular Islam, popular Islam in Central Asia, even now, and I am emphasising this word, even now, is very much under the influence of pre-islamic Hindu-Buddhist practices.

I think we should not belittle the significance of conclusions derived from the study from the study of recently discovered fossils (which is likely to take some time) when it comes to eventual kind of a dialogue of closer plank between India and this part of the world, provided we do not make the mistake of really saying that what is good in the Central Asian Islam or Central Asian Culture necessarily was a gift of the people from India. But otherwise I think this linkage is very important.

Another thing in this distinction between higher Islam and popular Islam is popular Islam is really the Islam to spell out in very popular terms, the Majhar Islam, the cult Islam as it were. The term Cult is very peculiar, because the term cult here also creates a problem,



when we approach the whole issue in terms of western perception. What is a cult? and here I am talking about religious cult.

Religious cult at every time in history has always two dimensions. On the one hand religious dimension, and also on the other hand identity dimension in terms of national or ethnic self awareness, self definition, and also self projection. And that is why, more often than not you will find while now so many mosques are coming, so many places are being re-named in the name of Muslim theologians, philosophers and what not. By and large you will find when it comes to any kind of a national self identity and also national projection in the immediate and in the larger areas heroes are drawn not from the religious spheres but so much from the cultural spheres.

Recently at a conference, attended mostly by the Central Asian scholars, and more importantly Ulemas, it was pointed out that even if it comes to the problem of preservation and consolidation of Islam in Central Asia, the sources of inspiration do not lie in the Islam dominated by the neighbouring countries and by that they meant Soudi Arabia, Iran, as well as Turkey and Pakistan. But the source of true Islam lies really in the memories which very importantly were really located in pre-Islamic terms. So this is a very interesting kind of a notion. That real Islam really lies in the pre-Islamic path and memories in these particular kind of people.

The fourth dimension of the local fundamentalism, so called is that after all what is fundamentalism for them as of now in terms of immediate gains in the arena of economy, in the arena of political consolidation and efficiency and in the arena of inter state bargaining - for three reasons once again.

Let us begin with the first. As all of us are aware here an attempt made immediately after collapse of the Soviet Union to float an All-Islamic party, I am not quoting the exact name, really came out as a failure, both at the level of the general CIS level but also at the various regional local levels. Not only that but very interestingly some of those who called themselves fundamentalists are the first who would say and they are saying that this fundamentalism does not mean automatic allegiance either to Taliban or to any of the organised

militias run by the other states, and three, in terms of political kind of a situation, if you look at the formation of the local idics at present and the situation is likely to be true for the next 30 years or so. Take the relationship between the secular ruling idics with the higher ulemas one and take the relationship between the higher Ulemas and the audience, namely the people, and take third the relationship of the higher Ulemas with outside centres of learnings, the situation becomes very clear.

In the last 70 years there was a complete rupture of any kind of the Ulema nourishment as if it were because the whole thing was a part of Soviet Union. Soviet authorities, the Bolshevik authorities, simply did not care for Madarsas and those kind of things. That is why much of the Ulema at present is not really trained to that level which really would give them a kind of commanding say in making the Islamic opinion all over the world.

But still more important to me. If you look at the peoples' level, as it is happening even in India, appeal to religion is so much a rationalisation in order to sustain ones very very secular kind of pursuits and religion has never been allowed in India and also it is not being allowed there to really come into the secular affair. Leave aside the Central Asian States, even if you look at the behaviour of Iran, you will find that inspite of so much talk about Iranian fundamentalism, Iranians have never seemed to follow the dictates of the religion in these matters when it comes to management of Central Asian affairs, including Afghan affairs. That is how I look at the situation.

But there is one another point. What does it mean for us ? I think it has foreign policy implications for us. It is better to be an alert and watchful kind of a dove rather than a hawk without a bite. That is to say, we should really take interest in what is happening in the religious sphere in Central Asia but at the same time I think we should not be in a hurry to take sides by freezing these kinds of categories which may suit other nations but not us. Our relationship should be an open relationship whereby we should maintain contact with each and every kind of ethnic as well as religious kind of a process there and at the most what we could do is when it comes to the projection of symbols not to act in a negative manner but in positive terms.

I am making this last point for one very simple reason. One of the states recently named Babar as one of their national heroes. Now I think when I consider some press comments from even some knowledgeable people, I am a bit disturbed. After all, Babar which they are talking is not the Babar which we have experienced. Let me put it that way. Or let us put it in another way. Babarnama is of course an interesting kind of book. But after all the Babar which they have in mind is a different kind of Babar. In other words, because that point was very beautifully made by another participant yesterday.

We have to make, to be very clear about some of the terms which very often come into our academic discourses as well as popular discourses. To take one example you know reference was made to Pakhtun Valley. I think many of the so-called codes which really are supposed to govern these societies are the product of the recent colonial history. They are after all colonial concepts and while they may have some element of truth after all why we should be in a hurry really to use them for the purposes of threat perception and for remedial action. This is exactly happening in case of religion and fundamentalism there.

If at all we have to understand Central Asian fundamentalism as a threat, if at all we have to do that, then certainly the anchorage both at the theoretical level and more importantly at the level of action should really be not the West or any other area, but it should be really in India. Indian perception of fundamentalism by definition would be one which would really have that kind of identity between the larger Indian interests in international affairs, the local interests of the local players and then the concerns of peace and prosperity.

**PAPER PRESENTED BY SHRI P. STOB DAN**

Admiral Nadkarni, colleagues, ladies and gentlemen.

When we look at the security environment of the north-west of India, things are quite different from what it used to be during the cold war, at least six years ago. The benign, peaceful environment that we used to have which was in fact maintained by the Soviet Union, the strategic balance that was maintained by the Soviet Union and India no longer exists now. Partly it is inevitable because Soviet Union only postponed the trouble for about 70 years. Things which would have been happening in 1920s have happened now. Now the cold war rivalry has ended but these things have been replaced by other issues - rivalry for the resources. It has been replaced by what Professor Bapat said the re-surfacing of religious issues, the ethnic issues, nationalism, sub-nationalism, sectarianism, regionalism, tribalism and so on and so forth.

Therefore the new Central Asian region - Central Asia is a very old region, but this has emerged again on the surface. It cannot be the same thing as Soviet Union used to be for us, for various reasons. Therefore in a sense it is a strategic loss for India. So you do not expect too many nice things happening in our north-west countries. Even Kashmir problem which you have witnessed came up only when the cold war was just about to end. The Afghanistan situation again in fact it has become worse after cold war. The civil war broke in 1992. Before, it was ideological rivalry between the Western camp and the Soviet Union.

Now to me the entire accentuation of the conflict in Afghanistan is related to the dualistic nature of the way the cold war ended, because the end of the cold war ideological rivalry for the Asiatic region was not the same thing as it was for Europe. There was no liberation of Central Asia like the liberation of Eastern Europe from the Soviet Union. Unlike in Europe there was no political unification taking place in this part of the world, in Central Asia or Caucasicus because the Islamic world, the West Asia or what you call Middle East was not a model for these countries, an attraction like the Europe was

for the East European countries or West Europe was for East European countries.

There was no particular anti-Russian nationalism in Central Asia. In fact Central Asia was not responsible for Soviet collapse. Soviet Union collapsed because of its own ideological bankruptcy. Therefore when we look at the situation in Afghanistan and in other parts of Central Asia it is qualitatively quite different, a new political game than it used to be in the past.

The most important point here is that in the context of Afghanistan, whereas the various Afghan groups unitedly fought for a common cause for Islam, cutting across the ethnic lines, whether it is Uzbeks, or Tajiks or anything under one Islamic umbrella finally were able to defeat the communists, they failed to establish peace in Afghanistan.

I think no Mujahedin leader would have ever thought that collapse of the Soviet Union would lead to the emergence of Central Asia or the unraveling of the ethnic boundary reviving the whole cultural contact, consolidation of ethnic boundaries across the Central Asian Afghanistan frontier.

The negative impact of the Soviet disintegration outweighed the spirit of Islamic unity against the communists. The new re-alignment of forces changed the very ideological tenor of the Mujahedins who made tactical alliance with ex-communists. The fundamentalists were making alliance with the communists. Therefore the shifting alliance has not only changed the pattern but also the reason of the conflict in Afghanistan.

First, it was Dostum and Masood who brought Najib down. This led to some communists Pushtun commanders taking side with the Mujahedin in Kandahar. Then the non-Pushtun domination, the Mujahedin made people like Hikmatyar who were Pushtus to distance themselves from the Kabul or Islamic government there. Also the Tajik united led the Uzbeks to distance themselves from the Islamic party government in Kabul. Since January 1993, we have been witnessing this game of shifting alliances, the latest being the northern alliance

between the Dostum of the Uzbek, the Tajiks, Masood Khalidi of the Hazaras or the Shias.

Why victory of Islam has not brought peace in Afghanistan? This question raises another question, whether western alliance which stood behind the Afghanistan Mujahedins for about 10 years, who spent about more than 60 billion US dollars to defeat the Communists in Afghanistan to push the Communists out was really to fight against, the communists, and if it is so or if communism was the only real problem, then there should have been peace in Afghanistan today.

I am afraid, it was not simply against the communists. To me it seems that it was to break-up the inner-Asian world. The whole debate in United States today. Central Asia is a very parochial kind of concept given by the Soviets for the five Muslim republics of Central Asia. But this is a larger concept called inner-Asia. It is a Maxmillan school which talks about the vast nomadic civilisation on the fringe of the major civilised world, on the fringe of Indian civilisation, on the fringe of Chinese civilisation, on the fringe of Persian civilisation. It is the peripheries of the major central world. It is not a centre but a centre of peripheries. It is not a core region, but it is a periphery of Islamic world.

Professor Bapat just mentioned that there are pre-Islamic feelings in Kirgistan and Kazakistan and other places. So these are new concepts now. Eurasia, Inner-Asia, these are new post cold-war concepts which are being propagated by the United States basically to undermine the importance of Russia, China, Iran, Persia, Indian civilisations.

I think, here USA wants only Uzbekistan as a core centre, core civilisational power to balance the things in Central Asia, to counterbalance the other forces around the world. You can see this happening in Kashmir, in China. I will come to this point later on. Therefore you see from two nation states in 1991 that is being Afghanistan, Mongolia in this part of the world, has gone to nine states now within a span of just two years with no American presence on the East of Moscow and North of Beijing. Today Americans are everywhere.

I was in Mongolia in 1986. That time just following the Vladivostok speech of President Gorbachev in 1986, the Americans were the first one to open their embassy in Mongolia, much before even Soviet withdrawal of troops which took place in 1992-93.

So therefore Inner-Asia is breaking up from other empires through Chevron companies, through Unicol, whatever you name it. But Central Asia is expanding. You see the trends. In Afghanistan it is an extension of Central Asia. U.S. presence is growing. So let the realignment of forces take place on ethnic lines, regional forces, political alliances. The inability of the traditional Pushtun group whether you talk about Taliban or Hikmatyar group or anyone to regain control in Kabul or in Afghanistan is the reflection of this changing pattern of ethnic configuration.

'The Tajik factor now in Afghanistan is important, the Uzbek factor is becoming a crucial thing, the oil factor of the Central Asian resource factor is a crucial thing for Afghanistan. There is a Kazak factor in Shreejung now. You must have heard about the recent bomb blast in Uruchi. Interestingly even Iran has suspected that Soviet break-up is a conspiracy against Iran. There are sixteen million Azaris in Iran, more Azaris in Iran than in Azarbaizan itself. There are kurdish prblems. There are Turkman problms. Even Iranians suspect that Soviet collapse is a conspiracy against all these big empires, including Iran. Therefore in the absence of a political unification what you see in Western Europe there is instability everywhere in this part of the world.

I think but for the CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) security structure which was formulated in 1992 and the other bilateral security mechanism which each of these countries have with Russia, there would have been hundreds of Yugoslav, there would have been hundreds of Lebanon kind of situation in this part of the world. It is only Russia which is still maintaining some kind of a stability there.

The Islamic world is not an attraction. There is a rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran, the factor which is quite articulated. Now even if Islam becomes a strong factor, there are again the other countervailing geo-political pulls, the strategic vicinity of Central Asia is such that

nobody can ignore Central Asia. We have our interest because of our own reasons, selfish interest. Russia has not given up despite all the confusion in Russia. There is a confusion there. Foreign ministry of Russia says we are oriented towards the West, there is a honey-moon with the West. Petroleum ministry and other agencies like federal intelligence agencies have a different opinion. They have to safeguard the vital interest of Russia, the Russians living in Central Asia, the resources.

It is not this Islam factor, but so many other things. They are not able to exploit the natural resources now but they do not like others to come there to take everything away from their sphere of influence. Chinese have made enough penetration. They were too happy to know that Central Asians themselves were against Islam.

Even the Koreans are quite active now in the area. You have now a disoriented lot- they were chaminists before they are aminists now, then they became Islam then they became communists. Today they are a disoriented lot, spiritually, economically, politically they cannot go back to Chaminism, they cannot go back to Islam. They have hesitation because things happened there in 70 years were totally changed which cannot be reversed. Irreversible changes. You cannot tell an educated person to forget everything he has learnt. So there is confusion now.

Even Israelis are pushing their own interest. There are so many things happening. To me the Soviet experience was not a colonising factor, it was a nationalising process. The prototype nation. the Kazak, the Kirgis, the Tajik, The Uzbek, the Turkman. these were created by the Soviets. There was nothing like Kazak, Uzbek. There was one Turkistan nation that time. So to them, they did not have to go through the struggle which we experienced for British Empire liberation movement.

Even the United States and Iran which stood on one side of the game against the communists, supporting the Mujahedins in Afghanistan, today they stand on a different camp for obviously different objectives. For the United States it is a containment of Iran for various reasons, international reasons. Then what kind of Islam! Same Islam is tolerated by Irani State.



A great noise was made, how Central Asia will come under the Islami fold, the Iranian type. Geographical proximity, the cultural affinity between Iran and Tajikistan. Rand Corporation had come out with a full study talked about Islamic factor. Now except for Turkmenistan, others seem to have glossed over this factor of Iran becoming a threat initially. Of course the Western world was totally ill-equipped to deal with the situation in Central Asia. They were only concerned about human rights, democracy, civil liberties, nuclear weapons. Because Kazakistan had some weapons there, they had to be shifted to Russia and some fascile material which was in fact bought by United States. They paid some money and took away all the material to United States.

But to their disappointment, Iran acted with a remarkable sense of pragmatism. Instead of exporting Islam, they talked in terms of exporting commodity, they talked in terms of economic joint venture despite affinity with Tajikistan, the only country which speaks Persian language. They took a very cautious view of the internal conflict going on in Tajikistan.

Similarly, Iran's peace initiatives in Caucacius have been totally pragmatic. They were supporting the Christian Armenians against the Muslim Azarbajjans on the Nagarno Karabakh issue. They supported the secular India in Kashmir against Islamic Pakistan. This is called pragmatism. It is not alliance about which Mr.Vaidik talked yesterday. It is a pragmatic step. No doubt there have been Iranian interests, several goals in Central Asia, political influence, for example, commercial trade interest, sectarian interest, Shia factor against the Wahabis, procurement of arms, nuclear expertise for Iran from Central Asian Republics, most importantly the oil factor and the problem of drug trafficking. These were some of the goals for Iran to be very active in Central Asia. Most importantly, things that the Iranians have used was the mataphor of economics - the new silk route, the iron silk route, gas and oil pipeline, railway line, roads. These are the languages which Iran was trying to use for last five years. ECO, OIC. In fact the Iranians were the only ones who took initiative how to get Central Asians and Afghanistan in the ECO. Economic Market. These things have brought Iran into a positive light for the Central Asians. They also took advantage of the Indian reputation. Let us go together in the Central Asia. India and Iran. These are the kind of gestures they made.

In one way, the whole exercise was to dispel the notion that Iran is an exporter of Islam. They want to shed away that thing. By rejecting Taliban, it seems that the Iranians have given a signal to the Central Asians that they are against fundamentalism. Of course Iranis have their own limitation, linguistic problems, except for Tajikistan others are Turkish nationality, the economic problems. The war destroyed Iran's economy, the economic sanctions imposed by international community, international isolation. They also know that they cannot play too much with nationalism, ethnicity because it can back lash on Iran itself, like the Azaris, the Kurdish prblems. They are also aware that Central Asia cannot be compared with the Islamic world where attraction for Islam is attributed to the poverty, urbanism, moral bankruptcy, political bankruptcy like in Algeria, Sudan, Egypt and so mahy other countries.

Now, there is no particular anti-Western rhetorics in Central Asia. They are reconciled with modality and change like the Arab World, the Arabian countries. On the other hand, there is also realisation in Central Asia to have an economic necessity to deal with Iran. Turkamenistan was the first to endorse this understanding that irrespective of whatever religious affinity, Iran is important because it gives us access to the sea. To them Iran is a closer country geographically, relatively a politically stable country. Expertise it has on the oil & natural gas exploration.

Due to these kind of pragmatic policies of Iran, the United States had to take a greater interest in the region. Therefore the US renewed interest in Afghanistan after a gap of six years after cold war. It is only in 1995-96 again they took interest. Now this thing came in the backdkrop of the larger interest in Central Asian affairs, to contain Iran, pushing the Russians north, keep the Indians away - larger interest.

How does United States do this because there is no geographical affinity or political boundaries limit to their access to this part of the world. How do they do that. No officials could propose such a thing or no military general wuld accept a military commitment for that region, at least after the Gulf War. It has to rely on its own surrogate, Pakistan, which was ever ready to revive its strategic fortune, they lost

after the cold war. They lost the strategic relevance after the cold war because they were going in for the clandestine nuclear weapon programme and under Pressler Amendment United States put sanctions on that. They were also singled out to be declared a terrorist state in 1991 - 92.

So Pakistan had lost its strategic value. But Central Asia was giving a new fortune for them. Earlier Pakistan was acting as a front-line state during the cold war. Today they want to be a gateway for the Western business men to go to Central Asia. In the past it was to contain communism, today as a guarantor of stability. These are the languages which United States used. Pakistan was important to United States in the past to contain communism, today it is important for United States as a guarantor of stability in Central Asia and Afghanistan.

Now seeing the completion of the trilateral project, which Mr. Sathe mentioned yesterday, Mashak-Serak Railway line which we sponsored, we were a party to that - Turkmenistan, Iran and India. Pakistan made open infringement of Afghan boundary. The surveillance, the engineers from Pakistan had gone inside the areas controlled by Taliban to make roads into Afghanistan to Central Asia.

Taliban's capture of Herat in October 95, the throwing away of Ismailikhan who took refuge in Iranian city of Mashak had heightened Iranian concern and it took several initiatives for peace making plans in Afghanistan. The Rabbani Government was trying to consolidate itself through other factions. The power sharing agreement between Rabbani and Hikmatyar was broken by Iran. Hikmatyar became the Prime Minister of Afghanistan in June 96. In fact there were reports of Iran negotiating with Taliban.

This was the American concern. In fact India also welcomed Hikmatyar becoming Prime Minister of Afghanistan, the newly elected government. Prime Minister DeveGauda sent a congratulatory letter to Hikmatyar who is the arch enemy of India for so many years. We have sent congratulatory letter to him for becoming the Prime Minister of Afghanistan. In fact the Charge-de-Affairs of the Indian embassy in Kabul invited him for the tea party on the 15th of August, our Independence Day, 1996.

These two three events were sufficient enough for the West to put more pressure on the United Nations to remove the United Nation's representative there, Mr. Mohammad Mistry from Tunisia to be replaced by Dr. Haul of Germany. Then it was followed by U.S. official Robin Rafael and Senator Hunsbrow making back to back visits to Kabul, Kandahar and so many places and conceived the plan, strategy to give a final push to Taliban. The whole thing was prepared by a Station Director of the CIA Station Director in Tashkand that United States will support, Saudis will give money, Pakistan will give the manpower. Capture it within 21 days. 15 days plus 10 days more for contingency.

This is how it happened. My estimate is more than 2.3 billion dollars have been spent for Taliban push in September. It is a different thing that sixty per cent of that money would not have reached into the hands of Taliban. I am sure because I know in the past forty per cent never reached Mujahedins, it went straight in Pakistan.

Three things were important for the US. Mujahedin had promised to the United States that they will get rid of narcotic cultivation which is a headache for the Americans concern. They will also hand over the terrorists hiding in Afghanistan territory once they get to Kabul. The terrorists who bombed the New York Trade Centre, who bombed the American bases in Saudi Arabia. They promised that they will hand over these terrorists hiding in the Afghan territory. They also promised the United States that they will remove the land mines. There were millions of land mines laid during Soviet times. They will do away with those land mines because those land mines were spilling over into third countries which was a concern to United States.

The timings were important, because Mr. Yeltsin of Russia was in operation theatre for heart surgery, and his foreign minister Premeco was in Morocco. That was the situation in Moscow on 27th of September. In New Delhi we had a Prime Minister, forget about his sensitivity on the foreign policy, security issues. He could not even locate where is Afghanistan. Coming from Karnataka you cannot expect him to know where is Afghanistan. And our foreign minister was sitting in New York mobilising international community for our non-permanent security seat.

This was a very crucial time. I do not think during the cold war this thing would have happened. In Mrs. Gandhi's time, even the bit Pakistanis would do, to push their army in Afghanistan, one division of our armed forces would move towards Indo-Pak boundary, two divisions of armed forces would move from the Russians and come down to Afghanistan border and it would have given enough signal for the parties to move away, keep yourself away. Things have changed. Today you cannot do that.

The compelling factor for the United States was the victory of Islamic forces in Turkey. Ilbakhani who was in power who talked about linkages between Iran and Turkey and talked about Islamic NATO. That was enough thing for the United States to worry about. These things made Taliban to come to Kabul. Lot of euphoria was made. United States will have immediately working relations with Taliban, Unicol, that Delta Unicol Oil Company President said the cost of our pipeline construction will come down by one billion from five billion to four billion because now Taliban controls Afghanistan.

But seeing the barbaric style of Taliban, the way they were ruling, United States tried to disown Taliban for a time being. Human rights violation. There was election going in United States at that time. If you remember, the CNN television film will show Taliban man beating a woman in Kabul and President Clinton asked what is this. His advisors would tell this is a Taliban beating an Afghan woman. Who are the Talibans? It is a militia backed by Pakistan in Afghanistan. Who is in charge of Pakistan. Sir, it is Mrs. Robin Rafael. Tell her we have nothing to do in Afghanistan, with Taliban. So, Mrs. Rafael comes and says we disown. We are misled on Afghanistan issue by Pakistan. We have nothing to do with Taliban. Please we support all the factions in Afghanistan. We support United Nation's effort in Afghanistan.

For about one month United States totally disowned. But the Iranian initiative does not succeed. They told the Uzbek, they told the Pakistanis not to attend Tehran meet on the November 29th. But today they are talking about the United Nations mission for peace in Afghanistan, but they also keep liaison with Taliban for various reasons and for United States it was possible to contain Iran because it was able to forge a strategic proximity with Uzbekistan. I will come to this

part later, because you know they want Uzbekistan to be a full player in this part of the world. Their countervailing force and I am sure five to ten years to come, Uzbekistan will outpass Pakistan as a strategic partner for United States. This is bound to happen and this will happen. We cannot do anything about it.

When the Soviet Union collapsed, Central Asia was not prepared for independence. It was in fact imposed on them. They were very reluctant. In Moscow, despite all the renouncement by the Russians, renouncement of Central Asia by the Russians as an imperial burden, they did not want to carry Central Asia in this post-cold war game. They wanted to get rid of this Central Asian thing for all the Asiatic baggage and despite all this confusion and the exclusion from the initial formation of CIS, you know the CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) was initially formulated by three Slavik nations, Belarus, Ukraine and Russia. Central Asia was kept away. Central Asia insisted and questioned how dare you keep us out from this structure, the post-Soviet mechanism.

The reason for this appeared, for the Central Asians the entire economic links with Russia all the transport communication net work was towards the north. They were dependent on Russians for the steel works production and other things. Militarily they were not prepared to be independent. Democracy was a new thing. They were not aware of what democracy needs. The power elite was still the same old communist nomenclature. It was difficult for them. There was Turkey who was trying to push the oppositions, the democrats, the Muslim opposition. So they got very suspicious and they kept their links with Moscow and this was the inevitable decision and there was a real threat from South. The Mujahedins just got the Communists defeated so it was a real problem for Central Asians to be with the Russians.

In such a situation, all the States except Turkmenistan joined CIS. The leaders of Central Asia made their first foreign visit to India and not Turkey, Pakistan or any other country. But knowing that we cannot fill the security, political vacuum in this area, they thought better to rely on Moscow again and they pressed for a collective security treaty in 1992 in Tashkand and President Karimo was the first one who was advocating this thing very very strongly. They decided to raise the

troops. There are 25000 Russian border guards, there are 5000 officers from the 201 deal, there is 1000 troops comprising the Kazak, the Uzbeks, and the Kirgis. There is 10,000 Tajik force which are defending the Tajik-Afghanistan border.

The military doctrine of Russia propagated in 1993 says that the outer boundary of Russia will still be between Central Asia and Afghanistan, not between Russia and Central Asian states and the near abroad policy was formulated to defend the right of Russians. There are 25 million Russians living outside Russia out of which 10 millions are in Central Asia. So this near abroad policy was to take care of the vital interest of Russians living in this part of the world. But the Central Asia resisted that they will give dual citizenship to the Russians living in their country. There were problems of anti-Kosaks in Kazakhstan. There were Kosak movements and this kind of things again which accentuated the problems.

These factors gave opportunity for the West to instigate Central Asians against Russians. Central Asians then started talking about the third option, CIKA (Confidence Building Measures) in process in Asia like the CSCE in Europe. European kind of a concept. Karimo of Uzbekistan talked about permanent set up under the United Nations auspices. The whole thing was to dilute the Russian interest there which was through their membership in the CSCE, their closer relations with NATO, all these countries, formation of ECO, OIC.

All these things contributed to their independent thinking away from Moscow. The other factor then, the Russian economic and military decline, the fall of Najibullah in 92, NATO's expansion towards east, then withdrawal of Soviet troops from Chechenya, this had proved that Russia is a declining power. Therefore Central Asians said No, No, let us forget about Russia. Let us do something else. All these things added to their apprehension that Russians cannot take care of their interests. Then the whole issue of oil and gas pipeline which we have talked yesterday. They have realised that this is the only way to break themselves completely free from dependence on Moscow.

Therefore we see now that the strategic equation in Central Asia is slowly changing. Karimo said that in 1995 when he went to United

States and that United States and Uzbekistan has got a relationship with a strategic characteristic. He said there is not a single initiative taken by United States which Uzbekistan has not supported. United States imposed sanctions on Cuba, Uzbekistan is the only country to support the United States. United States put sanctions on Iran, Uzbekistan apart from Israel was the only country to support United States. This is the type of strategic proximity which they are talking about.

Victory of Taliban gave first shock to the Central Asian countries. It came as a first direct threat to defend themselves in practical terms. Every Central Asian country and Russians had to live upto and be worried about and at the same time they did not want to commit the mistake of the past because they had the fresh memories of their defeat in Afghanistan. They could not formulate a common policy. They expected that Rabbani would push the Taliban away like Rabbani did in October 95. They never thought that Najibullah would be hanged. I do not think Taliban would have hanged Najibullah. It was Pakistan ISI which has killed Najibullah. There are lot of documents to prove that. Gorbachev condemned the Taliban taking over Kabul, but Kremlin kept quite restrained. Premokov was sitting in Morocco. Yeltsin was in the operation theatre. They were divided on this issue and in the absence of Primakov, the Secretary of the Security Council Lebit, you remember who became victim of the Afghan conflict. He was removed by Yeltsin. He hijacked the foreign policy and gave a very very worst case scenario of Central Asia of threat from Taliban. Territories of Uzbekistan, Tjikistan will be taken over at once by Taliban from Afghanistan. He thought that Taliban is pointed straight into the heart of Russia, Chechenya and therefore must be stopped by all means.

This was the view taken by Lebit, but Premekov challenged his views. He said Russia has got its finger burnt once and will not do that again. The opposition leader, Zerenovski said the Central Asians wanted to drag Russia into the second war, second Afghan war. We will not do that. Now despite all these things, the confusion and other things, Yeltsin only instructed the Prime Minister to have a meet in Almati and consult Central Asians and take measures. All of them came upto Almati on the 4th October and took the decision. The



Kazak were worried and they agreed to co-ordinate with Russia, Tajikistan, Kirgistan took a strong position because they wanted to hold the Taliban, otherwise the Talibans would push Masood into Badakshan area which is a threat for us if Afghans come upto Badakshan area, then they would give proximity to POK then into Kashmir. So it is a concern for us.

Turkmenistan, is a neutral country. They took a totally neutral line because of oil and other reasons and whole lot of economic interest, although President of Turkmenistan, Niazov, was called by Moscow and told you must co-operate with us on Afghan affairs and he agreed to do that. But all of them had a different position and Uzbekistan was the only factor which gave a totally different resolution to the conference in the CIS. They only agreed that if the situation gets aggravated, we will raise strength of forces. Tajikistan, if you see the report now, they have added two more divisions to strengthen the boundaries. So it is becoming a struggle in Central Asia, a strange cocktail of many problems.

Ethnically, Uzbeks are everywhere now. There are more Tajiks in Afghanistan than in Tajikistan. There are four million Tajiks in Afghanistan. There are only three million Tajiks in Tajikistan. There are more Pushtuns in Pakistan than in Afghanistan. Now according to some information only 20% of the national boundaries in Central Asia is scientifically defined. 80% of the national boundaries are arbitrary, drawn by Stalin - you take that or this one in 20s and 30s arbitrarily it was done.

Water is a key issue. Yesterday somebody said that it is only cotton monoculture which the Russians have made. Central Asia is only used for growing cotton. But now it seems they want to diversify their agricultural activities, but there is going to be a struggle for water and that is going to be a key issue which will lead to conflict. Oil is a critical commodity of strategic importance. I think crisis will go along the pipeline, conflict will go along the pipeline and the US will make sure that it will continue. Country like Turkmenistan is going to be like Kuwait, full of natural resources, oil, but it will have to rely for its security on a third country for its security like Russia. Then there is going to be an economic disparity - some are going to

be rich, some are going to be very poor. Kirgistan is going to be poor, Tajikistan is going to be poor, Turkmenistan is going to be rich, Kazakistan is going to be rich, Uzbekistan is going to be powerful. Economic disparity will lead to conflict. There is a flow of migration from Afghanistan, there is drug trafficking. 45% of the world's narcotic comes from this part of the world.

So this leads to the poignant conclusion that by the beginning of the next century, Central Asia will be a central focus of economic, political and military conflict and the security environment in the north west of India is going to be very very surcharged and volatile.

## SESSION IV

**REGIONAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT TO THE  
NORTH-WEST OF INDIA  
WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO AFGHANISTAN :  
IMPLICATIONS FOR INDIA**

**Chairman : J G Nadkarni  
Main Speaker : Ashok Joshi**

**PAPER PRESENTED BY LT GEN (RETD) ASHOK JOSHI**

Afghanistan, a sparsely populated country of some 16 million inhabitants, is amongst the most underdeveloped countries in the world. It scores 208 on the scale of Human Development Index and ranks 171 amongst the nations of the world on this basis. It has common borders with Iran, Pakistan, and three of the former Soviet Socialist Republics, namely, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan. All of the countries bordering Afghanistan are prosperous in comparative terms, and Iran is prosperous by South West Asian and Asian standards. Afghanistan has been a victim of an intense civil war since the Taliban started operating in 1994. But, descriptive labels apart, the situation has not been very different since 1979 December when the Soviets flew in their troops. During all this time, Afghans have been fighting against Afghans. The toll has been very heavy : some four and half million refugees crossed over the border into Pakistan and Iran. In the event of an outright Taliban victory, an exodus of up to half a million into Tajikistan and Uzbekistan is expected.<sup>1</sup> Apart from the displacement of the population on this scale, the destruction has been horrendous. One Pakistani officer has claimed that 2 million Afghans have died. <sup>2</sup>

Afghanistan seems, at the moment, unable to draw upon its natural and inner sources of power to create beliefs, minimum economic wherewithal, and organizations to attain viability as a state. It is unable to relate itself to the contemporary world except in terms of drugs, weapons, and violence.<sup>3</sup> The Taliban has Kabul in its control

along with nearly 60 per cent of Afghanistan. Right now - in March 1997 - it is busy tinkering with some of the more visible instruments of the state : recasting ministries and departments.

Certain prizes are up for grabs : political vacuum in Afghanistan that seems to invite power-projection ; oil and gas in Central Asian Republics (CARs) ; markets in CARs – which can only benefit from the oil boom ; and an opportunity to make claims on a portion of oil and gas, and profits that will accrue from trade by virtue of being able to control conduits in and out of CAR. Along with the prizes are also visible the penalties that are likely to visit the states surrounding Afghanistan.

Afghanistan is in a pit. What prevails there is not mere anarchy, but disorder that seems to have unravelled many strands of civilization, and dispelled instinctive restraint. Afghanistan cannot contain this disorder. One of the concerns is the impact that this disorder is likely to produce in the region and beyond.

One of the vectors' for the spread of disorder is the refugee. Afghan refugees seem to bring with them weapons, drugs, desperation, and a willingness to use force. Disorder in Afghanistan is likely to cause grave discomfiture in areas where there are undifferentiated continuities across the international borders. Along with drugs and weapons travel the divisive tendencies that upset balances within and exacerbate internal contradictions which exist in most societies, but particularly so in developing societies. Effort to control drugs may win kudos from many governments, but may antagonise the power centres in Afghanistan and managers of the distribution net-work all over the world. Access to oil and markets will bring in international-competition, and who can say that this would be without substantial hazard to the nations and societies which are considered weak.<sup>4</sup>

What will happen in Afghanistan and what impact it will produce on India is a matter that calls for prognostication on the basis of the past and current trends. And because information is inadequate and incomplete - when it isn't also an element of speculation. I propose to do this with reference to four scenarios. These are not in the nature of predictions, but mental constructs which help to reduce variables to

manageable proportions, and create discrete frames of reference to facilitate evaluation and discussion. The emerging reality may not conform to any one of them in particular, and yet I believe, it will not substantially be different.

Scenario 1. The Taliban has succeeded in largely overcoming the resistance of the Uzbeks in the north, and the Tajiks in the north-east. It has not been able to overcome the resistance in entirety; some pockets of resistance remain on the Afghan soil, and some recalcitrant elements have bought sanctuary across the border. The Uzbeks and the Tajiks after having rolled down towards Kabul and made another unsuccessful bid to wrest away Kabul from the grip of the Taliban for Mr. Burhanuddin Rabbani, or some other nominee of the Uzbek-Tajik coalition, are planning the next campaign. It is rumoured that there is a steady supply of advice and assistance to them. Their strongholds are beyond the reach of the Taliban. On the strength of sheer numbers, it is unlikely that the Uzbek-Tajik forces can prevail over the Taliban which has a larger support base - approximately 60 percent of the Afghan population is made up of Pushtoon and Hazaras of whom Pashtoos make up the larger group. Tajiks and Uzbeks make up 31 percent of the population, and the Uzbeks a mere 6 percent.<sup>5</sup> The support that they get from CARs is defensive in nature, rather than interventionist. Over a period of time, the Afghans have distanced themselves from Pakistan. Some of the personnel of the former Afghan army who had deserted to the Mujahideen fold and their kith and kin have memories of Russian associations.<sup>6</sup> Many were educated there, and had seen a regime of fixed prices and jobs for every body. Many Taliban who were former Mujahideens have seen the life of squalor and degradation in refugee camps. They do not want to remain an appendage of Pakistan, to do its bidding for small gains. Where the Soviets failed, the CARs could hardly expect to succeed. Over a period of time the Taliban came to represent the incipient Afghan nationalism, undoubtedly with Pashtoon identity at its core. It lost out some territory to Iran and some to the Baluch where its writ could not run. Eventually they have arrived at stable and manageable borders. Scenario 1 represents the formation of a comparatively modern state which presupposes or assumes major changes within the Afghan psyche and some adjustments in the margins in so far as international borders are concerned.

Scenario 2, presumes the break up of the Taliban into regional factions, much in the manner of the former Mujahideens organizations, and the formation of autonomous regions, say around Kabul and Kandahar, Herat, and Mazar-i-Sharif, with strong and friendly links with powers closest to them, namely, Pakistan, Iran, and CARs. Three autonomous regions, which are not without historical precedent, have emerged. Scenario 2 represents a vivisection of Afghanistan to create virtual protectorates of the adjoining powers on the basis of tribal identities and natural affinities.

Scenario 3 could be the rule of Pakistan approved feudal lords in much of the Pushtoon area closest to Pakistan, with a nominal government at Kabul, with tribal rule in the rest of the country, with opening up of roads and communications available for use to the highest bidder, after paying royalty to the tribal and feudal lords, and making concessions to the nearest major powers. Scenario 3 implies a shift west-ward and north-ward of the Durand line in so far as Pakistan is concerned, with limited accountability for governance.

Scenario 4 presumes a worsening of the present state of turbulence and upheaval to the extent that Pakistan comes under an unbearable strain due to repeated waves of refugees from Afghanistan. There is a possibility that many of the refugees will move into India, as a trickle to start with, but in hordes later. The use of force to stop them is likely to give rise to disturbances and even riots in parts of Pakistan and India. The situation appears really menacing to Pakistan : they cannot move their forces on the western border, because Indians have mobilised their border forces to prevent infiltration. It appears that without a co-operative effort, a satisfactory solution cannot be found either by Pakistan or India. The scenarios may take about a decade to emerge. What then is the purpose of considering the scenarios. Perhaps, they would help us to monitor and interpret changes as they actually appear with reference to discrete possibilities. An evaluation of the scenarios may also enable us to guess at the sources of impulses or inspiration that bring about the changes.

It may be worth while to recount the US and Pak interests in the region because Pak are the main actors on the stage at present, and, along with their own, they must sub-serve the US purpose in order to

achieve their own policy objectives which are out of their reach while operating by themselves. This would help us the better to evaluate scenarios for their impact on India. While concentrating mainly on the US and Pak interests and preferences, those of others need not be lost sight of.

The United States may well have the following security objectives in the region.<sup>7</sup>

Curtail and restrict influence of Iran, and keep it away from the gas and oil of CARs in general and Turkmenistan in particular.

Obtain access to the oil and other minerals of CARs and Afghanistan. Gain access to the markets of CARs.

Reduce influence of Russia in CARs with a view to de-coupling them strategically, so that even the possibility of the Russian thrust towards the Arabian Sea is nipped in the bud. Prevent drugs from the region finding their way into the industrialised world in general and the North American Continent in particular.

Minimise possibility of terrorism, drugs, and fanaticism - whether religious or radical - from spreading outwards from this region to the detriment of US interests.

Ensure viability of and stability in Pakistan so that access to nuclear devices in that country is kept restricted to those who are amenable to the US control. Ensure that Pak interests are so protected that the temptation to use nuclear devices is virtually eliminated. Retain Pak as a trusted ally so that access to the CARs, China, and the Islamic world - cutting across all divides - is facilitated.

Pakistan would like the access to oil, gas and markets of the region to be routed through Pakistan so that it can benefit directly by tapping into the conduits, as also control the flow and access to others, and particularly to India. Pakistan would like to stress the Sunni Islamic identity of the population in the region so that the leadership position naturally falls in its lap, and the resources of the region and strengths of the population can be manipulated in its own interests.

Pak wishes to distance itself from the sub-continent to become an extension of the Middle East, and the central Asia. Addition of territory in its backyard can only strengthen its position. It may not be wholly correct to say that Pakistan can gain strategic depth in relation to India by acquiring portions of Afghanistan. To achieve that objective, Pak would have to push international border further away from its vital areas, that is, acquire Indian territory. Its Islamic Identity and geographic location allow it to offer its services, good offices, and influence to further the US interests in the region. It must use this device to further its own main agenda - to which the US may, at best, be indifferent, or even opposed - i.e. to - increase its relative strength and power projection capability vis-a-vis India; and to seek disintegration of Indian Union into regions or states comparable to or smaller than Pakistan in size so that a balance of power to Pak advantage can emerge in the subcontinent.<sup>8</sup>

Scenario 1, by creating order and accountability, will help the multinationals to access the CAR oil, gas and markets on a competitive basis. Iran could be bypassed, provided of course that Pak transit facilities through Baluchistan are available. CARs can be made to look south-wards, i.e. away from Russia, and Iran. By controlling access to international institutions and markets, Afghanistan can be made to fall in line in matters of drugs and terrorism. Easterly containment of Iran will be complete for so long as friendly Afghanistan and Pakistan are maintained. Religious obscurantism may be controlled. Pak manipulative power may go down to a certain extent. Pak may face claims on Trans-Indus region. Afghanistan may look to India for balancing Pak power projection. Pak will definitely look in two directions with a prospect of a two - front conflict. Some of the smaller CARs - Turkmenistan and Tajikistan - may feel slightly apprehensive. It will be readily seen that the US, and to a lesser extent the G-7 group of countries would like the emergence of Scenario 1. Pak would not like it. China may not exactly like but may well be indifferent to it. Russia and Iran may also look upon it with disfavour.

Scenario 2, basically, is a step backward to feudalism, on one plane, and a rule by proxy, on another. The presumption is that tribal identities and sub-regional cultures will assert themselves to break loose from the centrally controlled Taliban by drawing on the support



of the nearest powers. As far as Pak is concerned, it will mean acquisition of a protectorate around Kabul-Kandahar which will do most of its bidding, but at a cost. It will not be big enough to look upon itself as an international entity, and may choose to continue a medieval existence with modern weaponry and consumer goods. Terrorism, drugs, and obscurantism will be rife, but the accountability of Pak will be comparatively low. As far as Iran is concerned, Turkmenistan may prefer to continue, at least in part, with the Caspian route, and the land route through Iran for trade and oil export. It can keep the disorder confined in the border region with some help from Iran, and deal with Afghanistan from a position of strength because of viability of alternative routine. CARs may feel more comfortable, having distanced themselves from Pushtoons tribals in some measure. Pak would have lost out, and shrunk the scope of its dominance in Afghanistan. The US and G-7 group of countries will scarcely notice the difference except that Iran will be seen as a net gainer. The possibility of access to oil and markets in CARs will now have to be with good offices of Pak and the Khans - to whom royalty and protection money may have to be paid. Profit margins may drop, and yet it may be acceptable as an improvement on the current situation.

Scenario 3 is only a modification of Scenario 2, in that only Pak has succeeded in controlling the fractionalised Taliban, and others, i.e. Iran, and CARs have failed in securing their protectorates. Pak is the net gainer with heightened advantages over Scenario 2. It is a come down from the present situation, in one sense : the ambition to control the whole of Afghanistan has had to be given up. But on the other hand, there are some gains : the accountability will have gone down, Iran and CARs will have been denied their prizes, and Afghan Pashtoons may remain controllable. Nothing may have been permanently lost. Dream of Scenario 1 can be held out to the US and others, and Pak will still continue to be the biggest player in Afghanistan.

It was for a very good reason - from their point of view that the British had created Afghanistan as a buffer state between Russia and themselves, and buffer zone between Afghanistan and British India. Buffer zones or states were prizes which could not be secured immediately by power projection. They were accepted as buffers by a

tacit agreement between two contesting empires. The essence of the arrangement was that the prize which was beyond immediate reach was denied to the rival also. This was done by an interesting device in the Afghan context. A certain level of disorder was maintained in the region, so that no development took place, xenophobic tribal identity was encouraged and supported, and obscurantist practices were admired. Tribal Chiefs were left to their own devices. If and when things were getting out of control, punitive expeditions were undertaken. Intervention and subvention was used to see that the prevailing disorder did not seep into the British Indian territory. This device denied to the rival the ability to create and occupy political space which requires creation and maintenance of order. By getting the tribal used to a high level of violence and obscurantism, the possibility of the rival establishing order with minimum force, and thereafter building up an economy amenable to profitable exploitation was precluded. If we see disorder in Afghanistan, we may well conclude that at least some of it is 'designer' disorder. Buffer zone and disorder are inter-connected.

Scenarios 2 and 3 are variations of buffer-zones, and may come about with least effort and more naturally. It so happens that they also suit the Pak purpose. Apart from Pak preferences, what may well preclude the emergence of scenario 1 is the essence of Afghan attributes. If we accept Mr. Galbraith's proposition that leadership, material strength, and organizational capability and acumen are the main sources of strength from which are forged the condign, compensatory, and conditioning instruments of power that a state can use to survive and prosper, there appears to be some limitations on the ability of Afghans to draw upon their intrinsic sources to emerge as a strong nation.<sup>9</sup>

Afghan nationalism has been slow in emerging, and when it has, it has not been without tribal overtones, because tribal identity is perhaps the most dominating element of collective consciousness. Turani, Irani, or Durani sub-nationalisms come in the way of Afghan nationalism, even when the narrower tribal loyalties are dispensed with. The tribes define their boundary conditions with clarity and mark out the 'we and they' divides indelibly. Added to this is a religious dogma that is not amenable to interpretation in contemporary

terms. This is a source of strength on one plane : there is a total lack of confusion in resolving problems associated with hierarchy of loyalties and scale and nature of obligations and expectations from individuals and the tribal entity. It creates great cohesiveness and staying power, and makes successful demands on the individual to sacrifice his all in the interest of the collective identity. It creates a tribal 'order' and political space that only the tribal chief can occupy. On the other hand, it does not allow the individuals and tribes to react to changing environment in creative spirit to invent, to re-structure and re-organize themselves to suit the demands of changing times. The base of tribal population from which to draw upon for regeneration is comparatively small, apart from the out-look being frozen in almost mythical past which bears no relationship with contemporary times.

Linkage in our times between power projection capability and well organized orderly societies - and nations they make up - deserves attention. Power projection mainly on the basis of compensatory and conditioning capability is very much possible. Offers of trade on favourable terms, capital, employment opportunities, and aid can obtain compliance of nations without infliction of pain, so much so that the exploited are more than pleased with the compensation that they receive. Japan is a prime example of the power projection capability in economic terms. Compensatory power comes from economic capability which needs order, education, and freedom as prime preconditions. At present, compensatory power is more amenable to conversion into condign power of force, rather than the other way around. That apart, a large component of condign power is drawn from the self-same industry that generates economic strength. Existence of modern armed forces is also predicated upon stable order and sophisticated organization. You can think of economic giants without strong force projection capability, but force projection capability without economic strength is unthinkable in our times. It was not always so. War was a profitable industry in times of Babur and Ahmedshah Abdali, both of whom projected power successfully on the basis of limited economic power and organizational strength at home. Obtaining of compliance through application of force may not often be a viable economic proposition in our times. Therefore, direct prosecution of war for power projection may not prove to be a profitable venture. In our times, perhaps, prosecution of war does not qualify as 'industry',

not to the extent that arms sales do. On the other hand, resistance to adversary's power projection through violence and disorder may make good economic sense under certain conditions. It is estimated that the cost of intervention to the Soviet Union in Afghanistan was of the order of US \$ 3 billions a year from 1979 to 1992. In comparison, the total aid from all the sources that went into the Afghan resistance was of the order of US \$ 8.7 billions. <sup>10</sup>

It would appear that the creation of buffer-zones in order to resist power projection by the adversary - by maintaining turmoil and disorder - is a highly practical proposition in our times. The US and Pakistan brought this about in Afghanistan at a comparatively insignificant monetary costs. Will non-monetary costs have to be reckoned at a later date, and by whom is to be considered later in this paper. Though Afghanistan has proved its ability to resist power, Afghanistan is incapable of effective power projection in the sub-continent. The possibility of basing Pak missiles, with or without nuclear war-heads, on Pak controlled Afghan territory does seem a bit far fetched, because given the Afghan love of engines of war, it would be nothing short of being foolhardy on the part of Pakistan to do so. Perhaps the US may be the first one to advise against such a venture.

Afghans have a living tradition of using force to gain personal and tribal ends. Their force projection capability has been neutralised by conditions in our times but the desire to use force and faith in its efficacy seems to survive undimmed. Conditions of terrain and political climate in which the mobility of the boot and the stirrup suffice to meet the tactical and logistic requirements, give full scope to Afghans ability to use force. He is not averse to learning the use of products of modern technology either, Kalashnikovs, Stingers, and remotely fired explosive devices have been deftly handled by him. Afghan Mujahideen showed better results with the Stinger missiles than the Pak regular army. Brigadier Yousaf mentions that Mujahideens showed 70-75 percent success rates with the Stinger missiles, and contrasts the results with those of the Pak army. At one stage, the Pak army jawans did not hit any target after firing 28 Stinger missiles. <sup>11</sup> The Afghan has not lost his hardihood, and zest for securing loot by using force - which in his view is a perfectly honourable way of acquiring wealth. No wonder then, that Afghan Mujahideens make such excellent

mercenary terrorists. They have been active in Kashmir, and they could also appear in large and small Indian towns where they can find hospitable hosts on the basis of kinship and affinities or shared hatreds, provided that enough disorder exists to permit their induction. Afghans will prove efficient and willing vectors of disorder. They are likely to make very few claims on those who inspire them : if anything, they will thank them for showing a way. They will seek rewards through money and violence.

Scenarios 1 to 4 have been arranged in a manner that Scenario 1 represents beginning of an organized modern society, and Scenario 4 represents its anti-thesis. Scenario 1 will be to India's liking, and that may be a good enough reason for Pak to look upon it with suspicion and resist it. If at all and until Scenario 1 materialises, all other Scenarios are likely to produce more or less undesirable impact on India : lack of access to emerging opportunities in the CARs, perhaps reduction in trade with CARs to the extent that they sever the former Soviet connections and develop new ones which may be under Pak control, and the apprehension that disorder from the region will creep into India in the form of weapons, violence, drugs, and a fillip to separatist movements.

Having said this, it may be appropriate to mention that Pak may also have to face the consequences of creating and enlarging the buffer zone in Afghanistan : Pakistan may reap the whirlwind. As recently as 1919, King Amanulla of Afghanistan amassed an army of some 50,000 men armed with modern rifles and 75 mm Krupp guns, most of them animal drawn, and successfully challenged the might of the British empire. He crossed over, gave battle, and the British had to remain content with the Rawalpindi treaty in which they acknowledged an independent and sovereign Afghanistan and Amanulla's right to deal directly with other sovereign states.<sup>12</sup> This was a remarkable event, and not without significance. To start with Amanulla," wrote the Viceroy of India criticising British handling of the internal security situation in India in general, and at Amritsar in particular, and said that he was moving troops close to the border to ensure that virus of discontent did not seep into his country.<sup>13</sup> The Punjab government, according to the then Lt Governor Michael o'Dwyer, had information that nationalists had established contacts with Afghan tribals and

Afghan advance was to coincide with mutinies in the British Indian Army. <sup>14</sup> At present, Afghan power projection capability is non-existent. But the cultural and racial continuities across the Pak-Afghan borders have not changed. Half of all Pashtoons live in Pakistan. There are any number of them in Pak regiments. If and when disorder spreads outwards on a substantial scale from the extended buffer-zone, Pakistan is likely to be its first victim. The idea that Pakistan can turn the Taliban at will against India may be rooted in our racial memories of past aggressions from the north-west, and may not at all conform to reality in our times.

While concluding that the impact of likely developments in the North-West of the sub-continent on India will generally be adverse, except in Scenario 1, and intolerable in Scenario 4, I may have to move away from thinking of India as it is now, and take a broader view.

The late Jawaharlal Nehru in his broadcast on 2nd June, 1947 said, "The India of geography, of history, and tradition, the India of our minds and hearts cannot change." <sup>15</sup> And then again, in a note on Pakistan of 26 April, 1953 - "This must not be taken to mean that anyone really thought of reversing partition. History cannot be reversed in this way." Later, in an interview to Mr. S.S. Harrison published in Washington Post on 19 December, 1962.

"Confederation remains our ultimate goal. Look at Europe, at the common market. This is the urge everywhere. There are no two people anywhere nearer than those of India and Pakistan. If we say it, they are alarmed and think that we want to swallow them."

The answer, I believe, is clear enough. In a narrow frame, we should hope and promote Scenario 1, if we can ; and in the mean time prepare to deal with somewhat larger number of Afghan mercenaries and what else they bring along. But in a broader frame, we may perhaps like to accept that there are certain matters which can only be tackled satisfactorily and advantageously if we think of the sub-continent.

In the closing years of the British rule over India, defence of the Indian sub-continent after the partition by Pakistan alone was not

considered a practical proposition by the British military authorities in India. Ms Ayesha Jalal<sup>16</sup> quotes from a paper/note prepared by the then Chief of the General Staff, Lt Gen Arthur F. Smith titled "Defence Implications of a Partition of India into Pakistan and Hindustan" and dated 1 April, 1946 : "It was impossible to consider the strategic defence of Pakistan and Hindustan separately."

This, of course, was in the light of a threat from Russia. The nature of threat has changed. We are now considering the spread of disorder through an unmanageable refugee movement. The basic point about Pakistan's lack of 'depth necessary' - that Gen Smith was making - to contain a threat from the North-West is perhaps valid even in the present context. It is another matter that Pak donned the imperial mantle<sup>17</sup> and the then British Chiefs of Staff accepted the Pak view that the possible threat to Pakistan came from India.<sup>18</sup>

The intention now should not be so much to comment upon whether or not the Indian opposition to Pak being an alliance partner at that stage was valid or not, as to consider the threat to Pakistan - and indirectly to India - which Pakistan may not be able to cope up on its own. The obvious point is that the Soviet threat could well have been exclusively Pak oriented, but the threat of disorder, if it overcomes Pakistan, is unlikely to remain restricted to that country. Soviet threat may have been well directed, and for that very reason, amenable to international pressures and control. But the spread of disorder would be like the spread of an epidemic. It should never be allowed to take root, and even less, allowed access to the sub-continent.

We have generally shunned strategic alliances - but not treaties of friendship and co-operation. In fact, our treaty with the Soviet Union before 1971 operations was crucial. We will be well advised also to review the past attitudes in the matter of strategic alliances in the interest of the sub-continent.

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1. Signed article by David Rieff in Asian Age of 10 Mar. 97.
2. Brigadier Mohammad Yousaf and Major Mark Adkin. The Bear Trap. Jang Publishers, Lahore, 1992.

3. IISS' Military Balance 1996/97 mentions 870 main battle tanks, and 1,000 + guns, and 130 Fighters. Tara Kartha, in 'Weaponisation of Pakistan', Strategic Analysis, IDSA, Jan-Feb 97, concludes that Afghanistan has enough small weapons within to equip the armed forces of both India and Pakistan.' Drug cultivation in 1988 reached 800 tons, having doubled in two years. (p.p.1393-97). C. Uday Bhaskar, in an article in the Times of India of 9 May 96, says, 'While Afghanistan has emerged as the major production centre for opium and its derivatives. Pakistan has become the main exit conduit with routes to Iran, and India.
4. Robert D. Kaplan, in an article titled 'Afghanistan : A country where war has become an end in itself', published in International Herald Tribune, and later reproduced in Asian Age, says, Indeed, Afghanistan may be an exaggerated example of declining states from Turkey eastward to India.'
5. On the basis of figures given in the Military Balance 1996/97. Lt Col Ludra quotes different figures in his article in the Strategic Analysis, (p. 1506). According to him 'Pakhtoons' make up 60 percent.
6. According to Brigadier Mohammad, there were 11 Afghan divisions that fought the Mujahideens along side 7 Russian divisions .op.cit. (p.45)
7. Following excerpts from the statement of Ms Madeleine Albright before the Senate foreign Relations Committee on January 8, 1997, extracted from USIS official text may be of interest in this context :  
 And our leadership must be sustained if our interests are to be protected around the world .. Arms control and nonproliferation are closely linked to our policies toward rogue states. We have a major interest in preventing weapons of mass destruction from being obtained by regimes with a proven disrespect for the rule of law . Our goal has been to build an environment in which threats to our security and that of our allies are diminished, and likelihood of American forces being sent into combat are reduced. We recognise that, in most of these situations, neither the United



States nor any other outside force can impose a solution. As we enter the 50th anniversary year of independence for both India and Pakistan, we will again consider the prospects for reducing the tensions that have long existed between these two friends of the United States. We have a wealth of equities in this region, and a particular concern about the regional arms race and nuclear nonproliferation. India and Pakistan should both know that we will do what we can to strengthen their relations with us and encourage better relations between them, and that we expect both to avoid actions calculated to provoke the other.

8. Mr. Rajiv Nayan has quoted a conversation with Mr. Mushahid Hussain who is close to Pak Prime Minister Sharif in an article in the *Times of India*, Bombay, of February 6, 1997: "India in its present form can never be friend of any South Asian Country and therefore favoured, in the name of stability and security of South Asia, India's disintegration."

Mr. Sreedhar, Senior Research Associate at IDSA mentions that work is progressing on the construction of a new 40-inch gasline from the onshore oil and gas field of Korpedzne in Turkmenistan to North of Iran. The onshore gasline will run along the eastern side of the Caspian Sea.' See, *The Taliban Factor in the ongoing Afghan Civil War*, Appendix, Strategic Analysis, IDSA, Jan-Feb 1997.

9. John Kenneth Galbraith, *'The Anatomy of Power'*, Hamish Hamilton, London, 1984.  
 "Power is the possibility of imposing one's will upon the behaviour of other persons." Max Weber on Law in Economy and Society. (p.2)  
 Condign power wins submission by inflicting or threatening appropriately adverse consequences.  
 Compensatory power, in contrast, wins submission by offer of affirmative reward.  
 Conditioned power, in contrast, is exercised by changing belief. (p.5)
10. Tara Kartha, *'The Weaponisation of Afghanistan'*, Strategic Analysis, IDSA, Jan-Feb 1997

11. Op. cit. (p.183)
12. Edgar O'Ballance. *Afghan Wars 1839-1992*. Brassey's, London, 1992.
13. Ibid. (p.p. 54-55)
14. Michael O'Dwyer, *India as I Knew it. 1885-1925'*, Mittal Publications, 1988 (Reprint). (p.p. 271-273)
15. Sarvepalli Gopal, *Jawaharlal Nehru, A Biography, Volume One'*, Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1975. (p.343). The next two quotes are from Volume Two (p. 128), and Volume Three (p.198)
16. Ayesha Jalal. *The State of Martial Rule*, Cambridge University Press, 1990. (p.50)
17. Ibid. (p.55)
18. Ibid. (p.54)

## SUMMARY OF DISCUSSIONS

The Seminar has been very timely. The security environment to the North-West of India is in a state of flux. Afghanistan is in a state of disorder and perpetual turmoil with quick-silver fast changing alliances. Many powerful external actors have developed vested interests in Central Asia and have their fingers in the pie. The disorder and turmoil could spill over to the adjoining countries, and become unmanageable. This has serious implications for India.

The observations/questions raised by a very large number of well informed participants were wide ranging and pertinent. These enabled the Chairman and the main speakers to go deeper into the subject and bring out their own personal experiences and observations. The picture that emerged was blurred. It called for India to keep a close watch over the developments, to keep its options open without being waylaid by the western media and to pursue a proactive but low key policy aimed at promoting and harmonising its long term interests keeping in view those of Pakistan, Afghanistan and the Central Asian countries. The discussions were animated and lively. A general consensus emerged on the following lines :-

- The ancestors of more than half the population of India have come from Central Asia. Linkages of geography, culture, security and economy have bound India and Central Asia through all vicissitudes of history.
- In Central Asia, the term Muslim denotes not a denominational, but ethno-cultural category. Here Islam has its own history, one for the nomadic economic management way of life and another for Islam in its sacred connotation.
- Higher Islam or Institutional Islam is the one that is projected by the ulemas, and is much influenced by Arab Islam. Popular Islam or Majhar Islam in Central Asia even now is much under the influence of pre-Islamic Hindu-Buddhist practices. The source of true Islam lies really in the memories which were really located in pre-Islamic terms.

- After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the cold war rivalry has been replaced by rivalry for the resources resulting in the resurfacing of religious issues, ethnic issues, nationalism, sectarianism, regionalism, tribalism etc in the Central Asian region.
- For a proper assessment of the situation in Central Asia and Afghanistan India should rely more on people to people contact and local press and its own intelligence rather than be way-laid by the Western media or Iran and Pakistan which have their own agenda.
- By the beginning of the next century, Central Asia is likely to be a central focus of economic, political and military conflict and the security environment in the north west of India is expected to be surcharged and volatile.
- Afghanistan is riven by internecine tribal rivalry and mistrust. The scene therein, after the fall of the Najibullah government is in a state of flux. It is very difficult to predict the outcome. The Afghans are known for the fluidity of the alliances they make.
- Afghanistan is incapable of resolving internal contradictions as these are trapped in the agenda of external powers. The CAS face the difficult challenge of how to deal with the dynamics of ethnic and regional realignments.
- The divided tribal loyalties of the Afghan society, with each faction supported by external actors may result in disintegration of Afghanistan if the civil war continues for long. This will have grave implications for the adjoining multi ethnic countries, namely Pakistan, India, China, Russia the CAS and Iran.
- The "Durand Line" demarcating the international border between Pakistan and Afghanistan exists only in atlases. It does not exist any more.

- No faction in Afghanistan accepts the Durand Line. A vivisection of Afghanistan on ethnic lines would have extremely serious implications for Pakistan as also India, Russia, China, Iran and the CAS.
- Pakistan is the principal external actor in the developments within Afghanistan. Pakistani influence stems from ethnic, linguistic, cultural, social, religious and sectarian factors as also the geographical and political realities of the cold war and post cold war period.
- There are more than two million Afghan refugees in Pakistan, which gives it leverage in sponsoring trouble. This also lands Pakistan with a liability, impacting its domestic economy, society and polity.
- Pakistani efforts to acquire "strategic depth" vis a vis India through increased linkages and influence in Afghanistan and CAR stand aborted.
- Export of narcotics is an imperative for Afghanistan - just to sustain its economy. There are over three million heroin addicts in Pakistan. The annual turnover of smuggling is estimated at Rs.10,000/- crores with another Rs.56000/- crores of narcotic smuggling. Compulsion to supply the food needs of Afghanistan is resulting in shortages within Pakistan, inflationary, pressures and foreign exchange crisis. Hence the importance of transit trade and oil pipelines from Central Asia passing through Afghanistan.
- Taliban is suspected to be a creation of Pakistan. It is now in control of 75 p.c. of Afghan territory not on account of its military strength and tactics, but by being successful in buying regional warlords and then wiping out their enemies.
- There is a real danger that Afghanistan may disintegrate. This spells danger of ethnic upheavals and transborder consolidations, threatening Pakistan.

- Afghanistan is in a state of flux. Powerful external actors have a vested interest in perpetuating disorder. This spells a grave danger to Pakistan, which by itself would be unable to stem the rot. Such a development will adversely impact India. This was partly foreseen even before partition in a different context. Lt Gen Arthur F Smith, the then Chief of General Staff, in a note dated 1 Apr. 96 on "Defence Implications of a Partition of India into Pakistan and Hindustan" had stated, "It was impossible to consider the strategic defence of Pakistan and Hindustan separately." The threat then was mainly from the Soviet Union. Now the threat could be an unmanageable refugee movement, and widespread disorder.
- The US interests in the Central Asian region are pragmatic and basically economic. It is making determined efforts to penetrate the Central Asian Republics and wean them away from Russia. It has kept lines of communication open with various factions in Afghanistan. A friendly regime in Kabul could be a spring board, a pressure point against Iran, India, Russia and also China.
- Iran has adopted a pragmatic Central Asian policy of guarding and advancing its economic interests through rail links and gasline.
- India commands much goodwill among the Central Asian States, among all factions in Afghanistan and also among a large number of Pakistanis. It should build upon these strands and make serious efforts to harmonise the mutual interests and outlook of all these along with its own - a sub-continental strategy to tackle and overcome present problems, shortcomings and dissensions so that the entire subcontinent achieves stability and prospers. This however would mean extremely difficult tight rope walking in the face of very stiff opposition.

## CLOSING REMARKS

R.D. SATHE

The Chairman, Shri R D Sathe said, it is my pleasure and privilege and duty to thank first of all all of you for having attended this seminar and taken such a keen interest in the proceedings.

The very fact that so many people wanted to speak and I had to cut them short is evident of the interest that has been evoked amongst the audience. But the interest in the audience has been evoked largely because of the fact that we have had five really wonderful speeches made by people, extremely knowledgeable people, people who have spent much time cogitating about the problems facing the country, problems arising in the countries who are our neighbours, countries which are a little further away. Their future impinges on us.

Yesterday. I had very naively said perhaps at the end of the session we would have some answers to whether Indian policy in regard to this area was on the right track or on the wrong track. I realise how naive my thinking was because as you must have seen that over the last two days we have trod upon a mine field of problems, we have perhaps not blown up any of those mines luckily and I think the discussions have gone through with great civility, great interest and if I may say with great erudition. So to that I can only say that I have myself nothing really to add to all that has been said. We have had people who think in terms of the past and those who think in terms of the future. It has been a blending of many thoughts.

As far as I am concerned, I dealt with this area in the late seventies and beginning of eighties. I was very deeply involved with one of the problems and which I would like to share with you.

When the Soviet Union sent their forces into Afghanistan at the request of the Afghan government', the Soviet Ambassador was sent for by Mr.Charan Singh who was the Prime Minister. Mr.Charan Singh, I do not think, was a great diplomat. But I have never seen an ambassador, his pride being taken off from an ambassador, in the manner in which Charan Singh took off. Now it was early morning.

I happened to be present over there. It was a joy to see because it was the gut feeling that came out of an Indian, an athlete who felt that something had been done which was against our interest. He was not deeply involved with foreign policy but there it was.

The United Nations was due to debate the issue at the General Assembly. Every two hours, three hours, Mr. Brijesh Mishra who was our permanent representative was ringing me up, to say that please let me know what I am supposed to say in the General Assembly on this issue. There was no government. Mrs. Gandhi had been declared the winner but the stars were not auspicious. She could not be sworn in till the 7th of January. Here we were asking for instructions from somebody, some government authority. We drafted the foreign office instructions to our representative as to what our role should be. This was the role which we thought India should take, the line which India should follow.

I personally took the telegram to Mrs. Gandhi and said Madam I need instructions very very urgently because we have to make a statement on India's position in the General Assembly. She said leave the telegram with me, and come back and collect it in the evening. I went again in the evening and said can I have that telegram. She said I am sorry but I have given it to some of my advisors. The telegram was duly given to me the next morning, quite different to what we had said in our telegram. I do not know whether Mrs. Gandhi even saw that amended telegram. She was so busy frankly with various other matters. But it was a beginning of what I would call one of our big mistakes that we made. But anyway all I have to say that Mrs. Gandhi did make amends for it when Gromyko came three weeks later, she fired him in the same manner as Charan Singh had fired the Russian ambassador. None of course was published. It will come out in due course. But Gromyko who normally was so thick skinned that nothing possibly could have hurt him, but that interview I think hurt him more than anything else.

I was delighted when all this happened. Ten years have passed. I now wonder whether what we did was right or wrong. I am still looking for an answer. I don't have it because the question was why this was happening. India and the Soviet Union were negotiating a



deal for 1.5 billion dollars worth. If India had taken a stand saying Russians get the hell out of Afghanistan, the Russians could have very well said no Migs, no guns, no tanks. What was India going to do. Did we do the right thing ? Did we do the wrong thing ? I still do not know. This is a kind of a mine field that I talked about earlier, when you discuss Afghanistan or any other case.

This is the dilemma and this dilemma will persist despite the wonderful speeches that we have had. But let me say this that we are all that much wiser today because we know that in foreign affairs, to guard our national security, there are no short cuts, there are no simple straight-forward answers. The answers lie in deep thinking, deep analysis, interaction of the people because what the common person in the street thinks is of greatest importance to the persons who make policies. I say this again and again, in the foreign office or in the Government of India our interaction with the people as a whole on these matters is virtually insignificant and this is one of our tragedies. May I once again thank you all for your support and your deep interest before declaring the Seminar as closed.

**REGIONAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT TO  
THE NORTH-WEST OF INDIA  
WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO AFGHANISTAN**

**SEMINAR : 21st - 22nd March, 1997**

**( Venue : Auditorium, National Film Archives, India )**

**LIST OF PARTICIPANTS**

- |                                 |        |
|---------------------------------|--------|
| 1. Shri RD Pradhan              | - CASS |
| 2. Shri RD Sathe                | - CASS |
| 3. Prof VG Bhide                | - CASS |
| 4. Air Mshl (Retd) YV Malse     | - CASS |
| 5. Admiral (Retd) JG Nadkarni   | - CASS |
| 6. Air Mshl (Retd) S. Kulkarni  | - CASS |
| 7. Gp Capt (Retd) SG Chitnis    | - CASS |
| 8. Brig (Retd) SB Ratnaparkhi   | - CASS |
| 9. Air Cmde (Retd) SV Dabadghao | - CASS |
| 10. Brig (Retd) NB Grant        | - CASS |
| 11. Wg Cdr (Retd) SD Karnik     | - CASS |
| 12. Lt Gen (Retd) RV Kulkarni   | - CASS |
| 13. Brig (Retd) AA Wagh         | - CASS |
| 14. Lt Gen (Retd) BT Pandit     | - CASS |
| 15. Shri MK Mangalmurti         | - CASS |
| 16. Maj Gen (Retd) A. Kaul      | - CASS |
| 17. Lt Gen (Retd) NS Cheema     | - CASS |
| 18. Shri VG Vaidya              | - CASS |
| 19. Dr. Pramod A. Paranjpe      | - CASS |
| 20. Brig (Retd) DA Paranjape    | - CASS |
| 21. Shri Prabhakar Khole        | - CASS |
| 22. Shri VL Date                | - CASS |
| 23. Shri Harish Bhargava        | - CASS |
| 24. Maj Gen (Retd) KS Pendse    | - CASS |
| 25. Lt Gen (Retd) Ashok Joshi   | - CASS |
| 26. Shri Dharmavirsingh Mahida  | - CASS |
| 27. Prof Mrs. KV Menon          | - CASS |
| 28. Cmde (Retd) BS Karpe        | - CASS |
| 29. Shri RK Seth                | - CASS |

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|-----|-------------------------------|------------------------|
| 30. | Maj Gen (Retd) A. Kaul        | - CASS                 |
| 31. | Gp Capt (Retd) S. Ratnaparkhi | - CASS                 |
| 32. | Shri PB Kulkarni              | - CASS                 |
| 33. | Miss. Aditi Biniwale          | - CASS                 |
| 34. | Col N. George                 | - CASS/NDA             |
| 35. | Capt M. Sri Kumar             | - CASS/NDA             |
| 36. | Lt AN Sabiki                  | - CASS/NDA             |
| 37. | Lt Cdr MK Singh               | - CASS/NDA             |
| 38. | Capt M. Kumar                 | - CASS/NDA             |
| 39. | Col Salil Prabhakar           | - CASS/CME             |
| 40. | Lt Col V. Dwivedi             | - CASS/CME             |
| 41. | Col BN Bhatia                 | - CASS/MITS            |
| 42. | Shri MA Sinare                | - CASS/R&D (Engrs)     |
| 43. | Brig RK Kukreja               | - HQ, Southern Command |
| 44. | Lt Col BS Hegde               | - HQ, Southern Command |
| 45. | Col PS Bhatnagar              | - HQ, Southern Command |
| 46. | Lt Col RK Nagaich             | - HQ, Southern Command |
| 48. | Col RU Misra                  | - HQ, Southern Command |
| 49. | Brig RK Kukreja               | - HQ, Southern Command |
| 50. | Lt Col AK Jha                 | - HQ, Southern Command |
| 51. | Col RU Misra                  | - HQ, Southern Command |
| 52. | Brig Malhotra                 | - HQ, Southern Command |
| 53. | Col NN Dogra                  | - HQ, Southern Command |
| 54. | Lt Col RM Sharma              | - HQ, Southern Command |
| 55. | Col PS Bhatnagar              | - HQ, Southern Command |
| 56. | Lt Col SM Abhyankar           | - HQ, Southern Command |
| 57. | Brig LK Malhotra              | - HQ, Southern Command |
| 58. | Shri HK Kapoor                | -                      |
| 59. | Dr MAH Siddiqi                | -                      |
| 60. | Shri SR Godse                 | -                      |
| 61. | Gp Capt (Retd) MS Rege        | -                      |
| 62. | Shri VG Kanetkar              | -                      |
| 63. | Prof Shrikant Paranjape       | - Pune University      |
| 64. | Miss. K. Khandke              | -                      |
| 65. | Shri HA Ketkar                | -                      |
| 66. | Wg Cdr (Retd) AT Thakur       | -                      |
| 67. | Lt Col AY Soman               | -                      |
| 68. | Capt (Retd) R. Vir            | -                      |
| 69. | Mrs. Meena Kulkarni           | -                      |

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|------|---|----------------------|
| 70.  | Shri MD Khandke                                   | -                    |
| 71.  | Maj Gen AS Narawane                               | -                    |
| 72.  | Shri MY Thote                                     | -                    |
| 73.  | Shri YV Pathak                                    | -                    |
| 74.  | Shri S. Mukerjee                                  | -                    |
| 75.  | Cdr (Retd) NN Sathaye                             | -                    |
| 76.  | Shri AV Bhagwat                                   | -                    |
| 77.  | Mrs. Mikki Seth                                   | -                    |
| 78.  | Dr. Arvind Phadke                                 | -                    |
| 79.  | Cdr (Retd) Arun Rao                               | -                    |
| 80.  | Mrs. Sulbha A. Rao                                | -                    |
| 81.  | Mrs. Saikat Datta                                 | -                    |
| 82.  | Mrs. Lata Chitnis                                 | -                    |
| 83.  | Prof Ram Bapat                                    | - Ex-Pune University |
| 84.  | Shri Sushant Sarin                                | - P.O.T.             |
| 85.  | Shri VP Vaidik                                    | - Senior Journalist. |
| 86.  | Shri P. Stobdan                                   | - I.D.S.A.           |
| 87.  | Shri HV Khatawkar                                 | -                    |
| 88.  | Gp Capt MR Naik                                   | -                    |
| 89.  | Wg Cdr Parganda                                   | -                    |
| 90.  | Shri SH Honawar                                   | -                    |
| 91.  | Brig (Retd) M. Prachand                           | -                    |
| 92.  | Mrs. K. Khandke                                   | -                    |
| 93.  | Mrs. Pratibha Malse                               | -                    |
| 94.  | Shri HA Ketkar                                    | -                    |
| 95.  | Vice Adm (Retd) S. Mookerjee                      | -                    |
| 96.  | Col (Retd) AK Moghe                               | - QMTI               |
| 97.  | Shri PB Sonawane                                  | -                    |
| 98.  | Mrs. RD Sathe                                     | -                    |
| 99.  | Ms. Mohini Moghe                                  | -                    |
| 100. | Shri Shridhas Loni                                | - Sakal.             |
| 101. | Shri VP Salunke                                   | - Sakal              |
| 102. | M.A. & M.Phil Students<br>to } of Pune University |                      |
| 130. |   |                      |